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Preface
In April 1988, the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board (ASB) issued nine
Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs). These standards address what
has become known as the expectation gap —the difference between what the
public and financial statement users believe auditors are responsible for and
what auditors themselves believe their responsibilities are.
The expectation gap SASs ushered in significant changes in some
fundamental and long-standing auditors’ responsibilities and audit require
ments. Specifically, these SASs were intended to (1) increase the auditor’s
responsibility to detect and report errors, irregularities, and illegal acts;
(2) improve audit effectiveness; and (3) improve auditor communications
with both financial statement users and those within an entity who are
responsible for financial reporting.
Members of the ASB and the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Division
recognized that SASs creating such significant and pervasive changes
would require periodic analysis and assessment to evaluate their implemen
tation and identify additional actions that might be necessary. Thus, on
May 11 and 12, 1992, in Charleston, South Carolina, a conference was held
to review the progress of the expectation gap SASs. The specific conference
objectives were to—
• Examine implementation of the expectation gap standards from the
perspective of practitioners and users of audit services to identify accom
plishments and needs.
• Identify emerging expectation gap issues.
• Stimulate research directly related to (1) the expectation gap SASs,
(2) issues that the ASB is currently considering, and (3) issues that the
ASB will be considering in the near future.
• Provide, through publication of the conference proceedings, materials to
enhance the quality of audit education.
The core of the conference was a series of commissioned research papers
prepared by leading academics that address specific expectation gap SASs
(see the table of contents). Each paper summarizes relevant research
concerning a specific standard or standards and reviews application of the
standard(s) in practice. Some authors conducted research pertinent to
the standard(s) specifically for the conference and reported the results.
The papers and related issues were discussed by the participants who
represented a broad variety of perspectives including auditing standard
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setters; national, regional, and local public accounting firms; the academic
community; financial executives, internal auditors, regulators, and inter
national auditing groups.
The conference proceedings identified a number of areas where the
objectives of the expectation gap standards had been accomplished, as well
as a number of areas on which additional efforts should be focused. In a few
areas, sufficient time had not elapsed to provide an adequate data base for
research. After the conference, the ASB’s Audit Issues Task Force reviewed
each paper and related conference discussion and, where warranted,
referred matters to the ASB or an appropriate ASB task force.
We are grateful to the conference sponsors who made this progress report
on the expectation gap SASs possible. Without their moral and financial
support, the conference would never have been more than another good
idea. We particularly want to acknowledge the commitment and efforts of
the authors of each paper. The extraordinary quality of the conference
papers demonstrates the talent and hard work of the authors and serves as
testimony that academic research can address audit policy and practice
subjects in a substantive and timely manner. We deeply appreciate the
authors’ efforts.
We also owe special thanks to those who helped organize and conduct the
conference. Don Neebes of Ernst & Young sparked the idea for the confer
ence and created the sponsorship group. Ray Whittington of San Diego
State University and Gary Holstrum of the University of South Florida
commissioned the research papers, worked closely with the authors as
they prepared them, and spent many hours editing the papers for these
proceedings. Jeanne Mebus-Summo, Technical Manager in the Auditing
Standards Division, ably carried out the innumerable administrative duties
associated with a conference of this size and devoted considerable time and
effort to the editorial tasks involved in the publication of these proceedings.
We sincerely appreciate the contributions of the conference participants.
Their comments, insights, and viewpoints stimulated thoughtful, objective
analysis of the progress of the expectation gap standards. Without their
dedication, the conference could not have accomplished its objectives.
Additional research on the implementation of the expectation gap SASs is
sorely needed. We believe the proceedings of this conference will provide
both stimulation and valuable perspective to those who are interested in
conducting such research. In addition, we believe that these papers provide
unique, informative, and readable educational materials for students of
accounting and auditing. Through the generosity of the sponsors, com
plimentary copies of these proceedings have been made available to each
member of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association
and to the head of the accounting program at virtually every college and
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university in the United States. We hope that the widespread distribution of
these proceedings will foster continued analysis, dialogue, and research
about the expectation gap SASs.
D a n M . G uy

A la n J. W in ters

Vice President,
Auditing Standards Division

Director o f Auditing Research,
Auditing Standards Division
June 1993
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The New Audit Report:
User Perceptions and
Implementation Issues
Henry R. Jaenicke, C.D. Clarkson Professor o f Accounting,
Drexel University
Arnold Wright, Arthur Andersen Professor,
Boston College
SAS No. 58 revised the previous audit report that had been in existence for
more than forty years. This paper identifies the primary objectives of
SAS No. 58 and reviews the research findings since its issuance to evaluate
the extent to which these objectives appear to have been accomplished.
Additionally, implementation issues o f SAS No. 58 are discussed based on
interviews with national office partners and staff. Finally, the implications
of the findings for standard setting and future research are considered.
The research results suggest that the new report has clarified the
respective roles o f the auditor and management. However, the audit process
is still perceived as unclear, and the role of reasonable assurance, GAAP,
and selective audit testing are not fully recognized and/or accepted by
users. Future research is needed to consider the most cost-effective means
of communicating intended auditor messages as well as identifying evolving
issues posing a potential expectation gap between users and auditors.
Implementation matters include choosing the appropriate opinion in
situations involving scope limitations, uncertainties, and GAAP issues;
other reporting issues; and providing additional information in the
standard report.

Introduction

SAS No. 58, Reports on Audited Financial Statements (AICPA, Profes
sional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 508), prescribed a new form of the
auditor’s standard report. The most significant changes from the previous
report were the addition of (1) an introductory paragraph differentiating
management’s and the auditor’s responsibilities, (2) language that explicitly

1

acknowledged that an audit provides reasonable assurance about whether
the financial statements are free from material misstatements, and (3) a
brief explanation of what an audit entails. The objective of the changes was
to improve user understanding of the auditor’s role by requiring that the
standard report explicitly address the responsibility the auditor assumes,
the procedures the auditor performs, and the assurance the auditor
provides. This paper has three purposes—
1. To summarize the research findings to date regarding the extent to
which the new auditor’s report has achieved its objectives.
2. To identify problems that practitioners may have in implementing the
new report.
3. To suggest ideas for future research in areas related to the auditor’s
standard report.
We do not consider the treatment of consistency and uncertainty matters as
addressed in SAS No. 58, since these issues are examined in separate
reports prepared for the Expectation GAP Roundtable.1

Research Findings
This section contains a review of the findings of research studies exam
ining the impact of the new report on the perceptions of various financial
statement users, auditors, and accounting faculty. Although there have
been a number of prior studies concerning the effect of various attesta
tion reports, the focus here is on research specifically addressing SAS
No. 58. Thus, the work is quite recent and includes both published and
unpublished studies. The review is organized by broad issues that are
addressed by SAS No. 58.
Responsibilities of Management and Auditors
As discussed earlier, one of the objectives of SAS No. 58 was to delineate
more clearly the responsibilities of management and the auditor. Therefore,
the revised report explicitly recognizes that the financial statements are the
responsibility of management, whereas the role of the auditor is to express
an independent opinion on these representations. Since the issuance of
SAS No. 58, a number of research studies have compared user perceptions
of the new and old audit reports to examine whether the report changes have
altered the message conveyed.
1 Choosing the appropriate report in the face of possible uncertainties is, however,
addressed in this paper.
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Kelly and Mohrweis (1989) provided a group of bankers and investors
with either the old or the new audit report and asked for their perceptions
on nine questions regarding areas of concern that prompted the issuance of
SAS No. 58. The new audit report was found to communicate more clearly
the responsibilities of management and the purpose of the audit to both user
groups. However, the slight changes in the new report to emphasize the
independent auditor’s report and the assertion that the financial statements
are audited (as compared with “examined” as previously expressed) had no
significant impact on views regarding the objectivity of auditors or that an
audit had ocurred. Corroborating evidence is provided by Geiger (1991),
who conducted a mail survey of banker decisions and perceptions in the
context of a loan application accompanied by the SAS No. 58 or the old
audit report.2 The level of confidence expressed in the auditor’s independ
ence was not significantly different across report formats.
In a national survey of bankers, Miller, Reed, and Strawser (1990, 1991)
also found that the new audit report increased awareness of management’s
responsibilities and the role of the audit. Hermanson, Duncan, and
Carcello (1991) sent a survey to members of the American Association
of Individual Investors. Eleven questions were presented in which there
were “correct” answers in terms of the message intended by the auditing
profession; of interest was the percentage of respondents providing the
appropriate answer upon receiving either the old or the new audit report.
Participants receiving the new audit report had a significantly greater
percentage of correct answers in evaluating the primary responsibilities of
management and the auditor than those receiving the old report.
Zachry (1991) surveyed the views of auditing practitioners and professors
as to whether changes in the audit report would improve user understand
ing. There was general agreement between the two groups. Respondents
believed users did not understand the old report and perceived that the
new report would improve overall understandability as well as clarify
the role of the audit. Beckman and Green (1991) and Beckman, Volk, and
Davies (1990) report the results of a study of student perceptions (surrogates
for investors) regarding the new and old audit reports. The findings
revealed the belief that the new report more clearly defines management
and auditor responsibilities.
Hatherly, Innes, and Brown (1991) examined the views of MBA students
in evaluating the current U.K. audit report or an expanded report analogous
to the SAS No. 58 opinion. (Participants also received a full set of financial
statements.) The findings revealed that those provided with the expanded
report perceived the purpose of the audit to be clearer; a higher level of
auditor independence; and management’s responsibilities more accurately
than those receiving the usual, short U.K. report. However, the current

2 Other opinion formats were also examined for a change in accounting method.
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U.K. audit report is not the same as the U.S. pre-SAS No. 58 report; thus,
the results are not directly comparable with other research studies reported.
In summary, the research to date provides consistent results indicating
that the new audit report clarifies that the financial statements are represen
tations by management. The role of the auditor in providing an independent
opinion is also more clearly communicated. Therefore, the primary objec
tives of the changes to the first paragraph of the new report appear to have
been accomplished.
Scope of the Audit Engagement
A major objective of SAS No. 58 was to clarify the nature of the audit
process and its limitations. Hermanson, Duncan, and Carcello (1991) found
that investors recognize more accurately the concept of “reasonable
assurance” with the new audit report, but there were no differences
concerning the notions of GAAS and less than 100 percent testing. Only
about half of the respondents realized the need for selective testing in an
audit. In addition, those receiving the new report were less likely to realize
that the opinion typically relates to more than one year.
Kelly and Mohrweis (1989) reported that bankers and investors perceived
that the new report delineates more clearly audit procedures than the prior
report. Even with the new report, however, users did not feel that audit
procedures were clearly defined, indicating on average a response of
“undecided” when asked to evaluate the clarity of procedures employed.
There were no differences in views concerning the level of auditor and
management responsibility to detect and correct material errors in the two
audit reports, which appears to be what was desired by the Auditing
Standards Board (ASB). The new opinion did not attempt to alter the level
of auditor responsibilities, but rather to clarify the audit process. Miller,
Reed, and Strawser (1991) also note that the audit report did not affect the
perceptions of bankers regarding the scope of the audit.
Hatherly, Innes, and Brown (1991) indicate that MBA students did not
perceive differences in the extent of audit work performed under the new
report but did believe there was a greater degree of judgment in selecting
audit procedures. Audit practitioners and faculty perceived that the
SAS No. 58 opinion would improve user understanding of the audit process
through acknowledgment of reasonable assurance and elaboration of the
scope of the audit (Zachry 1991).
The research findings suggest that the new audit report has clarified
the nature of the audit without altering the perceived extent of the work.
The apparent lack of recognition by some users of auditor use of selective
testing and responsibilities for comparative financial statements, however,
indicate potential areas where communication of the audit process could
be improved.
4

Assurance Provided by the Audit Report
SAS No. 58 altered the opinion paragraph by adding the provision that the
financial statements are fairly presented “in all material r e s p e c ts ."This
modification attempts to communicate more clearly that an audit opinion is
subject to a materiality threshold. The new report, as noted earlier,
intended to improve audit communications regarding assurances provided
through the opinion without altering the perceived level of auditor liability
and responsibility.
Hermanson, Duncan, and Carcello (1991) reported that investors
perceived more accurately that the audited statements are free of material
error with the new report but were less accurate in recognizing that the
financial statements are based on generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP). In contrast, Geiger (1991) found no differences between banker
perceptions under the new and old reports regarding the level of confidence
that GAAP had been followed and that the financial statements were free of
material unintentional and intentional errors. More important, loan
decisions were not affected by the report format. Kelly and Mohrweis
(1989) indicate users are marginally more accurate with the new audit
report in properly concluding that the financial statements are not 100
percent accurate.
In an experimental study, Anderson, Maletta, and Wright (1992) provided
a fraud and a bankruptcy case to auditors and judges. The materiality level
of an alleged misstatement in the financial statements was varied as either
marginally material or highly material. Attributions by judges of auditor
responsibility were not different across the two levels of materiality,
whereas auditors, as expected, assigned greater responsibility in the bank
ruptcy case when materiality was at a high level. These findings suggest
that judges may not recognize or accept the importance of materiality in
assessing auditor negligence for a business failure proceeding. In the fraud
case both auditors and judges concurred that the usual level of materiality
(e.g., 5 percent of pretax income) does not apply and a greater level of
precision is expected of auditors. Thus, the research findings are mixed
and not very strong regarding whether changes to the opinion paragraph
had any substantive effect on user perceptions regarding materiality or com
pliance with GAAP.
Kneer, Reckers, and Jennings (1992) examined whether the new audit
report would alter perceived auditor legal liability in an alleged audit failure
involving a management fraud. Investors participated in an experiment and
randomly received either the new or old audit reports. Furthermore, red
flags suggesting fraud were present or absent in the case used in the experi
ment. The results indicated that participants receiving the new audit report
believed the auditor was less liable than those provided with the old report.
Investors were sensitive to the existence of red flags and attributed greater
liability to the auditor when such factors were present. However, perceived
5

liability was lower for the SAS No. 58 report under both the red flag and the
no red flag conditions.
Kneer, Reckers, and Jennings (1992) also asked participants their views
on three matters relating to the new audit report: (1) management respon
sibility for the financial statements, (2) audit sampling, and (3) auditor
responsibility for fraud. Corroborating the research discussed earlier, they
found that investors attributed greater responsibility to management for the
financial statements under the SAS No. 58 report than the previous report.
However, no differences in views were present between the reports
concerning the extent of sampling and auditor responsibilities to search for
fraud. Investors strongly agreed that auditors cannot look at every transac
tion and are responsible for actively searching for fraud.
Kelly and Mohrweis (1989) found that the investors sampled believed
there was no change in the level of auditor responsibility under the old and
new reports. Bankers, however, perceived lower auditor responsibility with
the new report. Critics had contended that the revised report was an attempt
by the profession to lessen perceived auditor liabilities, which the ASB
denied. The findings of Kneer, Reckers, and Jennings (1992) and Kelly and
Mohrweis (1989), however, suggest that the revised report may be viewed
as a reduction in auditor responsibilities.
In examining this issue, Niles and Young (1991) argue that “responsibil
ity” and “liability” (legal) are not equivalent and unidimensional, as
assumed in prior research studies. They developed eight responsibility and
liability constructs from a review of the auditing literature and then used
these measures to examine whether perceptions vary with the old audit
report, the 1980 proposed report, or the SAS No. 58 report.3MBA students
with an average of seven years of work experience participated in the experi
ment, serving as surrogates for investors. The findings indicated that
respondents did perceive differences between auditor and management
responsibilities and liabilities, but beliefs did not vary significantly across
the three audit report formats. Furthermore, reponsibility and liability were
found to be multidimensional. For example, responsibility may encompass
factors such as discovery of illegal acts or the design/implementation of the
control structure. The lack of support in this study for a shift in views
regarding management responsibility with the new audit report is contrary
to the other studies cited earlier and may be attributable to the different
method or user group employed. Niles and Young suggest that a careful
study is needed of the intended messages to be conveyed by the audit
report along with research as to the most effective means of communicating
these messages.
3 In addition, Niles and Young investigated the effect of the presence of a management
report on user perceptions. They found that such a report fails to alter perceived
auditor or management responsibilities and liabilities.

6

In a survey of New York and American Stock Exchange shareholders,
Epstein (1992) solicited views on the usefulness and clarity of the auditor’s
report as well as the desired level of auditor assurance. In 1973, a similar
survey was conducted by Epstein, providing the opportunity to examine
changes in perceptions from the prior report to those of the SAS No. 58
report. A greater percentage of respondents felt that the new auditors’ report
was “somewhat useful” for investment decisions (30 percent) than the
previous one (13 percent).
The survey also examined shareholder views regarding the current
desired level of auditor assurance. Despite explicit recognition in the
SAS No. 58 report of the concept of reasonable assurance, 47 percent
indicated the auditor should provide absolute assurance that the financial
statements are free from material errors (51 percent responded reasonable
assurance was appropriate). These findings suggest that the notion of
reasonable assurance is still not widely accepted or understood by share
holders. A very high level of auditor assurance was expected with regard
to the detection of material misstatements resulting from fraud, with
71 percent of the participants expecting absolute auditor assurance and
26 percent reasonable assurance.
Miller, Reed, and Strawser (1991) found that bankers perceived the relia
bility of the financial statements and the likelihood that fraud would be
detected by the auditor to be similar with the old and new audit reports. In
comparing the U.K. audit report with the SAS No. 58 report, Hatherly,
Innes, and Brown (1991) noted that the expanded report had the ability to
influence user perceptions in several factors directly addressed by the
revised report such as management responsibility for the financial state
ments. However, the report also had “spill over” effects in altering views on
factors not intended. Specifically, users indicated greater confidence with
the SAS No. 58 report that the company is free of fraud, the auditor is
satisfied with the financial statements, and the audit adds credibility. They
caution that the new report, although reducing differences in views between
users and the profession in some areas, may actually widen the expectation
gap in others. Miller, Reed, and Strawser, therefore, suggested that the
report should specifically mention these other important dimensions.
Bankers and auditors participated in a study by Houghton and Messier
(1990), which compared the interpreted meaning of various audit reports,
including the previous unqualified report and the one suggested in the ASB
Exposure Draft for SAS No. 58. The findings indicated that the proposed
wording for the new report eliminated significant differences in meaning
present in the earlier report and, thus, resulted in greater ‘’shared meaning”
of communications. Houghton and Messier, however, noted that although
fewer differences in meaning occurred, this is not to say that the bankers
sampled were satisfied with the quality of the audit report message (e.g.,
whether additional information was desired).
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In summary, the research results are conflicting regarding the success of
the revised audit report in clarifying auditor assurances. Two studies
suggest that the explicit recognition of materiality has enhanced user
appreciation of this limitation, whereas two other studies revealed no
difference. Auditor responsibilities for detecting fraud were not perceived
as greater in two studies, and increased expectations were found in another
comparing the U.K. report with the SAS No. 58 report. Research regarding
perceived auditor legal liabilities under the prior and new reports is very
limited (two studies), with conflicting findings. Finally, the level of overall
auditor responsibility as reflected in the opinion was not perceived by inves
tors to have changed but, by bankers, to be lower.

Implementing the New Auditor's Report
The following discussion considers problems or issues related to imple
menting SAS No. 58 in several areas:
• Situations involving scope limitations
• Situations involving uncertainties and other matters
• Situations involving GAAP issues
• Other reporting issues
• Expanding the information content of the standard report
National office partners and their staffs from the six largest accounting
firms provided most of the specific implementation problems and issues.
Choosing the Appropriate Opinion
in Situations Involving Scope Limitations
Client-Im posed Scope Limitations. Paragraph 424 states that when
significant scope restrictions are imposed by the client, “ordinarily, the
auditor should disclaim an opinion.” Should the requirement to disclaim be
made absolute?
Audit o f Balance Sheet and Review o f Incom e and Cash Flow State
ments. (1) May an auditor be engaged to perform an audit of the balance

sheet but only a review of the statements of operations and cash flows? The
authoritative literature does not address this situation, which may occur in
a first-year audit of a previously unaudited entity. (2) If yes, what is the
appropriate form of reporting? May the auditor present two separate reports
(or a single, multilevel report) indicating the nature of the engagement?
4 Unless otherwise stated, all paragraph references in this paper are to SAS No. 58.
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(3) Should the response be different if the beginning and ending balance
sheets have been audited and the intervening statements of operations
and cash flows have been reviewed, or might readers be confused by such
an opinion?
Disclaiming on O nly Part o f the Financial Statements. A new client
made a change in accounting principle for which a cumulative effect
adjustment was appropriate. The lack of detailed accounting records to
support the beginning balance and the unavailability of the prior auditor’s
working papers prevented the client from being able to determine whether
the beginning balance had been calculated correctly. Accordingly, the effect
of the change on current operations could not be determined. (1) May the
auditor conclude that this situation represents a scope limitation not
imposed by the client? (2) Paragraphs 47 and 48 address limited reporting
engagements (balance sheet only), but do not address the situation in which
a complete set of financial statements is presented and must be reported on.
The second example in paragraph 76, however, implicitly suggests that the
appropriate way to report in that situation is to disclaim on the income
statement and statement of cash flows. Should the reporting guidance in this
situation be made more explicit?
GAAP Exceptions Accom panied by Scope Limitations. SAS No. 58
does not provide examples of the form of opinion to be used when there are
scope limitations (requiring either a qualified opinion or a disclaimer) and
GAAP departures (requiring either a qualified or an adverse opinion).
(This situation seems to afflict thrift institutions particularly.) Should such
guidance be provided?
Prior-Year Scope Disclaimer/Current-Year Clean Opinion. Paragraph
72 requires that the introductory paragraph begin, “We were engaged to
audit. . . ” when there is a scope disclaimer. Paragraph 76 provides examples
of reporting language when there are different reports on comparative
financial statements presented, but does not provide an example of a report
when audited current period financial statements are presented with prior
period financial statements on which a disclaimer of opinion has been
expressed because of a scope limitation. Should guidance be provided for
this situation?
Effect o f Prior-Year Scope Limitation Removed by Subsequent Evi
dential Matter. When comparative financial statements are presented

and the prior-year statements were qualified because of a scope limitation
(perhaps from the inability to confirm a specific receivable) evidence
obtained in the current year (such as the collection of the receivable) could
permit the auditor to issue a clean opinion on the current-year statement of
operations and cash flows. SAS No. 58 provides no guidance as to whether

9

the prior-year scope qualification could be removed in the current-year
opinion related to the comparative financial statements. Should such
guidance be provided?
Choosing the Appropriate Opinion
in Situations Involving Uncertainties
Distinguishing Explanatory Paragraphs for Uncertainties From
Emphasis-of-a-Matter Paragraphs. Paragraph 37 provides for a

voluntary emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph, and provides some examples
of when it might be appropriate: (1) Some practitioners find the provision
to be awkward and sometimes confusing, which may result in different
standards being applied by individual auditors. It may also serve to
discourage emphasis-of-a-matter paragraphs. Also, the examples in para
graph 37 consist entirely of factual matters. Some practitioners apparently
include comments that make the explanatory paragraph begin to look like
an uncertainty paragraph. Is further guidance needed on when to use an
emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph and on distinguishing its contents from
that of an uncertainty paragraph? (2) The awkwardness and confusion
referred to above may be particularly acute in the case of environmental
liabilities and development-stage companies. The SEC has also expressed
concern over the use of emphasis-of-a-matter paragraphs. In addition, the
absence of guidance on where an emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph should
be placed is an issue. A discussion of this question follows.
Distinguishing Scope Limitations From Uncertainties. The mean
ing of the phrase “by circumstances” in paragraph 40 creates the need to
determine whether the absence of evidence is the result of a scope restric
tion or of an uncertainty. Is the unavailability of evidence a “circumstance”?
Does it make a difference if evidence does not exist, on the one hand, or if
it exists but cannot be obtained, on the other hand? Jaenicke and Glazer
(1991) analyzed the guidance provided with respect to reports on investment
companies and broker dealers as set forth in AICPA Statement of Position
(SOP) Nos. 89-1 and 89-2 and concluded that if museums were required
by GAAP to recognize their art collections using fair values, an estimate
of fair value by museum employees, unsupported by specialists, unrelated
to the museum, would lead to the addition of an explanatory paragraph
to the auditor’s report because of an uncertainty. An “editors’ note” inserted
in the Jaenicke and Glazer article stated: “The editors believe that it would
be desirable for the auditing standards division of the AICPA to take
a position on the circumstances in which this analogy is appropriate. For
example, is the analogy appropriate only when there is no qualified
third-party appraiser?”
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Language for Uncertainty Disclaimers.

Paragraphs 70 to 72 provide
an example of a disclaimer of opinion resulting from a scope limitation.
Should a similar example be provided for a disclaimer resulting from an
uncertainty, as provided for in footnote 11 to paragraph 13?
Choosing the Appropriate Opinion
in Situations Involving GAAP Issues
Reporting When Pro Forma Financial Information Is Used to Disclose
a Subsequent Event. AICPA, Professional Standards (vol. 1, AU sec.

560.05) notes that occasionally a subsequent event may be so significant
that disclosure can best be made by supplementing the historical financial
statements with pro forma financial data giving effect to the event as if it had
occurred on the date of the balance sheet. In some cases, the pro forma
information is an integral part of the disclosure of the event. Paragraph 46
of SAS No. 58 notes that if these disclosures are not necessary for fair
presentation, they may be identified as “unaudited” or “not covered by the
auditor’s report.” SAS No. 58, however, does not address auditor reporting
when the pro forma information is both integral to disclosure of the subse
quent event and presented in columnar form on the face of the historical
statements: (1) Should such guidance be added to SAS No. 58? (2) Might
this be an example where an emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph describing the
event and the purpose of the pro forma information would be useful?
Reporting on Parent Company Separate Statements. For regulatory
or other reasons, the stand-alone financial statements of a parent company
are sometimes required to be audited separately. Normally, these
stand-alone financial statements would reflect a parent’s investment in its
subsidiaries using the equity method of accounting. The separate financial
statements may or may not be included with or as a part of the consolidated
(i.e., general purpose) financial statements. In other circumstances, if
investments in subsidiaries that should be consolidated are accounted for
under the equity method, the statements would not be in conformity with
GAAP. AICPA Technical Practice Aids (section 9410.05) indicates that a
qualified opinion would be required in this situation unless the parent
company’s financial statements are included with, or as part of, the general
purpose financial statements: (1) Could an unqualified opinion also be
expressed on the parent company’s statements if the general purpose
consolidated financial statements are issued and readily available, although
they are not presented with the parent company stand-alone statements?
(2) If so, should the auditor’s report contain an explanatory paragraph
identifying the special purpose for which the parent company’s financial
statements are prepared and refer to the coexisting consolidated financial
statements of the reporting entity?
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Liquidation Basis o f Accounting. Should the authoritative literature
provide guidance on whether a liquidation basis of accounting is GAAP or
OCBOA (other comprehensive basis of accounting)?
Reporting When the Financial Statements Are Prepared Using
Foreign GAAP or International Accounting Standards. In the

United States, there appears to be a growing demand for financial state
ments that are prepared in conformity with another country’s GAAP and/or
International Accounting Standards. Under present GAAS, a U.S. auditor
may follow SAS No. 51, Reporting on Financial Statements Prepared for
Use in Other Countries, and use the U.S. standard form of report modified
as appropriate because of departures from accounting principles generally
accepted in the United States. Alternatively, it would appear that the nonU.S. GAAP could be treated as another comprehensive basis of accounting
and the U.S. auditor could issue a special report under SAS No. 62, Special
Reports. Neither choice is attractive to issuers. Should SAS No. 58 be
amended to permit the issuance of a standard, unmodified report on financial
statements prepared in conformity with International Accounting Standards
or the GAAP of a foreign country or group of foreign countries?
Other Reporting Issues
Distinguishing a Financial Statement Audit From an Examination o f
a Forecast. Accounting estimates are often based on assumptions about

future events and circumstances, such as future cash flows from real estate
investments or future taxable income. Sometimes those estimates require an
auditor to evaluate evidence about the likelihood of income much further in
the future than would be permitted by the authoritative guidance on report
ing on prospective financial statements. For example, paragraph 225 of
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109, Accounting for
Income Taxes, permits an enterprise to project the existence of taxable
income as much as fifteen years in the future as a basis for eliminating the
need for a deferred income tax valuation allowance, whereas paragraph 45
of SOP No. 92-2, Questions and Answers on the Term Reasonably Objec
tive Basis and Other Issues Affecting Prospective Financial Information,
states that “it ordinarily would be difficult to establish that a reasonably
objective basis exists for a financial forecast extending beyond three to five
years. . . . ” Some practitioners believe that the line that separates an audit of
financial statements from an examination of a forecast is becoming blurred.
This could become more significant in the future if the auditor is asked to
report on new forms of information, particularly forward-looking and other
softer kinds of information such as is being considered by the AICPA’s
special committee on financial reporting: (1) Should the standard report
be more explicit than it is now about the “softness” of some of the estimates
12

in the financial statements? (2) Would additional disclosures in the notes
about the softness of accounting estimates be an alternative to explicit
auditor reporting about the softness of estimates? (3) Should auditor
reporting on “soft” or forward-looking information embedded in
accounting estimates be as an emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph or as an
uncertainty modification?
Reissuances. Some practitioners believe that the guidance in SAS No. 58
is limited with respect to reissuance of reports within the current period
(e.g., treatment for the addition or resolution of uncertainties and change of
opinion as a result of a subsequent event). Is additional guidance needed?
Location o f an Emphasis-of-a-Matter Paragraph. There is no
guidance as to whether a voluntary emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph should
precede or follow the opinion paragraph. An emphasis-of-a-matter
paragraph added after the opinion paragraph to disclose the loss of a
major customer after year end, for example, might lead users to assume
that the paragraph raised a question about an uncertainty or perhaps even
about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. Is more specific
guidance needed?

Including Additional Information
in the Standard Report
Including the Partner's Name in the Signature. Should SAS No. 58
provide specific guidance on whether, in response to a client’s request, it
would be appropriate to provide the engagement partner’s name below the
firm’s name?
Explaining the Work Done to A ssess Control Risk in the Scope Para
graph. The issue of whether the scope paragraph should include an

explanation of the auditor’s responsibility with respect to the client’s control
structure was debated at the time SAS No. 58 was issued. It was considered
again in 1991. On each occasion the ASB’s decision was not to change the
standard report; nevertheless, the issue remains. (A major justification for
not including language with respect to the control structure in the scope
paragraph is that it was preferable not to enumerate any specific auditing
procedures; otherwise, it would be difficult to know where to draw the line
in such an enumeration.) Some practitioners have suggested that certain
other procedures, such as obtaining client and attorney representation
letters, are so significant that they, too, should be enumerated in the
auditor’s report.
Reporting on Management's Assertions About Internal Control. If
management reports on its system of internal control over financial
13

reporting, should the standard report be modified to allow the auditor to
combine, in one report, the report on the financial statements and the report
on management’s assertions about internal control? That is, would one
combined report be preferable to two separate reports.

Implications of the Research
The research, in aggregate, does suggest that the revised audit report has
improved communications between the auditor and the users. The strongest
effect has been to indicate more clearly the responsibility of management
for the financial statements and the role of the auditor. The concept of
reasonable assurance has been conveyed more clearly as well as the broad
nature of audit procedures. Furthermore, the perceived extent of audit work
has not been altered. All of these effects of the new audit report were
intended in SAS No. 58.
However, research findings suggest areas where improvements in com
munications may be possible or where additional research is warranted.
The notion of less than 100 percent testing in auditing is still not appreciated
by users as fully as the fact that the financial statements are based on GAAP.
Future revisions to the audit report could serve to clarify these areas. In
addition, users indicated that although the new report delineated more
clearly the nature of audit procedures, the audit process is nonetheless seen
as ambiguous. Perhaps this confusion is inevitable given the technical
aspects of auditing and the inherent limitations present in describing the
audit process in a brief audit report. Educational materials provided by the
profession that describe audit procedures in further detail may be useful in
reducing the level of user ambiguity in this area.
The conflicting research results regarding preceived auditor responsibili
ties and legal liability under the SAS No. 58 report as compared with the
earlier report indicate that this is an important area for future study. Thus
far, the research on this issue is limited and exploratory. It is unclear, for
instance, whether different opinion formats affect user expectations regard
ing auditor responsibilities for the detection of fraud or the appropriate
application of accounting methods. How will the courts interpret concepts
introduced in the new audit report such as reasonable assurance and
management representations? Last, there appears to be either a lack of
understanding or consensus regarding the notion of “reasonable assurance”
in defining the auditor’s overall responsibility for ensuring that the financial
statements are free of material error. Further research is needed to examine
whether misunderstanding or low consensus explain investor views on
this matter.
Another issue concerns the most effective means to continue to refine and
adapt the audit report in the future. Previously the auditing profession has
14

largely considered modifications to the current report with limited or no
advance research. Another approach would be to identify the paramount
intended messages and then consider the most efficient and effective man
ner of communication based on auditor/user field research and opinions. In
some instances, user education may be the optimal approach rather than
revising the audit report, whereas in other cases alteration of the report may
be preferred. User involvement is essential to ensure that communications
are accurate and that the audit report is reflective of changing societal
expectations. Research can play a vital role in examining the efficacy of
proposed revisions to the audit report or efforts to improve user education.
In addition, research that identifies expectation gaps between auditors and
users provides an opportunity to consider revisions in auditing standards
and reports and/or efforts to educate or lobby user groups.
An additional issue worthy of future research is the impact of the
SAS No. 58 report on user decisions. Only two of the studies reviewed
examined whether revisions to the auditor’s report are significant enough to
alter user decisions; the focus has been predominately on perceptions.
Although user perceptions are important, ultimately it is vital to determine
whether changes in the audit report would have any impact on actions
(what has been referred to by some as having “practical significance”)
—for example, research investigating bankers granting loans, investors
purchasing stock, or the courts evaluating auditor culpability.
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Reporting on Consistency
Ira Solomon, KPMG Peat Marwick Distinguished Professor
o f Accountancy, University of Illinois
Jay S. Rich, Doctoral Candidate, University of Illinois
In this paper, we describe the history o f financial reporting consistency and
discuss the attendant audit reporting requirements. An overview is also
presented o f four streams o f accounting research relevant to financial and
audit reporting on consistency: (1) investigations o f auditees’ motivations
for accounting changes, (2) studies o f reactions of capital markets to
accounting changes, (3) studies that investigate how economic advisors
(e.g., financial analysts) and decision makers employ accounting change
information, and (4) studies that investigate auditing issues including how
auditors make materiality judgments when evaluating the impact of an
accounting change and among-firm differences in audit consistency report
ing policies. Subsequently, issues o f policy setting and research attention
are identified. Noteworthy among these issues are the meaningfulness o f
the distinction between comparability and consistency, the utility of and
conceptual basis for exception reporting with respect to consistency, how
auditors evaluate the adequacy o f auditees ’ disclosed justifications for
accounting changes, and various aspects o f audit materiality judgments
including among-firm differences and auditjudgment policies when there is
an accounting change with an insignificant current effect, but a potentially
“substantial effect” in future years.

Statement on Auditing Standard No. 58 (AICPA 1988) mandated numer
ous changes to the auditor’s standard report. One such change involved
the so-called consistency exception. Specifically, before SAS No. 58,
the auditor made an explicit statement in the opinion paragraph of the
standard report concerning consistent application of generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP). This statement was required whether the
auditor concluded that GAAP was consistently applied or inconsistently
applied. Post-SAS No. 58, however, the auditor is required to report in an
We would like to acknowledge the comments of our colleagues, Ivan Bull, Frederick L.
Neumann, and Richard E. Ziegler.
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explanatory paragraph, following the opinion paragraph, on an exception
basis; that is, the auditor makes an explicit statement about consistency only
when the conclusion is that GAAP was inconsistently applied and the
current financial statement impact of the change is material. The auditor’s
statement that consistency has not been maintained (i.e., taking exception
to consistency) still is not, by itself, to be regarded as an opinion qualifica
tion. Furthermore, it still is the case that if financial statement disclosure
of a material accounting change is inadequate, an opinion qualification
is required.
Using the changes introduced by SAS No. 58 as points of departure, we
discuss in this paper a variety of issues concerning consistency reporting.
The next two sections provide background by briefly reviewing, from both
financial and audit-reporting perspectives, the history of consistency and
scholarly research related to consistency. The fourth section identifies
several current issues of potential policy-setting concern as well as issues
that profitably could be the focus of future research. The fifth section
completes the paper by providing concluding remarks.

Background
Financial Reporting
As with many accounting issues, the history of consistency can be traced
to England. The corporate form of business had been restricted by the Bubble
Act of 1720, which was stimulated by widespread management speculation
and concomitant investor losses during the early 1700s. With the passage
of the Companies Act in 1844, however, corporations experienced a
resurgence. One provision of this later act, which was intended to provide
investors with some measure of control over management, required that
stockholders receive an audited balance sheet. Much of the demand for
consistently applied accounting principles has been attributed by historians
to extant and prospective owners’ increased desire to monitor manage
ment’s actions attendant with the rise of the corporate form of business
(see Chatfield 1974).
In the United States, prior to the crash of 1929, there was little regulation
of the content and presentation of financial reporting. Therefore, manage
ment could disguise unfavorable information by changing the underlying
accounting methods and procedures or, in extreme situations, omitting
unfavorable information. The potential for harm from these management
options was recognized, at this time, by many organizations, including the
American Institute of Accountants, the New York Stock Exchange, the
Investment Bankers Association of America, and the Federal Reserve Board
(see Chatfield 1974) and, with respect to accounting changes, was thought
to be greatest when time-series data were analyzed (Hendricksen 1982).
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Accountants, however, were split with respect to how to address this
problem. Behind this split was a controversy concerning what type of con
sistency was necessary. To illustrate, three different types of “consistency”
are distinguishable from the writings of the time: (1) usage of the same
accounting procedures and methods for related items by a given firm,
(2) usage of the same accounting procedures and methods from period to
period by a given firm, and (3) usage of the same accounting procedures
and methods by all firms (Hendricksen 1982). Some accountants felt
that “type 3” consistency (e.g., all inventories must be accounted for on
a first-in, first-out (FIFO) basis; all depreciation must be calculated on a
straight-line basis) was needed. Obviously, adoption of this position
renders many related issues moot, since any inconsistencies also would
imply “inappropriate” accounting.
Other accountants felt that given the variety of circumstances surround
ing different companies, the diversity of current practice and the variety of
uses of financial information, the auditee should be given some latitude to
select appropriate methods or procedures from those deemed acceptable as
long as the methods or procedures selected were disclosed. In 1932, the
American Institute of Accountants’ Special Committee on Cooperation
with Stock Exchanges brought closure to this debate by recommending
the latter position (Chatfield 1974). Thereafter, “types 1 and 2” became the
foci of financial-reporting consistency, whereas type 3 became known as
“uniformity,” and was excluded from the consistency umbrella. Although the
consistency concept was refined as a consequence of this recommendation,
at this time, neither interperiod consistency nor disclosure of accounting
procedures or methods was made a financial-reporting requirement.1
Policy-setting bodies did not devote significant attention to financialreporting consistency again until the 1970s. Specifically, in 1971, the
Accounting Principles Board (APB) released Opinion No. 20 (FASB 1985)
that prescribes GAAP for accounting changes. This pronouncement first
defined different types of accounting changes (e.g., estimates, reporting
entity, principle) and then focused on changes in accounting principle.
Such accounting principle changes were limited to substitutions of
one generally accepted procedure or method (which is preferred) for
another generally accepted procedure or method. Since the early 1970s,
therefore, if material changes were not accounted for and disclosed as
prescribed, the resulting financial statements would not conform to GAAP.
Furthermore, APB Opinion No. 22 set forth requirements for disclosure of
significant accounting policies in financial statement notes (FASB 1985).
Approximately forty years passed, therefore, between refinement of the
1 Curiously, George O. May was the chair of both the committee that recommended
types 1 and 2 be the foci of financial-reporting consistency and the American Institute
of Accountants’ Committee on Accounting Procedures, which failed to adopt such
consistency as a requirement for financial reporting (see Chatfield 1974).
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consistency concept and adoption of companion requirements for financialreporting disclosure.2
The Auditor's Report
Despite some early examples of acceptable reports provided by the
Federal Reserve Board in 1917 and 1929, the U.S. auditor’s report was
unstandardized until 1933. The first standardized report incorporated the
phrase “.. .in accordance with accepted principles of accounting con
sistently maintained by the company during the year under review” (see
Chatfield 1974).3 Further, as with financial-reporting requirements, the
American Institute of Accountants (1934) excluded “uniformity” from the
audit concept of consistency by stating:
Without the doctrine of consistency and with alternative accounting
procedures available, a company—like a juggler—may increase
periodic income in lean years and decrease it in fat years by select
ing from the alternative methods available the method which
produces the periodic income management wants. It is to prevent
company manipulation smoothing of periodic income that the
doctrine of consistency is directed.
Although significant changes were made to the standard auditor’s report
in 1939,1941, and 1948, the requirement to report on consistency effectively
was invariant during the approximately fifty-year period leading up to
SAS No. 58.4 The pre-SAS No. 58 second reporting standard of generally
accepted auditing standards (GAAS) describes this requirement: The report
shall state whether such principles have been consistently observed in the
current period in relation to the preceding period (AICPA 1987).
With SAS No. 58, the second reporting standard of GAAS was modified
to reflect the exception-reporting responsibility described in the opening
paragraph of this paper: The report shall identify those circumstances in

2 In addition, note that consistency has received attention from the Financial Account
ing Standards Board in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 (Qualitative
Characteristics o f Accounting Information, FASB 1980).
3 We were unable to find an explicit rationale for including consistency in the standard
auditor’s report. However, the financial-reporting environment of the time and
specifically, the aforementioned absence of a requirement for consistency, may
provide the best explanation.
4 It should be noted that, as discussed further below, the Auditing Standards Board did
attempt to change the treatment of consistency in the auditor’s report in 1980 but
ultimately withdrew the proposal. The proposal, at that time, was based on logic
similar to that behind SAS No. 58 and called for complete elimination of consistency
exceptions in the auditor’s report (see AICPA 1981; Geiger 1989).
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which such principles have not been consistently observed in the current
period in relation to the preceding period (AICPA 1991). Again, such a
statement, by itself, is not considered to be a qualified opinion and to make
this position more salient, the consistency exception now is made in an
explanatory paragraph rather than commingled with the opinion. However,
if the auditor is not satisfied with the appropriateness of the method or
procedure to which the auditee changed, with management’s disclosed
justification for making the change, or any other aspect of compliance
with APB No. 20 (FASB 1985), a qualified or an adverse opinion should
be issued.
The motivations for this audit report change (and concomitant change to
GAAS) seem to have been twofold. First, as suggested by the Commission
on Auditors’ Responsibilities (1978), any reference to consistency in the
auditor’s report effectively may be viewed as the origination, rather than
evaluation, of a financial statement assertion. Such assertion origination is
inconsistent with the role of the auditor as an attester to financial statement
assertions. Second, the audit report reference would seem to be redundant
in light of the GAAP requirement to disclose accounting changes and their
impact (Landsittel 1987).
Nonetheless, as with the failed attempt to change the auditor’s report in
1980 (see footnote 3) the SEC favored maintenance of the status quo,
apparently for two reasons.5 First, the SEC feared that removing the
reference to consistency from the standard auditor’s report might result in
a diminution of audit attention to consistency issues. Second, the SEC felt
that the consistency exception served as a “red flag” for financial statement
users. Eventually, however, the SEC agreed to remove the consistency
reference from the standard auditor’s report, but insisted on the exception
reporting contained in SAS No. 58. Interestingly, this change could be
instituted without modification of Regulation S-X.

Accounting Research
Four streams of accounting research seem relevant to the issue of
consistency and are discussed in this section. The largest of these literature
streams contains investigations of auditees’ motivations for accounting
changes. The most prevalent finding has been that changes are made to
increase net income (e.g., Neumann 1968; Cushing 1969; Frishkoff 1970;
Shank and Copeland 1973; Bremser 1975; Schwartz 1982; Johnson and
Dhaliwal 1988; Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler 1989) or as a response to

5 These explanations were obtained by personal communication in January 1992 with
Dr. Robert W. Rouse, an SEC Research fellow.
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poor performance trends (e.g., Bremser 1975; Lilien, Mellman, and
Pastena 1988). Other studies, however, suggest that accounting changes are
motivated by a variety of factors including an intolerance of ambiguity (e.g.,
Sorter, Becker, Archibald, and Beaver 1964) and a desire for tax savings
(e.g., Morse and Richardson 1983; Dopuch and Pincus 1988).
Similarly, studies motivated from a positive accounting theory perspec
tive have reported that accounting changes are introduced to increase
management compensation (e.g., Eggleton, Penman, and Twombly 1976;
Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Abdel-khalik 1985; Harrison and Grudnitski
1987; Healy, Kong and Palepu 1987; Abdel-khalik, Chi and Ghicas 1987),
to avoid debt covenant violations (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1978;
Dhaliwal 1980; Holthausen 1981; Daley and Vigeland 1983; Hunt 1985;
Harrison and Grudnitski 1987; Johnson and Dhaliwal 1988; Johnson and
Ramanan 1988) and to mitigate political or regulatory costs (e.g., Gosman
1973; Cushing and Deakin 1974; Bremser 1975; Eggleton, Penman and
Twombly 1976; Warren 1977; Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Morse and
Richardson 1983; Ricks 1986).
A second stream of research has investigated the reaction of capital
markets to accounting changes. This study assumed a model for market
efficiency (Fama 1970) with the capital asset pricing model as a framework
(Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965) to investigate the effect of accounting changes
on firms’ market returns. Initial studies tested the information content of
accounting change disclosures themselves and concluded that little infor
mation was conveyed therein (Comiskey 1971; Kaplan and Roll 1972;
Archibald 1972; Ball 1972; Baskin 1972).6 Research interest subsequently
shifted to changes involving last-in, first-out (LIFO) since these changes
affected cash flows. For example, Sunder (1973) concluded that firms that
switched from FIFO to LIFO experienced positive cumulative abnormal
returns in the switch years. However, this intuitively appealing result has
not been replicated consistently, as some subsequent studies have reported
no or even negative abnormal returns for firms that switched to LIFO
(e.g., Abdel-khalik and McKeown 1978; Brown 1980; Ricks 1982, 1986)
whereas others (e.g., Biddle and Lindahl 1982; Stevenson 1987) supported
the initial finding of positive abnormal returns.
One study has investigated the informativeness of audit report con
sistency exceptions rather than the effect of accounting changes on firms’
market returns. Specifically, Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler (1989)
examined the ability of consistency exceptions to signal firm failure. For
two of the three models tested, they reported that consistency exceptions
were correlated with future firm failure. Although these authors did not
offer a theory that would explain their results, it may be that such results are

6 However, this conclusion is based on failure to reject the null hypothesis.
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simply further evidence that changing firms generally are less successful
than nonchangers (see Lilien, Mellman, and Pastena 1988).
A third stream of accounting change research more directly adopted the
perspective of financial statement users. In an early study, McCosh (1967)
described a computer simulation investigating the value of consistency for
time-series comparability. Using a dynamic, multiperiod model that
employed both economic and cash flow data (e.g., units of raw material
purchased, average price of raw material, number of labor hours, average
sales price) and accounting policy data (e.g., inventory pricing, inventory
costing, depreciation, management bonuses) McCosh (1967) studied
eamings-per-share (EPS) numbers produced from the same set of
economic data for two different sets of accounting policy data. Using
perfect comparability (i.e., the same accounting policy data for both sets)
as the baseline, six different levels of consistency were simulated to
determine how much of the variance in the EPS numbers of one set could
be explained by the EPS numbers for the other set. The results indicated
that consistent application, no matter how diverse the accounting methods
may be, resulted in EPS numbers that explained the vast majority of the
variance in the other set’s EPS numbers (97.12 percent in this simulation).
Furthermore, the ability to explain the variance of the EPS figures of
another set rapidly declined as the accounting policy data were applied
more and more inconsistently. Consistent application of accounting
methods, therefore, would appear to capture a great deal of the effect of
environmental factors on the firm.
More recently, a number of studies have reported that financial analysts
experience relatively greater difficulty in forming forecasts in the presence
of accounting changes than they do when changes are not present
(e.g., Ricks and Hughes 1985; Hughes and Ricks 1986; Biddle and Ricks
1988; Elliott and Philbrick 1990). Ricks and Hughes, for example, inves
tigated situations in which firms changed from the cost to the equity method
of accounting for long-term investments and found that analysts’ forecasts
displayed systematic errors. Furthermore, these errors were positively
correlated with the current-year earnings effect of the change. Hughes and
Ricks and Biddle and Ricks reported similar results for firms adopting
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 34 (FASB 1979) and firms
changing to LIFO, respectively. Similarly, in a study covering a wide
variety of accounting changes and employing a research design in which a
given firm, in a nonchange period, acted as its own control, Elliott and
Philbrick noted that, in change periods, the absolute forecast error and
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts were significantly greater than in non
change periods. Furthermore, the within-year dispersion was correlated
with the absolute value of the income effect of the accounting change.
Researchers have also addressed the possibility that users of accounting
information become functionally fixated and thus, do not properly adjust
their decision processes when accounting changes are made. Both changes
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in inventory flow (Dyckman 1964a, b; Bruns 1965; Dopuch and Ronen
1973) and costing assumptions (Ijiri, Jaedicke, and Knight 1966; Ashton
1976; Swieringa, Dyckman, and Hoskin 1979; Dyckman, Hoskin, and
Swieringa 1982; Barnes and Webb 1986) have been investigated primarily
with inexperienced, student subjects.7 Each study can be interpreted as
suggesting that decision makers exhibit some degree of functional fixation.
These studies typically require the use of one decision process over a
number of trials and then observe the extent of failure to alter the process
when data are presented that are based on different accounting methods or
procedures (e.g., cost of goods sold calculated under full instead of direct
costing of inventories). In practice, however, financial statement users
would appear to possess at least two advantages over these experimental
subjects that may enhance one’s ability to avoid functional fixation. First, in
practice, users should be more cognizant of the impact of inconsistent data
on decision inputs. Second, accounting changes, in practice, are high
lighted by disclosures that, typically, have been rather limited in these
studies. The study by Swieringa, Dyckman, and Hoskin is the only one that
investigated the effect that disclosures of method changes may have on the
decision processes of information users. Unfortunately, design weaknesses
made the results of the study difficult to interpret. Consequently, additional
research is needed with respect to the ability of method change disclosures
to mitigate such functional fixation.
A final stream of change research focused on auditing issues. A number
of studies, for example, addressed the materiality thresholds associated
with consistency exceptions. Results indicate a lack of consensus among
auditing firms (Neumann 1969) with some firms apparently using material
ity thresholds as high as 25 percent of net income, whereas others used very
small materiality thresholds (Frishkoff 1970).8 In a more recent study,
Morris and Nichols (1988) reported evidence that consistency exception
materiality decision models vary considerably among CPA firms and that
such decisions are of significantly differential predictability. On a more
positive note, another recent study by Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler (1989)
noted that few audit reports were issued without a consistency exception
when accounting changes affected net income by more than 4 percent.
Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler also noted that discretionary changes (those
made absent of a regulatory stimulus) were more likely to result in
consistency exceptions than were nondiscretionary changes.

7 The study by Barnes and Webb (1986) is a notable exception, using actual business
managers as subjects.
8 These results should be interpreted with caution because they may be a function
of low net incomes. This possibility is supported by studies (e.g., Lilien, Mellman,
and Pastena 1988) indicating that change firms tend to be less successful than
nonchange firms.
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Other studies attempted to investigate if audit firms have differential
propensities to include consistency exceptions in their reports. Both
Gosman (1973) and Cushing and Deakin (1974) concluded that Coopers &
Lybrand issued significantly fewer consistency exceptions than several
other auditing firms.9Interestingly, although both of these studies suggested
that CPA-firm client portfolio differences may account for this finding, no
evidence was reported to support that attribution. In a follow-up study,
Warren (1977) failed to identify any significant auditor differences using a
similar analysis. Consequently, at present there is not closure with respect
to CPA-firm propensities to issue consistency exception reports.

Current Issues
The preceding discussion of the evolution of financial and audit reporting
requirements and accounting and auditing research related to consistency
suggests numerous issues of contemporary import. In this section, a sample
of these issues is described from the policy-setting and research perspectives.
Perhaps the most striking issue relates to the objective of the standard
itself and the distinction drawn in APB Opinion No. 20 (FASB 1985)
between comparability and consistency. APB Opinion No. 20 distinguishes
between comparability and consistency by stating that all accounting
changes that affect consistency also affect comparability, but some account
ing changes affect comparability but not consistency. For example, some
accounting changes were described as a normal part of the accounting
process (e.g., changes in estimates of useful lives of depreciable assets) and
thus, were deemed to be outside of the domain of financial-reporting
consistency. If, however, the primary objective of accounting consistency is
to facilitate users’ abilities to make within-firm intertemporal comparisons,
the comparability-consistency distinction may be meaningless. To the
extent that changes affecting comparability but not consistency are treated
differently, the potential for harm exists. For example, if higher materiality
thresholds were used for changes that affect comparability relative to
changes that affect consistency, holding the income effect of the change
constant, some of the former type may not be disclosed, whereas disclosure
would be made if the change were of the latter type. Attempting to legislate
that some accounting changes effectively “do not matter” or matter less
because, for example, they are a normal part of the accounting process,
seems to miss the point. If information produced by accounting methods
or procedures that have materially changed is employed, irrespective

9 Note that the studies by Gosman (1973) and Cushing and Deakin (1974) were based
on the same data set.
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of the motivation for and nature of such changes, users need to be able to
identify their effect or users’ intertemporal decision making could be
adversely affected.
Interestingly, two surveys (Bird 1969; Carpenter and Strawser 1972) have
suggested that one class of users (financial analysts) would like the scope of
the consistency standard to be extended. These survey results suggest that
there is a demand for retroactive restatements of the financial statements for
all material changes (i.e., change in principle, change in estimate, change
in entity, and correction of error) rather than just those changes that APB
Opinion No. 20 identifies as affecting consistency. Admittedly, however,
these survey results are twenty years old and it would seem appropriate for
them to be updated. There is also some potential for harm associated with
the comparability-consistency distinction to the extent that financial state
ment users do not fully understand it. It is our view that some of the wording
within the applicable professional standards may contribute to a lack of such
understanding. For example, SAS section 420 (AICPA 1991) uses the term
“comparability” when referring both to the objectives of the consistency
standard and to audit reporting with respect to consistency. Subsequently, in
the same pronouncement, however, changes that impact comparability,
only, are defined to be outside of the scope of audit consistency.
Research may have a further role to play in better defining the needs of
users of financial statements with respect to consistency. To elaborate, in the
early 1970s, it was not uncommon to hear calls to develop better descrip
tions of financial statement users’ decision models (AICPA 1973). At that
time, however, behavioral research tools to elucidate judgment and decision
models were considerably more primitive than they are today. Consequently,
one potentially fruitful avenue for future research is to investigate by con
temporary behavioral methods (e.g., by analysis of verbal data [Ericsson
and Simon 1985] or in-depth task analysis techniques [Peters 1990]) the
models of financial statements users so that their consistency needs can be
determined scientifically rather than by a political process.
Another striking issue concerns the current exception-reporting require
ment (under SAS No. 58). Specifically, assuming that the aforementioned
logic (i.e., post-APB Opinion No. 20, GAAP requires consistency or
adequate disclosure of the effect of material changes) was the reason for
eliminating the audit-reporting requirement when consistency has been
maintained, the reporting requirement also should have been eliminated
when consistency has not been maintained. This symmetry argument rests
on the observation that, assuming adequate disclosure of the change, the
auditee has followed GAAP in both situations. In addition, when there is
inadequate disclosure of accounting changes, the consistency exception
would seem to contain little new information since inadequate disclosure is
a violation of GAAP, which is recognized by issuance of a qualified or
adverse auditor’s opinion. Even under SAS No. 58, therefore, the auditor is
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required to make what is a seemingly redundant disclosure. Further, the
auditor’s role as assertion attester still is somewhat intertwined with the
auditee’s role as asserter. SAS No. 58, therefore, did not fully address
the convoluted audit-reporting requirements related to consistency that
have been documented and so characterized for at least fifteen years (see
Commission on Auditor’s Responsibilities 1978).
As noted earlier, the cause of the asymmetric treatment is apparently
the SEC’s contention that the explanatory paragraph acts as a red flag
to financial statement users. Thus, for example, the exception taken as to
consistency in the auditor’s report is not a redundant disclosure, but instead
a signal by the auditor that, although he or she is not issuing a qualified or
adverse opinion, the user should proceed with caution. At first it may seem
that the auditor has little discretion with respect to including a consistency
exception in his or her report when an accounting change affecting
consistency has been made. However, because only material accounting
changes require such inclusion and materiality remains largely a judgmen
tal matter, considerable discretion is possible (see the related comments
below). This interpretation would be analogous to the one of Banks and
Kinney (1982) with respect to their findings on issuance of qualified opinion
audit reports in the presence of loss contingency footnote disclosures. It is
also consistent with the findings of Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler
(1989) for pre-SAS No. 58 consistency exceptions. Accordingly, research
extending Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler to post-SAS No. 58 con
sistency exception reporting would seem to be of value.
Another possibility is that, irrespective of the redundancy issue, at least
some auditors value the ability to draw attention to material accounting
changes in audit reports. One potential source of such value is that it may
be perceived as a means of increasing the auditor’s leverage with the auditee
(i.e., to induce the auditee not to make accounting changes) whereas
another source may be that it enhances the auditor’s ability to protect
himself or herself in the legal arena (i.e., it may make the auditor’s judg
ments more defensible). The SEC’s posture with respect to the SAS No. 58
exposure draft seems to provide some evidence that regulators share the
view that attention-directing paragraphs have utility (see Holstrum 1988;
Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler 1990). This view coupled with the research
finding that change firms are more troubled than nonchange firms also
may explain why some auditors have issued pre-SAS No. 58 consistency
exception reports even when the impact of the change was less than 4
percent of net income or even zero (Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler 1990).
Given the many possibilities, it would seem that researchers would be
interested in explaining the demand for this seemingly redundant dis
closure. Interestingly, many of the comment letters provided in response to
the two recent attempts (in the early 1980s and in the later 1980s in connec
tion with the SAS No. 58 exposure draft) to eliminate consistency from the
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audit report, were negative (see Geiger 1989).10 In particular, three of the
seven then Big-Eight CPA firms who responded to the SAS No. 58 exposure
draft indicated disagreement with the proposals and twenty-five of the
sixty-one total respondents who commented on the consistency issue
expressed disagreement, even though some persons regarded the changes as
“editorial” in nature (Elliott and Jacobson 1987). Unfortunately, the stated
reasons for the disagreement are varied and not informative with respect to
the genesis of the demand for audit report consistency exceptions.
Another interesting issue involves the judgment that an auditor must
make under APB Opinion No. 20 concerning the auditee’s justification of
an accounting change. Although controversy has surrounded this issue for
at least fifteen years (see Revsine 1977), we are unaware of any research
describing how auditors evaluate the auditee’s stated accounting change
justification. Although many accounting changes apparently are made
because of changes in regulatory requirements (e.g., a new FASB
pronouncement) and thus, are “preferred” by definition, other changes are
discretionary and, as noted earlier, are associated with a variety of circum
stances. Research would seem to have a significant role to play in elucidat
ing the factors that auditors consider when evaluating an auditee’s stated
motivations for making discretionary accounting changes. For example, is
there reasonable justification if an auditee makes an accounting change
(e.g., from FIFO to LIFO) to minimize taxes or, alternatively, must an audi
tee be able to justify the change primarily on conceptual grounds even
though there would be a positive income effect?
A final set of issues concern the application of materiality within the
context of consistency. First, there is something of an inarticulation within
extant professional standards in that SAS No. 58 seems to preclude issuance
of a consistency exception explanatory paragraph when the effect of an
accounting change is judged to be immaterial in the current period. AU sec
tion 420 (AICPA 1972, paragraph 19), however, seems to suggest that such
an exception is permissible when the accounting change is reasonably
certain to have a substantial effect in a later year. It would seem that clarify
ing what is and is not required or permissible in this respect would be of
considerable import. Also, little is known about how auditors make these
“substantial effect” judgments.
Second, studies have suggested that when evaluating accounting changes,
there is considerable diversity in terms of the materiality thresholds
employed both within and among CPA firms. In addition, there seems to be
substantial variability in terms of the decision models used among CPA
firms and in the extent to which consistency exception decisions are predict
able. Perhaps such variability is not unique to accounting changes but is a
10 A news item in the Journal o f Accountancy (AICPA, April 1981) suggested that
the proposed changes were withdrawn in the early 1980s because of cost-benefit
considerations.
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reflection of the general subjectivity of reporting materiality judgments.
Alternatively, it may be that the “problem” is more pronounced for
accounting changes. Researchers would seem to have a role to play here in
bringing evidence to bear on this issue. Indeed, perhaps this should be a
high priority since, in many respects, materiality may be the Achilles’ heel
of the financial and audit-reporting requirements on accounting changes.

Concluding Comments
In this paper we have described the evolution of the accounting
consistency standard from the perspectives of financial and audit reporting.
We also have provided an overview of extant research of relevance. On the
basis of these discussions, we subsequently derived issues of potential
contemporary interest to policy-setting entities such as the Auditing
Standards Board and to researchers. Major themes of our discussion are
that the distinction between comparability and consistency as well as the
auditor’s exception-reporting requirements under SAS No. 58 should be
reconsidered. The former recommendation follows from recognition that
financial statement users may well benefit from comparability rather than
mere consistency. That is, intertemporal decisions may be hindered by the
lack of information about accounting changes that affect comparability but
not consistency.
The latter recommendation arises from the asymmetry in treatment for
situations in which: (1) no material accounting change has been made, and
(2) a material accounting change has been made but is fully disclosed. In
both situations GAAP has been followed, but in the second situation the
auditor would be required to include a consistency exception in his or her
report. This requirement also continues to cloud the distinction between the
auditor and the auditee as some may feel that it effectively puts the auditor
in the role of an asserter. The potential contribution that research could
make to each of these issues also has been discussed. For example, the
needs of financial statement users with respect to consistency could be
elucidated by using contemporary behavioral research methods. Such a
systematic and scientific approach would seem to be better suited to that end
than a political approach. Last, research also could help to explain the
demand for seemingly redundant disclosures and provide insights into
how and how well auditors make accounting change materiality (and
“substantial-effect”) judgments.
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Reporting on Uncertainties,
Including Going Concern
D. R. Carmichael, Department o f Accountancy,
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Arizona State University
Appropriate auditor responsibility for evaluating and reporting on uncer
tainties, including the “going-concem status ” o f a client, has long been
debated. Most recently, Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) Nos. 58 and
59 were issued and deal with this area. In this paper we discuss the histori
cal development o f auditor responsibility for reporting on uncertainties,
summarize relevant research, discuss implementation issues, and suggest
future research.
In summary, our historical review reveals an increasing extent o f formali
zation o f standards on uncertainties in the United States, especially those
relating to a client’s going-concern status. Consistent with the auditing
profession’s attention to the topic, several studies seem to indicate that
investors depend on audit reports to highlight significant uncertainties. Yet,
especially in the area o f going-concern uncertainties, many companies
continue to receive a report not modified for going-concern status the year
prior to filing for bankruptcy. In addition, terminology used in the stan
dards (e.g., “going concern” and “substantial doubt”) currently may be
interpreted in varying manners by CPAs. Also, a number o f difficulties
involved in implementing the new standards are presented.

In this paper we discuss and analyze research related to SAS No. 58 and
No. 59 on uncertainties, including doubt about going-concern status. First,
we discuss the background of auditor responsibility in this area. Second, we
summarize relevant research related to uncertainties; our goal is to describe
the general nature of research approaches and the findings, rather than to
The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments provided by Jim McKeown
and Jane Mutchler.
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provide a comprehensive literature review.1In the third section, we discuss
implementation issues based on discussions with practitioners and obser
vation of practice. Fourth, we discuss limitations and implications related
to the information presented. Finally, we suggest future research issues
and conclude.

Historical Background
The auditor’s role and responsibilities in evaluating and reporting on
uncertainties, including the “going-concern status” of a client, have been
debated for some time. The evaluation issue relates to whether auditors are
better equipped than users of financial statements to identify circumstances
likely to impair a client’s ability to continue as a going concern or to identify
when an unfavorable outcome to other uncertainties is likely. The primary
reporting issue concerns whether, and, if so, under what circumstances an
auditor who is aware of an uncertainty should modify the audit report when
that uncertainty has been properly presented and disclosed in the financial
statements. Any audit report modification would then serve only the role of
providing a “red flag” concerning the company’s potential future problems.
Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) No. 15 represents the AICPA’s
first effort to consider formally the effects of uncertainties, including goingconcern uncertainties, on the audit report. SAP No. 15 suggested that the
cumulative effect of uncertainties may be so great as to create a situation in
which an auditor’s report might require an exception, or in which it might
not be possible to render an opinion. Subsequently, the SEC’s Accounting
Series Release No. 90 and SAP No. 33 required that the phrase “subject to”
be used to introduce a qualification of opinion when the financial statements
were materially affected by uncertainties. In 1974, the Auditing Standards
Executive Committee, the predecessor of the Auditing Standards Board, in
SAS No. 2, concluded that an uncertainty concerning ability to continue
should be reported on in the same manner as any other uncertainty.
In 1978, the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities (Cohen Commis
sion) recommended elimination of report modifications for uncertainties,
including going-concern uncertainties. The Commission concluded that a
responsibility to evaluate whether an uncertainty should lead to a qualified
opinion was not compatible with the auditor’s basic role. The auditor
should evaluate whether uncertainties are properly presented and disclosed
in conformity with GAAP and not attempt to reduce uncertainty by predict
ing the outcome.
1 Asare (1990) and Boritz (1991) provide very detailed summaries of the available
research on going-concern uncertainties.
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In March 1981, SAS No. 34 was issued. SAS No. 34 accepted the premise
that audit reports should be modified for going-concern uncertainties and
provided operational guidance to auditors on assessing a client’s likely
continued existence. Thus, rather than eliminate the “subject to” qualifica
tion, the Auditing Standards Board’s solution was an attempt to improve
practice by providing additional guidance. SAS No. 34 stated that although
an auditor does not search for evidential matter relating to an entity’s
continued existence, when an auditor becomes aware of information that is
contrary to continued existence, modification of the audit report might
become necessary. It also established procedures to be followed when such
questions arose.
One year later, in March 1982, the Auditing Standards Board, issued a
proposed SAS that, if adopted, would have eliminated the subject to qual
ification. The argument for elimination was based largely on the belief,
previously articulated by the Cohen Commission, that an audit report
should not be modified when the financial statements adequately present
and disclose an uncertainty in conformity with GAAP. In June of that year,
before making the change, the Auditing Standards Board held a public
meeting to obtain the views of financial statement users. Users attending the
meeting argued that the “subject to” opinion qualification was valuable,
and that its elimination would be viewed as an attempt by auditors to avoid
responsibility to investors. In June 1982, based largely on the views
expressed at the public meeting, the Board delayed the release of the
proposed SAS indefinitely. Subsequently, in 1986, the Auditing Standards
Board dropped its efforts to eliminate such reports, despite a consensus that,
contrary to audit reporting requirements, “a ‘subject to’ opinion is not
appropriate if a contingency has been disclosed appropriately under FASB
Statement No. 5” (AICPA Auditing Standards Board 1986). The Board also
concluded that a project to reconsider the auditor’s reporting responsibility
when a going-concern question arises might be added to the agenda.
Despite the Auditing Standards Board’s contention that properly dis
closed uncertainties should not result in modification of the audit report,
others have considered this to be an important function performed by
auditors. Going-concern qualifications have received the most attention as
necessary early warnings of impending trouble. Indeed, some have defined
an audit failure as a situation in which an independent auditor issues an
unqualified opinion and shortly thereafter the entity goes bankrupt or has
major financial problems (Berton 1985). Representative John Dingell,
chairman of the House Commerce Committee, stated succinctly, “the level
of busted audits has been too high and too spectacular” (Berton and Ingersoll
1985). In his remarks to Congress, Congressman Wyden (1986) stated:
In one financial disaster after another, including E. F. Hutton,
United American Bank, Penn Square Bank, E.S.M. Government
Securities, Home State Savings Bank of Ohio, American Savings
and Loan of Florida, Drysdale Government Securities, Saxon
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Industries and others, the disaster struck virtually on the heels
of clean audit certificates issued by audit firms indicating that
the companies were financially sound. The result? Hundreds of
thousands of investors and creditors were out hundreds of millions
of dollars.
Although informed observers might fault the factual accuracy of this
analysis, the popular press generally does not question assertions that
auditors are not providing the public with adequate advance warning about
the deteriorating finances of companies. Thus, in the mid-1980s, auditors
faced a “political situation” in which at least two key representatives
believed that not only were going-concern report modifications necessary,
but that auditor performance in issuing them needed to be improved. Also,
in 1985, one international CPA firm advocated increasing audit require
ments to include consideration of a company’s financial condition as well as
financial position. The distinction between position and condition was
intended to address specifically public concerns of business failures
occurring shortly after a company had received a report without a goingconcern modification (Price Waterhouse 1985).
The net effect of the Auditing Standards Board’s deliberations appear in
SAS No. 58 (all uncertainties) and No. 59 (going-concern uncertainties).
In both cases, the “subject to” qualified opinion is replaced with an explana
tory paragraph following the opinion paragraph. The guidance about the
need to add a fourth (explanatory) paragraph on uncertainties directly
tracks SFAS No. 5. When a material loss is probable, but no reasonable
estimate of the amount is possible, an explanatory paragraph is required.
When a material loss is reasonably possible, the auditor is to consider
whether to add an explanatory paragraph based on the magnitude of the
amount involved and the likelihood of occurrence.
SAS No. 59 requires auditors to evaluate whether there is substantial
doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern for a reasona
ble period, generally not to exceed one year beyond the date of the financial
statements being audited. The recoverability of asset amounts and the
amount and classification of liabilities is no longer the deciding factor in
whether to modify the report. Substantial doubt about a client’s goingconcern status is the critical factor.

Research
Importance of Modification
Stock M arket "Inform ation" Tests. Various studies, all dealing with
pre-SAS No. 58 and No. 59 data, have analyzed whether an “abnormal”
stock return reaction occurs when a “subject to” qualified opinion is issued.
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The overall approach, adapted from finance research, is one of using prior
stock market returns to develop an “expected” return. That expected return
is compared to the actual returns around the time of the issuance of a report
modified for an uncertainty. If the reaction varies significantly from that
expected, it is referred to as abnormal and the report is considered to have
provided information to the market.
The results using this approach have been mixed. The earliest studies
isolated no effect (Asare 1990). Several subsequent studies, however,
concluded that “subject to” qualified opinions had information content. For
example, Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1986) found a significant
negative stock price reaction when the media disclosed that a “subject to”
qualified opinion was to be issued. Also, Frost (1991), replicating an earlier
study by Banks and Kinney (1982), found that a small sample of firms
with “subject to” qualified opinions had more negative stock price reactions
than those not receiving such audit reports, although the difference is not
statistically significant at conventional levels.
A primary limitation of this approach is that knowledge of the type of
audit report to be issued often becomes available concurrently with the
release of the information in the financial statements. This makes it difficult
to isolate a true market reaction to the audit report. Because the company
involved may be experiencing severe financial difficulties, a lack of a
market reaction also may occur because investors expected such an audit
report well in advance. Assessing such investor expectations is, at best,
a difficult task.2
Survey a n d Experim ental Research. Survey and experimental
research on this topic either asks a respondent whether such reports are
desirable or gathers responses to a “case” situation that manipulates one
or more related variables. Shank and Dillard (1979) and Campbell and
Mutchler (1988) surveyed various financial statement user groups
and financial executives and found that they perceived the “subject to”
qualified opinion as useful. However, when users are placed in simulated
decision-making contexts, the results have been different. Libby (1979a, b)
and Abdel-khalik, Graul, and Newton (1986) provided financial statement
loan officers with financial statements that disclosed an uncertainty in the
notes to the financial statements. One group of respondents was provided
financial statement note information on an uncertainty, whereas the other
group received that note description plus a report modified as to the
uncertainty. Both studies concluded that managements’ disclosures of
contingencies with “subject to” qualified opinions had no significant
additional effect on bankers’ assessments of the riskiness of clients. The
2 Consistent with this limitation, studies by Mutchler (1985) and Dopuch, Holthausen,
and Leftwich (1987) have shown that going-concern modified reports can be
predicted relatively accurately using publicly available information.
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results of both studies are thus consistent with a conclusion that, for
the tested populations, uncertainty qualifications were unnecessary.
Subsequently, Pringle, Crum, and Swetz (1990) used a similar approach
comparing SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59 reporting guidelines and concluded
that for their (student) subjects, the new audit report format is primarily
a change in the form of auditor communication rather than a change in
the substance of the information being communicated. However, they
also report that the SAS No. 59 approach may have confused some of
the subjects.
In summary, prior research on uncertainties and going concern provide
limited direction for standards setting. Research relating to the usefulness of
“subject to” report modification is not conclusive. The available studies con
sidering the new reporting requirements would seem to imply that a similar
situation is likely to exist relating to the expectation gap requirements.
Relationship to Bankruptcy
Comparison to Models. The relationship between subsequent bank
ruptcy of a client and the issuance of a modified audit report has received
research attention, all of it using pre-SAS No. 59 data. One significant
limitation of such an analysis is that professional standards make clear that
going-concem-related report modification decisions are not equivalent to
bankruptcy prediction. The law literature has no parallel to a going concern
(American Bar Association 1987). SAS No. 59 provides examples of condi
tions and events that may raise doubt about whether an entity is a going
concern but, as explained in more detail later, does not explicitly define one.
Figure 1, adapted from Boritz (1991) presents the typical stages of business
failure in an enterprise. A “severe cash shortage” might lead the auditor to
conclude that a going-concern modification is necessary. Yet, subsequently,
management’s rescue actions may succeed and the company may regain
financial health. In such a situation, most would not consider it incorrect to
have decided that substantial doubt existed about the company’s ability to
continue as a going concern. Similarly, a company might fail due to a
sudden event subsequent to the audit. Bearing these limitations in mind,
a summary by McKeown, Mutchler, and Hopwood (1990) may be used
to measure auditor performance in this area. The results of that study
approximate and extend those of a number of earlier studies (Asare 1990).
As table 1 indicates, the authors divided their sample into “stressed” and
“nonstressed” clients.3
3 A “stressed” company exhibited at least one of the following: (1) negative working
capital in the current year, (2) a loss from operations in any of the last three years
prior to bankruptcy, (3) a retained earnings deficit three years prior to bankruptcy, or
(4) a net loss in any of the last three years prior to bankruptcy.
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INCUBATION

MANAGEMENT ATTEMPTS
RESCUE ACTIONS
• sale of equity or assets
• merger or acquisitions
• proposal or arrangement

MANAGEMENT
RETAINS CONTROL

RESCUE
ATTEMPTS
FAIL

RECEIVERSHIP

MANAGEMENT
LOSES CONTROL

BANKRUPTCY

REORGANIZATION
EFFORTS FAIL

Typical Stages of Business Failure (Adapted from Boritz, 1991)

SEVERE CASH
SHORTAGE

FIGURE 1

LIQUIDATION

TABLE 1

McKeown, Mutchler, and Hopwood (1990) Sample
Panel A : Companies That E ntered Bankruptcy
Stressed
Nonstressed

Modified
Nonmodified
Total Bankrupt

54
(46%)
64
(54%)
118
(88%)

0
16
16
(12%)

Totals

54
(40%)
80
(60%)
134
134

Panel B: Companies That D id N o t E n ter Bankruptcy

Modified
Unmodified
Total Nonbankrupt
Totals

Stressed

Nonstressed

Totals

4

0

4

(5%)
76
(95%)
80

80

156

80

198

96

160
294

In short, table 1 indicates that auditors modified their reports depending
on whether the company had substantial doubt about going-concern status
46 percent of the time for 134 companies the year before they filed for
bankruptcy. On the other hand, using a random sample of 160 companies
that did not file for bankruptcy, auditors modified their reports only four
times. Similar to the research on the information content of report modifi
cations, these results relate to the time period in which SAS No. 34 was in
effect. We are unaware of any such analysis subsequent to SAS No. 59.
These auditor success rates are also lower than a number of studies
that used bankruptcy prediction models (Asare 1990). The stress conditions
considered in this study are similar to those conditions and events that
SAS No. 59 suggests might indicate substantial doubt as to the company’s
ability to continue as a going concern. In a subsequent study, Hopwood,
McKeown, and Mutchler (1991) consider separately stressed and
nonstressed companies and the actual failure rate in the population of all
companies. Their results indicate that under those circumstances, the
auditors’ opinions are comparable indicators of bankruptcy as compared
with statistical models.
Self-fulfilling Prophecy. Some have argued that the issuance of a goingconcern modification is likely to be a “self-fulfilling prophecy.” The
argument is that the report, rather than the condition of the entity,
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may result in the failure of the entity. The casual observation that many
companies continue to operate after receiving such reports would seem to
indicate that such reports do not invariably lead to business failure. Indeed,
Altman (1982) found that in his sample, 75 percent of 213 companies
receiving going-concern qualifications between 1972 and 1978 did not go
bankrupt. Yet, one can visualize that for a small developmental company
needing financing, a going-concern report modification would make capital
acquisition more difficult.4
Going-Concern Decision Process. Recently, several researchers have
attempted to obtain a better understanding of the actual decision process
followed by auditors. These researchers have studied, in a going-concern
context, such psychological constructs as temporal sequence (mixing the
order of evidence presented to an auditor), framing (whether the original
assumption is that the company is a going concern vs. a going-concern
question), and considering the effect of experience on audit judgments
(Ricchiute 1992; see also, Asare 1990 for several references). The results at
this point are far from conclusive, but there is some indication that the order
that evidence is presented in does affect reporting decisions at least in an
experimental setting. Research on framing and experience effects in this
area have been even less conclusive.
Report Modification "Trigger" Terms Used
in SAS No. 58 and No. 59
The Auditing Standards Board struggled with identifying the point at
which report modification for uncertainties should occur. For uncertain
ties, SFAS No. 5 terminology, including “probable” and “reasonably
possible,” were retained without embellishment. “Substantial doubt” was
selected for going-concern modifications.
Probable and Reasonably Possible. SAS No. 58 suggests that the
auditor should add an explanatory paragraph when it is probable that a
material loss will occur, but management is unable to make a reasonable
estimate of the amount. When a loss is reasonably possible, the auditor is
to consider both the magnitude of the amount involved and the likelihood
4 Anecdotal evidence would suggest that the effect of an audit report modified as to
going-concern status might be quite immediate. One of the coauthors interviewed one
Big Six partner who recounted a situation in which he, as partner in charge of an
audit, thought “long and hard” about issuing a “subject to” qualified report to a client
that was seeking a loan. To his relief, the client’s management was “glad” to receive
the report because it would make clear to the bank how essential the granting of the
loan was. The report was issued on a Friday. The bank turned down the loan on the
following Monday, and the client filed for bankruptcy on Tuesday.
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of occurrence. As indicated above, these terms track SFAS No. 5, which
defines them as follows:
Probable: The event or events are likely to occur.
Reasonably possible: The chance of the future event or events
occurring is more than remote but less than likely.
The general nature of these definitions led to studies that required respon
dents to operationalize the terms (for example, see Schultz and Reckers
1981; Jiambalvo and Wilner 1985; Harrison and Tomassini 1989;
Raghunandan, Grimlund, and Schepanski 1991). These studies asked CPAs
to interpret the numerical meaning of the terms “reasonably possible” and
“probable.” All studies have reported significant variation in replies.
Average responses for “reasonably possible” are between 15 percent
(Harrison and Tomassini) and 42 percent (Schultz and Reckers). Slightly
less variation exists for the meaning of “probable,” which typically receives
a mean of 70 percent likely.
SFAS No. 5 does not suggest whether the consideration of likelihood of
unfavorable outcome and estimation should be simultaneous or sequential
in which the auditor first estimates the magnitude of potential loss, and then
assesses the probability of its realization. The studies have, in general, found
that auditors responding to cases generally do not follow a sequential
process, but make decisions considering materiality and likelihood simul
taneously and also consider “trade-offs” between the two.
SAS No. 58 explicitly includes a trade-off between probability and
amount of loss. That is, as the amount involved becomes more material, the
auditor is more likely to include an explanatory paragraph in the audit
report. Raghunandan, Grimlund, and Schepanski (1991) found that auditors
replying to cases did follow this type of a decision process.
Substantial Doubt. SAS No. 59 uses the undefined state of substantial
doubt as the triggering point for report modification. Knapp, Wallestad, and
Elikai (1991) tested a variety of situations asking 162 CPA respondents to
report the numerical probability at which substantial doubt occurs. On an
overall basis, the average reply was approximately 55 percent. Among the
variables measured was the respondent’s perception of the “likelihood that
an auditor of a failed firm will be sued.” Replies varied as follows based on
that perceived risk:

Substantial Doubt
Low risk of being sued
High risk of being sued

60.4 percent
48.7 percent

Similar to the earlier results concerning SFAS No. 5 terminology, there
were large variances in replies. (A standard deviation of approximately 18.5
percent exists for various groups of replies.)
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These results may indicate that the general nature of the SFAS No. 5
definition and the lack of a definition for substantial doubt lead to a
situation in which CPAs interpret the concepts differently. Yet these studies
have fairly significant limitations. All except Schultz and Reckers
considered individual CPA replies rather than replies arrived at through
group discussions comparable with the decisions of an audit team in a firm
environment. Also, all are affected by whether CPAs in practice think
in the quantitative terms elicited. For example, a lawyer assessing the
outcome of litigation responds in qualitative language: “The client should
prevail.” It is likely the auditor translates this directly to, “An unfavorable
outcome is remote.” The auditor does not think, “Ah, 20 percent must
be remote.”

Expert Systems, D ecision Aids

Two expert systems have been described in the literature (Biggs and
Selfridge 1988; Dillard and Mutchler 1989). The Biggs and Selfridge model
uses current liquidity and operating performance to recognize a goingconcern problem. The Dillard and Mutchler model uses a series of
suggestions, rules, and methods to make the going-concern reporting
decision. Both are at an early stage of development.

Implementation
Some implementation issues relate only to going-concern problems,
whereas others relate to all uncertainties, including going-concern problems.
G oing-Concern Uncertainties

SAS No. 59 changed existing guidance in the following key ways:
• Detection—There is now an affirmative obligation to make an assess
ment at the conclusion of the audit of the client’s ability to continue as a
going concern rather than to merely remain aware of the possibility that
the assumption of continuity might not hold. However, there are still no
required procedures that are especially or solely directed to searching for
conditions or events that would indicate a going-concern problem.
• Time Period—The focus of the auditor’s assessment of ability to continue
as a going concern is now tied to “a reasonable period of time” that is
explicitly limited to a period “not to exceed one year beyond the date of
the financial statements being audited.”
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• Evaluation—Previously the decision to modify the audit report hinged
on recoverability of the assets and recognition and classification of liabil
ities. Now going-concern status is a separate issue.
• Reporting—The “subject to” qualification, as mentioned earlier, has
been supplanted by a fourth explanatory paragraph for all material
uncertainties including going-concern uncertainties. However, use of a
disclaimer is still not precluded.
What implementation problems have these changes created, highlighted,
or exacerbated?

Detection. Although SAS No. 34 read as if an auditor had to stumble
over a going-concern problem before recognizing it, auditors generally
were well-aware of the need to evaluate a client’s ability to continue. Thus,
this requirement has had little effect on practice other than to increase
documentation of the consideration. Most CPA firms have adopted a policy
of including some routine documentation of the consideration of goingconcern status in the workpapers. This documentation may be limited to
checking off a box on a generalized form or including a statement in a wrapup or final memorandum indicating there is no concern with the client’s
ability to continue.
Time Period. Because the focus of the evaluation is on an explicit
12-month period following the balance sheet date, there are certain
implementation issues. One is generally referred to as the “15-month”
problem. This situation arises when the client is not expected to have any
financial difficulties for the next 12 months, but the auditor knows that
difficulties will exist within the following few months. For example, a client
that has recently undergone a leveraged buyout has a large balloon payment
due shortly after the 12-month period and will have some difficulty meeting
this requirement of the debt agreement.
SAS No. 59 does not acknowledge any need to look beyond 12 months
and, in fact, says the reasonable period is not to exceed one year beyond the
date of the financial statements being audited. Should that, however, be
viewed as an impenetrable barrier to consideration of a known financial
difficulty? Also, if auditors do begin to reach out to the next few months for
a known matter, might that begin to erode the reasonable limit on the time
horizon set by SAS No. 59? At this point, a practical solution generally
adopted has been to include an emphasis of a matter paragraph in the report
that highlights the financial difficulty problem. In this way, the financial
statement user is alerted, but the auditor has not extended the going-concern
evaluation into the forbidden zone.
Another implementation issue related to time period is the “dating”
problem. This problem may arise when the auditor is asked to reissue
an audit report. Consider the case in which an auditor is asked to reissue an
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audit report for the year ended December 31, 1991, prior to the conclusion of
the client’s next reporting year, 1992. Under current guidance on report dat
ing, the 1991 report is reissued with the original report date. This signals that
no auditing procedures were applied since the date of the original report.
The problem arises when the auditor is aware of new conditions that are
likely to result in a going-concern modification of the audit report on the
financial statements for 1992. In other words, because the auditor is satis
fied that the client will survive to the end of 1992 there is no requirement to
add an explanatory paragraph to the original report. However, the audit
report for 1992 is likely to be modified because of doubt about the client’s
ability to survive a year beyond the current year end.
Again, a practical solution is to add an emphasis of a matter paragraph to
the original report worded somewhat as follows:
As discussed in Note XX, “Subsequent Events,” subsequent to
March 10, 1992 [date of original report], the Company lost its major
customer, incurred significant operating losses, and defaulted on
the loan agreement with XYZ Bank. If these conditions continue,
it is likely that our report on the company’s financial statements for
the year ending December 31, 1992, will be modified because of
substantial doubt as to the company’s ability to continue as a going
concern through December 31, 1993.
By including the explicit date of the period for which going-concern
status is in doubt, the auditor provides the user of the financial statements
with a better understanding of exactly what responsibility the auditor
is assuming.
This raises the related issue of whether it would be appropriate to indicate
the period of time to which the auditor’s substantial doubt relates by rou
tinely including an explicit date. The explanatory paragraph would state
that “there is substantial doubt about the Company’s ability to continue as
a going concern through December 31, 19XX.”

Evaluation. SAS No. 34 did not use the phrase “going concern.” The
auditor was to evaluate the entity’s ability to continue. An inability to
continue might arise from not being able to meet obligations as they
become due without substantial disposal of assets, restructuring of debt, or
externally forced revisions of operations, which was effectively equated
with insolvency, or other factors not involving solvency. These “other
factors” would be significant events such as loss of a principal customer.
SAS No. 34 indicated that the auditor’s reason for concern with the ability
of the entity to continue was the potential effect on the “recoverability and
classification of recorded asset amounts, and the amounts and classification
of liabilities.” A report modification would result only if substantial doubt
about continued existence created sufficient uncertainty concerning
recoverability, classification, and amounts of material assets and liabilities.
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SAS No. 59 made substantial doubt about ability to continue as a going
concern, by itself, the triggering point for report modification.
The distinction is illustrated by the development stage company that has
not yet produced a salable product. The company has expensed all product
development costs. There are no receivables because there are no sales;
likewise there is no inventory. Financing is all from equity and there are no
employee benefit plans that would result in recording new liabilities on
termination. As long as its productive assets have alternative uses so that
realization is not impaired, SAS No. 34 would require no report modifica
tion. Apparently this would be true even if the company would have to cease
operations unless it could produce a salable product and bring the product
to market within the next 12 months. SAS No. 59 would require a goingconcern explanatory paragraph in the same circumstances. It is doubtful
that a competent auditor would have failed to qualify the opinion even under
SAS No. 34, but SAS No. 59 is an improvement.
SAS No. 59, however, elevates going-concern status to the report modifi
cation triggering mechanism without defining a going concern. This has
created implementation issues.
Early drafts of SAS No. 59 did include a definition, such as expected
insolvency or bankruptcy. But these legal concepts were excluded from
the final draft. As a result, there are conflicting views in practice on the
meaning of the phrase going concern.
SAS No. 59 in its first paragraph states that:
Ordinarily, information that significantly contradicts the going
concern assumption relates to the entity’s inability to continue
to meet its obligations as they become due without substantial
disposition of assets outside the ordinary course of business,
restructuring of debt, externally forced revisions of its operations,
or similar actions.
Some view this as the definition of a going concern. They apparently fail
to recognize that SASs often do not bother to define central terms. For exam
ple, SAS No. 47 on audit risk and materiality defines audit risk, but not
materiality. An FASB definition is quoted, but intentionally not adopted.
Others read a definition of sorts into the first paragraph of SAS No. 59 by
noting that the first sentence states that the SAS provides guidance to the
auditor for evaluating going-concern problems and, in a footnote, that
sentence indicates the SAS does not apply to an audit of an entity in the
process of liquidation. Thus, an entity would no longer be a going concern
when it is probable the entity will be forced to liquidate.
This would mean that in evaluating going-concern status the auditor is
assessing the likelihood of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. Some, in
fact, say that unless a company liquidates, it does continue—there are just
new shareholders, the former creditors. However, this seems to be too
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sanguine an attitude. The shareholders are wiped out and top management
is probably out of a job. An early warning signal that sounds only for
imminent liquidation is not going to close any expectation gap.
One problem created by lack of a clear-cut definition is the ambiguity that
attaches to evaluating management plans. SAS No. 59 requires that the
auditor evaluate management’s plans for dealing with a going-concern
problem. It defines management plans as including “plans to dispose of
assets” and “plans to borrow money or restructure debt.” If the auditor is
satisfied that the plans can be successfully implemented, presumably an
unmodified report is appropriate. However, if a company is not a going
concern when it cannot meet its obligations and they become due “without
substantial disposition of assets outside the ordinary course of business or
restructuring of debt,” certain management plans only confirm that the
company is not a going concern.
Some also question whether it is feasible to audit management’s plans
that involve nonoperating actions, such as debt restructuring or disposition
of assets outside the ordinary course of business. Normally there is no
historical experience for the auditor to use in evaluating the likelihood of
these actions being successful. Nevertheless, an auditor must, for example,
audit management’s planned disposal of a segment of a business. APB
Opinion 30 requires an estimate of loss on disposal and loss from operations
during the period between the measurement date and disposal.
Clarification and guidance in this area would require explicit definition
of a going concern and guidance on evaluating nonoperating actions. For
example, the relation of going-concern status to bankruptcy and solvency
might be clarified and guidance might be provided on auditing compliance
with APB Opinion 30 and similar nonoperating actions. Alternatively,
going-concern status might be defined so that plans for nonoperating
actions would confirm substantial doubt and the auditor would consider
only operating improvements, such as enhanced cash flow from operations,
to alleviate substantial doubt.
Reporting. SAS No. 59 both created new reporting issues and continued
or amplified old ones. From a user’s perspective, a significant new issue is
the ability to distinguish emphasis of a matter paragraphs, explanatory
paragraphs for an uncertainty, and going-concern explanatory paragraphs.
A particular problem—for example, significant investment in junk
bonds—may be the subject of any of the three types of paragraph. A user
is aided in distinguishing between a going-concern problem and an
uncertainty by the new requirement added by SAS No. 64 to include the
phrases “substantial doubt” and “going concern.” However, the only way
to distinguish between an emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph and an explana
tory paragraph for an uncertainty may be the absence of a phrase such as
“no provision has been made in the financial statements for this matter” in
an emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph. This issue as well as the issue of use of
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a disclaimer for an uncertainty relate to implementation of SAS Nos. 58
and 59. Both are discussed further in the next section.

All Uncertainties
Implementation issues for all uncertainties include the type of report to be
issued and the proper report disclosure for various types of uncertainties.
D isclaim er for Uncertainty. SAS Nos. 58 and 59 carry forward from
SAS No. 2 the substance of a footnote that now states:
Nothing in this section, however, is intended to preclude an auditor
from declining to express an opinion in cases involving uncertainties.
This sentence has led some to conclude that SAS Nos. 58 and 59 permit
either a standard unqualified report with an additional explanatory
paragraph or a disclaimer of opinion in equivalent circumstances. In other
words, there is an option to disclaim or to add an explanatory paragraph
in the same situation. The option chosen can have serious implications in
practice because the SEC does not accept a disclaimer as meeting the
requirements of the 1933 Act for certification of financial statements.
A reporting option was not the intent when SAS No. 2 was issued, even
if it is viewed as the current result. When SAS No. 2 was being developed,
a requirement to decide whether a “subject to” qualified opinion or a dis
claimer of opinion for an uncertainty was appropriate was removed from
the authoritative literature. The reason for the removal was the inability to
develop reporting criteria for the decision. In other words, the committee
members felt unable to provide guidance and as a result rescinded the
requirement. However, the committee members did not believe it was
appropriate to preclude the use of a disclaimer for an uncertainty.
To prohibit a disclaimer would be tantamount to instructing an auditor to
issue an opinion in circumstances in which the auditor personally did not
believe he or she had an opinion. In other words, a professional who does
not have an opinion should not be required to express one. Thus, the
disclaimer was not seen as an alternative in equivalent circumstances. It
was to be used only when the auditor did not have an opinion.
The problem was that SAS No. 2 did not provide guidance on when
it was not possible to have an opinion. To fill that void in the authori
tative literature, some CPA firms developed their own specific guidance
on when a disclaimer was necessary. In general circumstances, that
guidance provided—with variations in wording among firms—that a
disclaimer should be issued when the uncertainty so overshadowed
the client’s financial position or operating results that there was no
substance to the opinion. In specialized industries, some firms provided
more explicit guidelines.
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Savings Institutions as an Example. A peculiarity of some specialized
industries, including the savings and loan industry, is that a company does
not fail until a state or federal chartering authority declares that it has failed
and takes possession. An important consideration for the chartering
authority is usually the solvency of the company. In most regulated indus
tries, this translates into some form of net worth or capital requirement.
However, the capital requirement may be based on an average of several
years rather than just the current year. For example, from 1982 through 1988
the capital requirement of savings and loan institutions was 3 percent, based
on a 5-year average. Thus, a savings and loan institution could be insolvent
on a GAAP basis and still meet the net capital requirement.
The current net capital requirements for savings and loan institutions,
adopted at the end of 1989, establish differing percentage requirements for
tangible capital, core capital, and risk-based capital. In response, some
CPA firms have adopted specific criteria for reporting on savings and loan
institutions that require a disclaimer when there is an extreme goingconcern problem. An extreme going-concern problem is defined as not
meeting the tangible capital test, tangible capital below zero, and a capital
plan that either has not been approved by the Office of Thrift Supervision
or that is not likely to be achieved during the year following the balance
sheet date. A savings and loan institution in the same situation with an
approved plan and that is likely to be in compliance with the plan within a
year would receive an audit report with an explanatory going-concern
paragraph following an unqualified opinion. A savings and loan institu
tion that does not meet the tangible capital requirement, but that has
tangible capital above zero in the current year and has an approved
plan that it is likely to achieve in the coming year, would receive an
explanatory uncertainty paragraph rather than a going-concern paragraph
following an unqualified opinion.

Distinguishing Uncertainties and Qualified Opinions. The SEC’s
administrative policies also contributed to another practice problem prior
to SAS No. 58 and No. 59 that has continued. The SEC does not accept
financial statements in filings that have other than an unqualified opinion
caused by a scope limitation or a GAAP departure. In some cases, an
auditor was known to treat an item as an uncertainty that might more
appropriately be considered a scope limitation or a GAAP departure.
Under APB Opinion 11, for example, to recognize a tax loss carryforward
as an asset, realization had to be assured beyond a reasonable doubt. One
large public company recorded an asset for a tax loss carryforward, but the
audit firm issued a report modified for uncertainty because of uncertainty
concerning the company’s ability to realize the carryforward.
A new casualty insurance company, or one entering an entirely new line
of business, often does not have a sufficient base of historical experience
to reliably estimate loss reserves. This is evaluated by some as a scope
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limitation because an insurance company would ordinarily be expected to
have sufficient experience to reliably estimate loss reserves. Others view this
as an uncertainty because for this particular company, the historical exper
ience never existed and the proper reserve will be known at a future date.
A sset Realization Uncertainties. The SEC’s administrative policies
also prohibit a fourth paragraph for uncertainties that affect asset realiza
tion, except for going-concern uncertainties. Apparently the SEC’s view is
that asset realization is a matter that should be audited and that an evaluation
should be made as to whether a write-down is necessary. An uncertainty
paragraph should not substitute for a write-down. This policy makes some
sense for trade receivables, inventory, and other assets ordinarily presented
at net realizable value. However, even in this case, there may be exceptions.
For example, the collectibility of a receivable from a single large customer
may be in doubt because of that customer’s financial difficulty.
Environm ental U ncertainties. Environmental problems raise an
interesting implementation issue because of the massive potential cost of
cleaning up existing problems and the fact that in some industries potential
significant future problems are a virtual certainty. Are these risks being
properly evaluated? Is the absence of explanatory paragraphs for uncertain
ties concerning environmental cleanup costs a lurking disaster comparable
to the savings and loan crisis?

Limitations and Implications
Limitations
The research is limited by the fact that most of it was conducted prior to
SAS No. 58 and No. 59. Studies that attempt to measure a market reaction
to a going-concern modification are also limited by difficulties in isolating
the effect of the audit report. Release of the report simultaneously with
other information makes identifying its effect on stock market returns diffi
cult. Also, isolating circumstances in which such a report is not expected by
the market and therefore provides “information” is difficult. Finally, the
market studies do not consider the reaction of financial statement users
other than common stock investors.
The various studies using experimental and survey approaches address
additional user groups. However, they are also limited in that most were
conducted prior to the new SASs and they are all affected by questions as to
external validity. It is unclear whether the answers to the various question
naires are indicative of “real world” responses and whether most of
the studies on auditor decision making solicit from a respondent what is
essentially a team decision.
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Implications
Several market reaction studies would seem to indicate that some inves
tors depend on audit reports to highlight significant uncertainties. In certain
“surprise” situations equity investors responded to “subject to” qualified
opinions. We have not found any study that confirmed these findings for
audit reports issued after SAS No. 58 and No. 59 became effective, but
stock market reaction in earlier studies would seem to imply that at least
one user group values such audit report modifications. Also, survey
research has suggested that other groups of financial statement users main
tain that they use such reports. These results would ultimately argue that
such reports do benefit some investors.
Given this admittedly weak support for the notion that financial statement
users do use such modified reports, a basic decision must be made by the
Auditing Standards Board as to whether the issue of audit report modifica
tion for uncertainties should be reopened.
Should SAS No. 59 be revised to clarify the relationship between goingconcern status and the concepts of bankruptcy and solvency? The fact that
numerous studies performed prior to SAS No. 59 indicate that approxi
mately one-half of companies that fail do not receive such a modified report
in the period prior to bankruptcy may not bode well for the profession due
to potential litigation exposure. Has performance on this dimension
improved subsequent to passage of SAS No. 59?
The definitions in SFAS No. 5 for “reasonably possible” and “probable”
result in situations in which there is great variation in the numerical proba
bilities that auditors attach to these phrases. The term “substantial doubt”
in SAS No. 59 leads to similar results. The Auditing Standards Board may
wish to consider whether providing quantitative guidance in this area would
be meaningful or worthwhile.

Future Research
At one extreme it may be argued that all of the research performed prior
to issuance of SAS No. 58 and No. 59 is of only historical interest since the
standards have changed. Thus, an updating and replication of the various
research approaches might be called for. In the process, a refinement of
these approaches might lead to more meaningful results. For example, the
power of statistical tests of stock market return data may be improved by a
greater emphasis on identifying situations in which the issuance of the
report is a surprise (for example, see Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich
1987).
Most of the behavioral studies have reduced what is a team decision to an
individual decision. The extent to which such individual decisions general
ize to the “real world” is open to question. An obvious extension of extant
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research is to replicate it in a group setting. However, obtaining realistic
audit teams is not likely to be accomplished easily, if at all.
It would seem that standard setting and practice would both benefit from
a significant amount of descriptive research. Table 2 summarizes audit
reports of 600 large SEC-reporting companies as presented in Accounting
Trends and Techniques. One notices, perhaps, a slight increase in modified
reports. On an overall basis, has the shift from a qualification to an explana
tory paragraph resulted in more, fewer, or no change in uncertainty-related
modifications? What types of uncertainties result in explanatory paragraphs
other than going-concern problems? What types of uncertainties are
disclosed only in notes to financial statements without an explanatory
paragraph in the audit report? For going-concern uncertainties, what
sources of substantial doubt are described in explanatory paragraphs? Is
there any relationship between the sources of substantial doubt and the
issuance of a disclaimer? Are SAS No. 58 and No. 59 being complied with?
Do explanatory paragraphs on going-concern problems include the phrases
“substantial doubt” and “going concern”? Do descriptions of some
uncertainties seem to indicate GAAP departures or scope limitations?

TABLE 2

Going Concern
Litigation
Other
Total Uncertainties
Total Companies

Summary of 600 Audit Reports Reported
in Accounting Trends and Techniques
1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

18
20
8
46
34

12
18
12
42
32

8
11
7
26
23

13
10
9
32
24

11
12
15
38
30

13
18
15
46
33

14
16
9
39
29

The reaction of users of financial statements to different types of report
modifications also seems to be a fertile area for research. Do users recog
nize or react to the distinctions among an emphasis-of-a-matter paragraph,
a fourth explanatory paragraph for an uncertainty, and an explanatory
paragraph indicating substantial doubt about ability to continue as a going
concern? Do users perceive the explanatory paragraph differently from a
“subject to” qualification? Do users regard a disclaimer of opinion and an
explanatory paragraph for an uncertainty as substantially different? Per
sonally, we would be very surprised if users did not recognize a substantial
difference. Would such a difference mean that the Auditing Standards
Board should restore the requirement to disclaim an opinion and provide
guidance on when an uncertainty precludes an opinion?
What criteria do CPA firms use for disclaimers? Do the criteria that have
been developed by CPA firms for when to disclaim provide operational
guidance?
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Have CPA firms developed operational criteria for qualitative concepts of
likelihood (probable, reasonably possible, substantial doubt)? We noted
earlier the limitation that auditors may not make likelihood evaluations in
quantitative terms. There is a related research area of comparable sig
nificance. Because audit situations do not come with numerical probability
labels, it might be worth researching what numerical probability auditors
attach to particular factual situations involving uncertainties.

Conclusion
We hope we have raised provocative issues for both researchers and stan
dard setters. Although there are several interesting issues concerning
reporting on uncertainties, generally, the most important and perplexing
issues relate to going-concern uncertainties. This is not surprising because
going-concern reporting is at the heart of a central element of the expecta
tion gap. How can a business fail shortly after receiving an unmodified
audit report? If an audit cannot provide an early warning of impending busi
ness failure, what good is it? For this reason, we believe one of the most sig
nificant issues our review of the literature and practice has highlighted is the
relationship among going-concern status, solvency, and bankruptcy. In
short we cannot seem to agree on the answer to a simple question—What do
we mean by a going concern? Until that question is answered, bot h research
and practice will suffer.
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Audit Committees:
Is There an Expectations Gap?
An Analysis of SAS No. 61,

Communication With Audit Committees
Larry E. Rittenberg, Professor o f Accounting,
University o f Wisconsin-Madison
R. D. Nair, Professor o f Accounting,
University o f Wisconsin-Madison
SAS No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees, was issued with a
stated objective of ensuring “that the audit committee receives additional
information regarding the scope of the audit that may assist the audit
committee in overseeing the financial reporting and disclosure process for
which management is responsible. ’’ This paper examines changes in the
responsibilities placed on audit committees as they attempt to meet the
public’s demand for effective governance structures and then discusses
the auditing profession’s role in meeting those demands. Many of the
increasing demands on audit committees can be traced to the perceived
power of corporate management, including influence on the board of
directors, and the need to provide another independent view of the financial
reporting process. SAS No. 61 is seen as a positive step in influencing the
activities of audit committees. However, the demand for increased respon
sibilities for audit committees in the corporate governance area creates a
gap between rising expectations and the role presently served by the
independent auditor. The nature of these rising expectations is addressed,
the gap between current performance and the expectations is identified, the
appropriate role and limitations of the public accounting profession in
meeting the increasing demands are discussed, and suggestions are offered
for increasing the responsiveness of the profession.

SAS No. 61 was issued with a stated objective of ensuring “that the
audit committee receives additional information regarding the scope of
the audit that may assist the audit committee in overseeing the financial
reporting and disclosure process for which management is responsible.”
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The communication required by SAS No. 61 supplements requirements in
other auditing standards, such as SAS No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility
to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities, SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts by
Clients, and SAS No. 60, Communication of Internal Control Structure
Related Matters Noted in an Audit, that require auditors to communicate
with audit committees when they become aware of significant deficiencies
in an organization’s control structure, or of the existence of fraud, or of
illegal acts, in the course of their audits.1 The standards, by describing the
information that should be communicated to audit committees, give us a
picture of the auditors’ views of the responsibilities of audit committees. At
the same time that auditors have been addressing these issues, other organi
zations and groups, such as the Treadway Commission, the SEC, the GAO,
insurance organizations, as well as accounting firms, have been describing
their views of the responsibilities of audit committees. Our paper examines
the differences—or, in other words, the gap—between those points of view.
The gap appears to be substantial.
This paper examines the evolving role of audit committees as they attempt
to meet the public’s demand for effective governance structures, compares
that evolving role with the information that auditors are currently required
to provide to audit committees, explores the gap between required auditor
communication and the expectations of audit committees, and points out
areas where the public accounting profession may assist audit committees
more effectively in meeting their responsibilities.
External auditors and audit committees both can help improve each
other’s performance. The requirements can be compared with the challenge
issued by A. A. Sommer, Jr. (1991), chairman of the Public Oversight Board
of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA:
If American business is to meet the demand that its governance
structures and practices match public expectations, it is vital that
audit committees do a better job. And, if auditors are to reduce the
hazards posed by litigation, they must avail themselves of every
resource available to them. Clearly the audit committee is one of
those resources. It is in their interest to be sure that resource is as
effective as it is possible to make it, and they are in position to make
it so.

1 For example, SAS No. 53, paragraph 28, states:
For the audit committee to make the informed judgments necessary to
fulfill its responsibility for the oversight of financial reporting, the
auditor should assure himself that the audit committee is adequately
informed about any irregularities of which the auditor becomes aware
during the audit unless those irregularities are clearly inconsequential.
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The Audit Committee, the Board of Directors,
and the Power of Management
Audit committees, no matter how effective, may not be an adequate
substitute for effective, independent boards of directors. Nor should audit
committees necessarily be expected to replace the corporate oversight
functions reserved for the board of directors (e.g., if the board of directors
is dominated by insiders and friends of the CEO, then it is difficult to
expect that the existence of an audit committee will necessarily improve
the oversight function). Leslie Eaton, writing in Barron’s (1990), states it
another way:
The Eighties, whatever the decade’s other claims to feme, was rife
with corporate excess. It was a period when managements pros
pered mightily, often at the expense of the corporation’s true
owners. Thus, executives’ pay and perks soared, even when their
companies’ performance faltered. Shareholders’ interests, mean
while, were subverted by greenmail payments, poison pills and
golden parachutes.
Which raises the question: Where were the corporate directors, who
are supposedly the stewards of those shareholders’ interests?...
One reason directors have failed as corporate watchdogs, quite
obviously, is that they tend to represent management rather than
shareholders.
Similarly, Wechsler (1989) is very critical of the influence of management
on the audit committee:
Too many audit committees are more creatures of the company’s
management than they are watchdogs over shareholders’ interests.
Wechsler quotes Peter Martosella, brought in to run Crazy Eddie’s, a failed
retail company, after it was discovered that the financial statements were
fraudulently prepared. Martosella states:
You have to be careful about how much you expect of the audit
committee. You’re talking about people brought in by the CEO and
you’re telling them they shouldn’t necessarily listen to him. It’s not
realistic, especially when the chief executive is a charismatic
person, a darling of the securities world.
A survey by executive recruiter Korn/Ferry International indicated that
in 74 percent of the 426 companies it surveyed in 1989, the new directors
had been appointed upon the recommendation of the CEO. Indeed, one of
the reasons many audit committees are not attuned to danger signals is that
CEOs often pick other CEOs as members of the board of directors and they
often serve on each others’ boards. This, coupled with the lack of time to
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adequately serve on a number of boards, tends to invest even greater power
in corporate executives. The strength of chief executives in dictating
operating procedures and covering up losses or “managing earnings”
allowed massive frauds in such companies as Miniscribe, Crazy Eddie’s,
and Equity Funding to take place. Some of these companies, such as
Miniscribe, even had audit committees, but they were not attuned to the
danger signals of the fraud.2
Such views of the limitations of audit committees are not limited to the
United States. The Economist writes in its May 30, 1992, issue:
In principle, shareholders have two main controls over managers:
the company board and the company’s auditors. The board is
supposed to look after their interests; non-executive directors,
especially, are expected to do so. Auditors are supposed to tell
shareholders whether a company’s account of itself is broadly
correct. Neither control is working properly. Boards are dominated
by the company’s bosses; non-executive directors, though approved
by shareholders, are nominated by the chief executives they are
meant to monitor. Auditors, too, are far closer to a company’s
managers, who supply the information they need, than to share
holders; other sorts of lucrative work, such as management
consulting and tax planning, may hang on the auditor’s relationship
with management.
Hopefully, the nature of that relationship may now be changing. The
recent example of the Board of Directors at General Motors assuming a
more positive stance may be an indication that Boards of Directors in many
organizations may become more independent in action in the 1990s (White
and Ingrassi 1992). Such movements may greatly assist the audit commit
tees in accomplishing the tasks that seem to be demanded by the public.

The Evolution of Audit Committees
The concept of an audit committee is not new. Audit committees were
proposed by the AICPA as long ago as 1937 and have been recommended by
the SEC since 1940 as one way of addressing the problems raised in the
McKesson-Robbins case. The New York Stock Exchange recommended
the formation of audit committees in the early 1970s and made it mandatory
for listing on the Exchange after 1978. The American Stock Exchange
recommends the formation of audit committees, of which the majority

2 For a description of the ineffectiveness of audit committees at Miniscribe, see Curtis
C. Verschoor. 1990. “Miniscribe: A New Example of Audit Committee Ineffective
ness.” Internal Auditing (Spring): 13-19.
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must be outside directors. The National Association of Securities Dealers
and Quotation Analysts (NASDAQ) adopted a requirement in 1989 that
audit committees should be established, “the majority of the members of
which shall be independent directors.” The recommendations have been
taken to heart. Sommer (1991) reported that a 1989 survey by Korn/Ferry
International found that 97.7 percent of the companies responding to their
survey, which were listed on all three exchanges, had audit committees and
none included “inside” directors.
Audit committees are recommended to help ensure the integrity and
independence of the audit function and to protect the public interest.
Accounting Series Release No. 123, issued March 23, 1972, provides an
overview of the SEC’s long-standing interest in audit committees:
The Commission,.. .endorses the establishment by all publiclyheld companies of audit committees composed of outside directors
and urges the business and financial communities and all share
holders of such publicly-held companies to lend their full and
continuing support to the effective implementation of the
above-cited recommendation in order to assist in affording
the greatest possible protection to investors who rely upon such
financial statements [emphasis added].
The implied message is that audit committees represent an effective
device to protect outside investors who rely on financial statements. But, the
demand on audit committees has not stopped with the call for oversight of
the integrity of financial statements; indeed, the demand on audit commit
tees has continued to expand beyond the scope of the financial reporting
process. There are many reasons for the calls for more effective audit
committees. These include—
• The relaxation of rules affecting competition in the public accounting
profession.
• The increase in power of corporate executives.
• The increase in incidences of fraudulent financial reporting.
• The increase in takeovers and other business combinations.
• The increase in businesses and other entities affecting the “public
interest,” but that are not publicly held companies.
• Governmental pressure, especially GAO reviews of the banking industry.
Reaction to these forces can be seen in the following calls for expanded
audit committee effectiveness.

The Securities and Exchange Commission
As noted earlier, the SEC has been an active proponent of the audit
committee concept. Although the earlier pronouncement focused on the
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financial reporting process, its commissioners have been active in
promoting a larger role that includes an emphasis on broader corporate
governance issues. As early as 1979, A.A. Sommer Jr. (1980), then an SEC
commissioner, encouraged audit committees
to approve in advance each professional service provided by the
independent auditors, and review their independence; to consider
the range of audit and non-audit fees of the independent auditors; to
review the adequacy of the corporation’s system of internal
controls, and propose major changes in accounting policy; to direct
and supervise investigations into any matter within the scope of its
duties; to make recommendations and reviews in respect to the
corporation’s code of corporate conduct and business practices;
and to review the corporation’s report to stockholders and other
financial statements prior to publication.
Sommer’s broad role contains items that had not been addressed
previously in the auditing literature such as proposing major changes in
accounting policy, directing and supervising investigations, monitoring
compliance with the corporation’s code of conduct and business practices,
and reviewing (all) financial statements (not just annual reports) before
publication. Most of the items advocated by Sommer had been embraced by
the SEC in Accounting Series Release No. 278 in 1978. That release also
contained the explicit task of recommending the “engagement or discharge
of the independent auditors.” The push by the SEC for audit committees to
become more involved in corporate governance issues has since been
echoed in many subsequent reports on the evolution of audit committees.

AICPA Activities on Audit Committees:
The 1970s and 1980s
The AICPA has been a long-time advocate of effective audit committees.
However, it was not until the issuance of SAS No. 61, Communication With
Audit Committees, in January 1989, that it specifically established a
requirement for formal communication with audit committees as a standard
part of each audit.

Informal Recommendations: 1979. A 1979 special committee on audit
committees appointed by the AICPA concluded that audit committees were
not necessary for either the maintenance of auditor independence or for the
performance of an audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards. However, it did comment that audit committees could be helpful
to both corporate directors and independent auditors in fulfilling their
responsibilities. The committee report went on to specify the following
duties that the audit committee should perform:
1.
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Approve the selection of the independent auditor

2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

Review the arrangements and scope of the audit
Consider the comments from the independent auditor with respect to
weaknesses in internal accounting control and the consideration given
or corrective action taken by management
Discuss matters of concern to the audit committee, the auditor, or
management relating to the company’s financial statements or other
results of the audit
Review internal accounting procedures and controls with the com
pany’s financial and accounting staff
Review the activities and recommendations of the company’s internal
auditors

The C om m ission on Auditor's R esponsibilities (1978). The Com
mission on Auditor’s Responsibilities (often referred to as the Cohen
Commission, 1978) reiterated the importance of audit committees and
independent directors in achieving a proper balance between the auditor
and management and in protecting the shareholder’s interest. The Cohen
Commission states:
The important point is that the auditor should have direct access to
a significant number of board members who are not part of
management. Outside members of the board of directors are in a
unique position to represent the shareholders’ interest, to monitor
the performance of management, to provide adequate support to the
independent auditor, and to make changes within the organization.
The Cohen Commission statement extends the potential responsibilities
of the audit committee to one of representing shareholders and effecting
change in an organization.

Opposition to Expanded Role of Audit Committees
Traditionally, this more expansive role of the audit committee has been
met with opposition on the part of the auditing profession. That view was
summarized by Larry D. Horner, then chairman and chief executive of Peat,
Marwick, Main & Co., in a 1987 speech to the National Association of
Corporate Directors. Horner outlined audit committee activities in a tradi
tional sense, but included overseeing the company’s internal accounting
controls. However, he objected to expansion into operational areas:
More importantly, a committee should not take on functions that
involve it too directly in operational matters. This will impair the
committee’s independence and credibility can suffer.. . . For this
reason, Peat Marwick opposes any mandate or movement that
would detract from the audit committee’s oversight of auditing and
financial reporting. (Bacon 1990)
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The outside public accounting firms were not the only groups who
resisted expansion of the audit committee duties. Joseph Wright, chairman
of the Audit Committee of Bethlehem Steel stated in a 1979 speech:
While it is obvious that boards of directors must have oversight
responsibility for a corporation’s environmental behavior and
community relations, these are not really functions of an audit
committee, and they should not b e... .The same goes for opera
tional audits; they are a necessary part of corporate management,
but can divert an audit committee from its primary responsibility
regarding financial audits. (Wright 1980)
Others also disagree on the extent that audit committees can, or should,
be involved in detailed issues regarding corporate accounting. Wright
points to a 1979 report of a committee of the American Bar Association
which states:
It [the audit committee] is not equipped to make determinations as
to specific actions the corporation should take in the areas of finan
cial accounting and reporting.. . . No audit committee should
undertake to determine the scope or extent of the annual audit,
decide upon financial accounting standards to be used in the
preparation of financial statements___These are, and must remain,
functions of management and/or the independent auditors.
That traditional view stands in marked contrast with the recommenda
tions from the GAO and the Treadway Commission discussed below.

The Treadway Commission
The Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Report
ing (1987, hereafter referred to as the Treadway Commission) cited an
effective, vigilant audit committee as one of the cornerstones of an effective
policy to minimize the incidences of fraudulent financial reporting. The
Treadway Commission recommended that all public companies should
be required by the SEC to establish audit committees composed solely of
independent directors. However, the Treadway Commission also recog
nized that it is not enough to simply have an audit committee; care must be
taken to structure and staff the audit committee to ensure its effectiveness.
Their prescription for audit committee activities and responsibilities was
quite broad and included:
• The board of directors of all public companies should be required
by SEC rule to establish audit committees composed solely of indepen
dent directors.
• Audit committees should be informed, vigilant, and effective overseers
of the financial reporting process and the company’s internal controls.
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• All public companies should develop a written charter setting forth
the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee. The board of
directors should approve the charter, review it periodically, and modify
it as necessary.
• Audit committees should have adequate resources and authority to
discharge their responsibilities.
• The audit committee should review management’s evaluation of factors
related to the independence of the company’s public accountant. Both the
audit committee and management should assist the public accountant in
preserving his or her independence.
• Before the beginning of each year, the audit committee should review
management’s plans for engaging the company’s independent public
accountant to perform management advisory services during the coming
year, considering both the types of services that may be rendered and the
projected fees.
The recommendations of the Treadway Commission envisioned an active
role for audit committees in overseeing a company’s financial reporting
process and its internal control structure. Additionally, it should play an
important role in assisting the public accountant in preserving independ
ence, including an analysis of management’s plans for procuring other
services from the audit firm.

The Conference Board Report: A 1988 Survey on Practice
The Conference Board has conducted two major surveys of audit com
mittees: the first in 1978 (Bacon 1979) and again in 1988 (Bacon 1990).
The Board cites the rationale for the 1988 report as an opportunity
to examine changes in the audit committee as an institution that stood
“out in bold relief as a success story among the array of organizational
approaches to make corporate boards of directors more effective” (Bacon
1990). They cite seven major reasons for the increased call for more effec
tive audit committees.
1.

2.

Corporatefailures. Bad judgment, or mismanagement, and inadequate
financial controls and reporting systems are often cited as major
contributors to corporate failures and bankruptcies. They suggest
that effective, independent audit committees could help monitor
such activities.
Takeovers and business combinations. Mergers, especially unfriendly
takeovers, have generated substantial litigation, with much of that
litigation focusing on false or misleading information about finan
cial circumstances. Such allegations call the audit committee’s role
into attention.
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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Growth in internal auditing. The growth of internal auditing and the
responsibilities of audit committees are inextricably intertwined. The
increased professionalism of the internal audit community facilitates
and contributes to the functioning of many effective audit committees.
An “expectation gap” regarding independent audits. The Conference
Board report describes the audit committee as one of the ways by which
the profession has responded to questions about its responsibility to
ensure the integrity of an organization’s financial statements.
The Treadway Commission Report. The Conference Board believes the
Treadway Commission may represent the “most influential privatesector initiative” on audit committees.
Other private sector initiatives. The study cites initiatives by the
Institute of Internal Auditors and the American Law Institute as major
contributors to the effectiveness of audit committees.
Regulatory and legislative initiatives. Most of the push for expanded
and effective audit committees at the time of the Conference Board
report came from the SEC.

The Conference Board notes that the above cited factors have pushed
the audit committee to expand beyond its initial role of simply overseeing
the annual report and discussing financial audit matters with the external
auditor. This expanded responsibility is best summed up in their words:
Most of the tasks that stretch the committee’s reach beyond
financial issues relate to monitoring corporate behavior, both the
firm’s as a whole and on the part of individual executives or other
employees [or directors]. Thus, many audit committees now
oversee the content of, and compliance with, corporate policies
governing ethical behavior and employee conflict of interest. Some
committees also monitor compliance with specified laws such as
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or with the Defense Industry
Initiatives. . . . Some have an even broader mandate to monitor the
company’s compliance with the law in general; this may include
reviewing litigation against the company or its employees or
directors... .A final point on the audit committee’s enlarged
role: This committee is sometimes the logical choice when a
situation arises that requires investigation or review at the board
level but does not fit easily into the job description of any particular
board committee. Several of the audit committee’s characteristics
recommend it: (1) it is made up of outside directors, which gives it
objectivity; (2) it is accustomed to probing; and (3) it has
experience working with outside accounting firms [emphasis
added] [Bacon 1990].
Clearly, the Conference Board sees audit committees emerging with an
expanded scope of responsibilities. Interestingly, they cite the audit
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committee’s experience working with the outside public accounting firms
as one of the major qualifications that should allow them to be more
effective in this expanded realm of duties. The Conference Board also
addressed the extent to which audit committees are formally taking on
responsibilities related to the expanded role. As seen in table 1, which is
based on a survey of 689 corporations, audit committees presently have the
authority to perform many of the activities, such as initiating investiga
tions, monitoring compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and
monitoring compliance with laws or regulations as cited above.

TABLE 1

Authority of Audit Committee to
Carry Out Various Activities

Audit Committee Activity
Meet privately with outside auditors
Meet privately with internal auditors
Initiate investigations
Monitor compliance with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act
Monitor conflict-of-interest policy
Monitor code of ethics or behavior
Monitor compliance generally with
laws or regulations
Review quarterly financial statements
Monitor Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
Hire outside expert advice or service

Authority
(%)
98
93
86

No
Authority
(%)
1
1
1

Not
Established
(%)
1
6
13

79
76
74

6
8
8

15
15
18

72
68

8
12

20
20

64
61

8
8

29
31

Insurance Guidelines for Audit Committee Members:
Another Insight Into Scope of Duties
National Union Fire Insurance Co. is the leading underwriter of Direc
tors and Officers (D&O) insurance in the United States. They sponsored a
study to examine causes of litigation against boards and officers and to
make recommendations to audit committees. The nature of claims made
against boards and officers (D&O Claims) also serves as a guideline to
expectations of audit committee members.
Their 1989 report, Audit Committees: A Self-A ssessment Guide, identi
fies D&O claims as a source of concern with an average growth rate in
claims of 10 percent per year. They cite a trend in which many of the higher
dollar claims were directly related to financial reporting or matters
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associated with financial reporting, and companies that experienced losses
showed greater susceptibility and frequency to D&O claims than those
companies without losses. A description of the types of claims provides
some insight into public expectations of audit committees and directors.
The five major sources of claims cited in their study were:
1. Irregularity in securities issuance. These mostly relate to representa
tions contained in financial statements—both the annual statement and
quarterly statements.
2. Misleading representations. These apply to annual and quarterly
reports to shareholders.
3. Failure to follow mandated procedures. Many of these procedures are
set forth by legislative and regulatory bodies and include procedures
specifying financial reporting. A prime example is given in manage
ment’s representation that there is a proper functioning of the system of
internal control.
4. Improper expenditures. These are claims against the companies for
incurring expenditures that are not prudent or exceed company-stated
policy. Often audit committees are charged with reviewing the
processes that ensure the propriety of these expenditures.
5. Conflicts of interest. Many of these are claims that involve transactions
with related parties. The proper disclosure of such transactions is often
called into question.
The insurance report develops a set of self-assessment guidelines that
should be helpful for organizations in reviewing the scope of their audit
activities and the independence of the committees. An outline of the ques
tions contained in that assessment is included in the appendix.

The General Accounting Office Report
on the Banking Industry
The General Accounting Office (GAO) has performed a number of
studies relating to failed financial institutions. Their findings are not
surprising: many of the causes of the failures were related to numerous
internal control breakdowns that contributed to improper extensions of
credit, outright fraud, and insider loan dealings. They called on audit
committees to provide an “independent review” of management’s conduct
of the business of the bank.
The GAO, in a separate study, expressed significant dissatisfaction with
the functioning of audit committees in banking institutions (GAO 1991).
Their criticism touched on areas such as independence, expertise needed to
perform their tasks, and the lack of information available to perform
independent assessments of key bank operations (and the audit committee’s
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reliance on the external auditors for much of that information). The GAO
reported that many bank audit committees had members who had customer
relationships with the banks. More than half of the audit committee chairs
interviewed indicated that their committees lacked expertise in some
specific areas where they had oversight responsibilities. Finally, the GAO
indicated that audit committees were very reliant on external auditors for
the wide variety of information (not all of which are contained in financial
statements) needed to perform their analysis. They were also concerned that
internal auditors who reported administratively to bank management may
not be sufficiently independent to provide objective information, or have
banking regulators consistently provide effective early warning signals.
The GAO was critical of the public accounting profession on two fronts:
1. The annual external audit did not consistently help identify or make
recommendations to resolve problems related to internal controls and
compliance with laws and regulations. For example, they reported that
fourteen of the twenty-five chairpersons that reported significant asset
quality/loan collectability problems and four of the six chairpersons
that reported significant problems with compliance with banking laws
and regulations, also reported that their external audits did not help
them identify these problems.
2. Audit standards do not require adequate examination and reporting on
internal controls and compliance therewith. They were critical in their
interpretation of the control standards, asserting that the current
standards do not require auditors to examine any management or
administrative controls that are not directly related to financial state
ments. Their example is that controls that might provide reasonable
assurance that the bank is in compliance with safety and soundness
laws are generally not examined, and the existing standards do not
require tests of compliance with any controls.
The GAO reported that audit committee chairpersons felt that additional
information and analyses from the outside auditors beyond what is
currently required in financial statement audits would be highly useful to
audit committees. Specifically, a majority of respondents wanted to receive
an analysis of the adequacy of management’s control structure and compli
ance with applicable banking laws and regulations.
The GAO recommended that legislation be passed that—
• Requires all federally insured depository institutions to have independent
audit committees made up solely of outside directors.
• Requires large institutions to maintain an audit committee that (1) does
not have members that are large customers of the institution, (2) includes
members with banking or related financial management expertise, and
(3) has access to legal counsel.

71

Most of these recommendations were included in the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.
Consistent with their previous recommendations, the GAO also recom
mended that an auditor’s report on management report on its system of
internal control, and that it report to the institution and the regulators on the
institution’s compliance with laws and regulations that are identified as
relating to safety and soundness where compliance can be determined
objectively. Finally, as in the report from the insurance industry cited
above, they recommend that independent accountants for large institutions
perform reviews of quarterly financial data. The general thrust of the GAO
recommendations for banks also applies to other financial institutions such
as mutual insurance companies, savings and loans, and credit unions that
operate in the public trust.

The Public Accounting Profession
and Audit Committees
As noted above, the public accounting profession has been an effective
agent for change. Although the profession cannot mandate the scope or
duties of audit committees, it can require that certain information be com
municated regularly to the committee. The profession can also effectively
serve by educating audit committees on matters that will assist them to
accomplish their expanding responsibilities.

SAS No. 61: An Agent for Effective Change
SAS No. 61 expanded the scope of the independent auditor’s respon
sibility to ensure that the audit committee receives information useful
to assist them in “overseeing the financial reporting and disclosure
process for which management is responsible.” It specifies the following
matters that must be communicated to audit committees, either orally or in
written form:
1. Auditor’s responsibility under generally accepted auditing standards.
The committee should be informed of the responsibility taken by the
auditor. The audit committee should be warned that an audit is
“designed to obtain reasonable, rather than absolute, assurance about
the financial statements.”
2. Significant accounting policies. The audit committee should be
informed about the initial selection of and changes in significant
accounting policies or their application, especially the accounting
for controversial or emerging areas for which there is a lack of
authoritative guidance or consensus.
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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Management judgments and accounting estimates. A number of
financial frauds have taken place through the manipulation of account
ing estimates. Audit committees should be informed as to the critical
assumptions, past data, and the processes used by management in
making significant estimates.
Significant audit adjustments. The committee should be informed of
significant adjustments that could, either individually or in the
aggregate, have a significant effect on the entity’s financial reporting
process. This communication should take place even if management
agreed to make such adjustments.
Other information in documents containing audited financial statements.
The auditor needs to communicate the nature of the responsibility
and any reservations regarding the fairness of the presentation of the
other information.
Disagreements with management. Disagreements with management
can arise over a wide range of items, including (1) application of
accounting principles, (2) management’s judgments on important
accounting estimates, (3) scope of the audit, (4) disclosures to be
included in the audited financial statements, and (5) wording of
the audit report. The disagreements should be discussed with the
audit committee, even if the disagreements were resolved to the
auditor’s satisfaction.
Consultation with other accountants. If the auditor is aware of manage
ment’s consultation with other accountants, the auditor should discuss
the nature of the consultation and the auditor’s views on the significant
items that were the subject of the consultation with the audit committee.
Major issues discussed with management prior to retention. This item
is designed to discourage “shopping for accounting principles” since
the audit committee would be aware of any potential agreements
reached by new auditors and management regarding treatments of
controversial accounting areas or the scope of the audit.
Difficulties encountered in performing the audit. This communication
is designed to focus on significant audit difficulties that were the direct
effect of management, such as unreasonable delays in providing infor
mation or delays caused in commencing the audit.

The auditor is still required to communicate significant deficiencies in the
organization’s control structure, the discovery of fraud or illegal acts, and
reservations about interim financial information. It would appear that the
requirements of SAS No. 61 should meet two of the objectives of audit
committees as set forth in the Treadway Commission’s recommendations:
overseeing the financial reporting process and assisting the public account
ant in preserving independence. SAS No. 61 has had another positive
change: it has encouraged auditing firms to expand their regular interaction
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with audit committees thereby becoming more conversant with the needs of
audit committees.

Recent Public Accounting Firm Guidance
on Audit Committees
Many public accounting firms have recognized that the external auditor
does indeed serve a unique role that could assist audit committees in
meeting their public expectations. For example, Grant Thornton (1988),
in one of its regular newsletters to financial institution clients, states:
The auditors are a gold mine of information. For some reason, bank
and S&L staff will often confide in auditors about operating
problems, faulty documentation, or even fraud. The external
auditors have a better chance of passing this information on to the
audit committee than the internal auditors.
Advocates of expanded communication with audit committees may be
disappointed that Grant Thornton only describes the information as some
thing they “have a better chance of passing along to audit committees”
rather than being required to pass it along. But it does recognize that
auditors can expect to communicate more information to audit committees.
Other public accounting firms also see a broader role for audit com
mittees. Deloitte & Touche, in its booklet Current Issues for Audit
Committees, 1992, cites the following examples of special projects the
audit committee may undertake to ensure that the company’s disclosure
obligations are satisfied:
• Investigating questionable payments or lapses of internal control
• Monitoring compliance with the company’s code of conduct
• Assessing the adequacy of internal control over electronic data process
ing operations or certain computer-accessible data
• Measuring the impact that changes in accounting standards proposed by
the FASB or other regulatory bodies are likely to have on the company.
Arthur Andersen & Co., in its booklet Audit Committees in the 1990’s,
firmly comes to grip with the growing global economy and the need for
independent and effective action by audit committees. They recognize that
“expectations of regulatory agencies, shareholders, lenders and the public
at large have risen dramatically in recent years. These expectations, world
wide, are likely to broaden even further in the 1990’s and beyond.” Their
view is broad:
The Audit Committee, with the full Board, should concentrate on
critical business issues and assure itself that management and the
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independent auditors have focused on the areas of greatest risk to
the company.
Their subsequent conclusion is the same as that of the Committee of
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission in its preliminary
report, Internal Control—Integrated Framework:
The Audit Committee, in conjunction with, or in addition to a
strong internal audit function is in the best position within an entity
to identify and act in instances where top management overrides
other internal controls or otherwise seeks to misrepresent operating
or financial results.
Areas of risk cited in the Arthur Andersen & Co. document include
elements of the corporate control environment, regulatory matters, and
business risk. A review of these risk areas provides an avenue to which
we can compare the potential expectation gap between audit committee
needs and SAS No. 61. Elements of that detail are briefly discussed below
in each of the areas of (1) monitoring the overall corporate control environ
ment, (2) ensuring a sound financial reporting function, and (3) fostering
ethical behavior.

Monitoring the Overall Corporate Control Environment. In assess
ing control, much of the discussion in the AA booklet focuses on traditional
areas already discussed. However, the information needed to understand,
assess, and monitor the financial planning and control function includes
knowledge of an organization’s—
• Strategic business plan.
• Annual operating budget.
• Future business, financial, and control risks.
• Key financial and business controls.
• Data processing function and related controls.
• Management information systems.
• Liquidity.
• Long-term commitments.
• Regulatory requirements.

Ensuring a Sound Financial Reporting Function. Audit committees
are increasingly concerned that a sound reporting function exists if they are
to meet their expanding responsibilities. They can accomplish this analysis
only if they thoroughly understand the business and related accounting
concepts. This area includes—
• Understanding the company’s business.
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• Understanding and assessing the financial reporting process, including
an understanding of the complexity of company business and financial
systems, significant judgmental reporting matters, and the historical
reliability of the company’s reporting system.
• Understanding and assessing the fairness of financial reporting.
Fostering Ethical Behavior. AA sees a broad role for audit committees
in fostering and monitoring an ethical environment in the organization.
This includes the assurance that a code of conduct is developed,
implemented, and effectively monitored.

Rising Expectations: Is There a Gap
or Is It a Nonaudit Role?
Expectations of audit committees are clearly growing. It is not expected
that required auditor communication address all the issues of rising expec
tations, but it is necessary to periodically compare the rising expectations
with current responsibilities. A summary of those expectations and
SAS No. 61 and other reporting requirements is shown in table 2.
As can be seen in table 2, expectations of audit committees have
evolved to an extent where much is expected of them. As pointed out
earlier, a large part of this is caused by changing ideas about corporate
governance and the growing recognition of the responsibility of the
board of directors to serve as an independent check on the powers of
management. Also, as noted earlier, many of these responsibilities are
being thrust on the audit committee, because usually it is the only
committee of the board composed solely of outside directors, its members
are used to probing, and working with independent, objective third-party
advisors. In this changing environment, we feel that external auditors,
as well as others, have an important role to play. However, the external
audit role defined in SAS No. 61 is restricted to financial reporting issues,
problems in conducting the audit, significant accounting policies,
judgments, and estimates, and “opinion shopping,” rather than broader
and more important issues of corporate governance. Our specific
recommendations about what changes are necessary are discussed
in the next section.
Questions may be raised as to whether this is a legitimate role for auditors
to play. However, the changing environment may thrust this role on
accountants by holding them responsible for not providing such
information. As the earlier quotation from Al Sommer (1991) stated: “If
auditors are to reduce the hazards posed by litigation, they must avail them
selves of every resource available to them. Clearly the audit committee is
one of those resources. It is in their interest to be sure that the resource
76

77

External auditor;
internal auditor;
company counsel;
financial management
External auditor;
internal auditor;
financial management
External auditor;
financial management

Oversee internal controls; ensure propriety of expenditures;
ensure compliance with regulations and laws; control EDP
operations

Monitor the overall corporate control environment; evaluate
management and administrative controls

Evaluate and assist in maintaining independence of outside
auditor; recommend engagement or discharge of outside
auditors

External auditor;
financial management

Management;
external auditor;
internal auditor

reporting controls; evaluate changes in
review financial statements (annual and
impact of changes in accounting standards
party transactions

Assess areas of greatest risk to the company; possible liquidity
problems; major loss contingencies; asset quality; marginal
operating units or product lines

Oversee financial
accounting policy;
quarterly); measure
and monitor related

Possible Information
Providers

(continued)

Reporting disagreements with manage
ment; consultations with other accountants;
issues discussed prior to retention

Reporting deficiencies in the control
environment

Reporting deficiencies in internal control;
reporting fraud and illegal acts

Limits auditor responsibilities to report
ing deficiencies in internal control; initial
selection and choices of accounting
policy; audit adjustments; reservations
about interim information

SAS No. 61 Requirements

Comparison of Audit Committee Expectations and Auditor Responsibilities

Expectations of the Role of Audit Committees

TABLE 2
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External auditor;
financial management
External auditor;
financial management;
company counsel
External auditor;
internal auditor;
financial management
External auditor;
internal auditor
(more limited)
External auditor;
internal auditor;
company counsel
External auditor;
internal auditor;
company counsel

Review provision of other services by outside auditor

Review material transactions, contracts, and status of legal
matters

Review audit and non-audit fees, arrangements and scope of the
audit, and results of the audit

Perform independent review of management’s conduct of busi
ness and safety and soundness issues

Direct and supervise special investigations

Review compliance with a code of conduct, management per
quisites, ethical behavior, and conflicts of interest

Possible Information
Providers

Reporting difficulties in performing the
audit

SAS No. 61 Requirements

Comparison of Audit Committee Expectations and Auditor Responsibilities (continued)

Expectations of the Role of Audit Committees

TABLE 2

is as effective as it is possible to make it, and they are in a position to make
it so.” Some accounting firms are clearly moving toward recognizing this
increased responsibility. For example, Arthur Andersen believes that
independent auditors should be prepared to answer the following questions:
• Has the audit identified any areas of serious concern relative to the
overall corporate control environment?
• To what extent is a review of compliance with government or other
regulatory requirements a part of the annual audit? Are you aware of any
areas of significant risk or instances of noncompliance?
• What issues or concerns exist that could have a serious future adverse
impact on the financial or operating stability of the company? Do you
believe that these are being addressed by management?
• Are the personnel in the financial organization sufficient in number,
experience, and capability for the size and complexity of the company
and its activities?
• Putting yourself in the Audit Committee’s position, are there any other
key questions that you (the auditor) believe should be asked by us as
outside directors?
Brochures from other firms suggest similar types of questions.
Clearly, there is a gap between expanding responsibilities and required
communication. Also, our analysis of table 2 shows that there are many
areas where external auditors have a competitive advantage in assisting the
audit committee members in performing their tasks.

R ecom m en d atio n s an d F uture R esearch
SAS No. 61 has been effective in promoting communication with audit
committees. However, as discussed in the previous section, there are areas
where the auditing profession could more effectively meet the challenge
offered by Sommer at the beginning of this paper to ensure that this resource
(i.e., the audit committee) is as effective as possible. The first set of recom
mendations may have implications for the Auditing Standards Board. The
second set of recommendations are more pertinent to the general practice of
public accounting in assisting audit committees to be more effective.

Recommendations With Potential
Standard-Setting Implications
1.

The required communication in SAS No. 61 to audit committees should
specify that the auditor be required to meet at least once annually with
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the audit committee without members of management present. The
internal audit profession should develop similar standards for meeting
with audit committees. Those standards should be incorporated into
audit committee charters.
2. The SEC should consider having the auditor review quarterly financial
data on all publicly held clients, significant nonpublicly held financial
institutions, and other companies that have significant operations in the
public trust. The results of that review should be communicated to the
audit committee.
3. Communication with audit committees ought to be expanded to include
a discussion of compliance with significant laws and regulations where
noncompliance may cause unusual risks for the organization.
4. SAS No. 55 cites an effective and independent audit committee as one
of the important elements of an organization’s control environment.
However, there is a concern as to what constitutes “independent” in
terms of audit committee membership. The profession should consider
providing additional guidance in evaluating the independence of audit
committees—as noted above, it is more than just being an outside direc
tor. An audit study guide on effective audit committees could develop
suggestions on the content of meetings, the audit committee charter,
and the potential audit committee role in evaluating compliance with
laws and regulations.
5. The profession should consider the development of guidance to assist
auditors and audit committee members in evaluating aspects of internal
control such as those being developed in the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations (COSO) report and cited in the GAO report that have
traditionally been viewed as administrative controls, but are important
in assessing business and control risk.
6. The SEC should consider expanded reporting on the resignation of
audit committee members.

Recommendations for Public Accounting Firms
1.

2.

3.
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External and internal auditors should anticipate the information needs
of the audit committee and help it be an effective force. The financial
management of the company can help this effort by providing regular
briefings as well as training on important issues to committee members.
Audit committee members need to be educated in several areas,
including those reporting issues in which judgment is required, the
nature of the business, operational and financial risks facing the
company, as well as complex financial reporting issues.
The public accounting firms should work more aggressively with audit
committees in ensuring that management takes follow-up actions in
light of their findings and discussions.

4.

5.

6.

Public accounting firms should work with clients and their internal
auditors to establish audit committees in organizations such as mutual
insurance companies that could affect the public well-being.
The public accounting profession should work with the internal
auditors in planning and working to meet the needs of audit com
mittees. The public accounting profession can reinforce for audit
committee members the importance of the internal audit function,
including its usefulness in helping the committee operate effectively.
External auditors need to alert audit committees about potential
problems as soon as they are noted.

Future Research Recommendations
Audit committees are evolving and there is a call for more responsibility
in the area of corporate governance on a worldwide basis. But are there
limits to audit committees? These limits and the profiles of effective,
independent audit committees need to be examined further. We suggest the
following topics for further research:
• Factors affecting the independence of audit committees. To what extent
do audit committee members have relationships with management that
may negatively affect their independence? What are these factors? Should
these factors be monitored by, or reported to, the SEC?
• Methods to improve accountability of audit committees. To what extent
should the actions of the audit committee be communicated outside of the
corporation, especially regarding controversial issues where auditors
and management may have had disagreements? What mechanisms exist
to ensure that audit committees communicate effectively with the boards
of directors?
• Limits and expectations of audit committees. There are limits to the role
that an audit committee can take in dealing with broad corporate
governance issues. What are those limits? What mechanisms exist for the
audit committee to carry out its responsibilities if it has disagreements
with both management and the board of directors?

C oncluding C o m m en ts
Audit committees have been, and continue to be, an important component
of the system of corporate governance. During the last decade they have
been asked to assume an even greater role. The external auditing function
can assist audit committees in performing that function and can do so within
the parameters of SAS No. 61. However, the profession also needs to assist
audit committee members in achieving needed effectiveness through the
implementation of the recommendations discussed above.
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A ppendix

Audit Committees:
A Self-Assessment Guide
Note: The following questions are offered as top-level questions to begin inquiry
into the nature of Audit Committee activity. A No answer to any of the questions
requires the committee to consider the effect of the answer on its activity. A Yes
answer leads to further questions to explore the extent to which procedures relating
to the question have been effectively implemented.

I.

Organization

1.
2.

Is your Audit Committee composed of a majority of independent directors?
Is the chairman an independent director?

3.

Does the Audit Committee follow a written charter?

4.

Does the Audit Committee meet at least three times annually?

II.

Financial Reporting

1.

Does the Audit Committee review annual financial statements, footnotes,
audit adjustments, accounting changes, and where required to be filed, the
annual report on Form 10K?

2.

Does the Audit Committee review quarterly financial statements and, where
required, Form 10Q and 8K filings?

3.

Does the Audit Committee review transactions with related parties?

4.

Does the Audit Committee review status of income and other tax returns,
reserves, and significant disputes with taxing authorities?
Does the Audit Committee review terms of material transactions, contracts,
and other agreements as they affect the financial statements?
Does the Audit Committee review the status of significant legal matters
affecting the Company?

5.
6.

III.

External Auditing Matters

1.

Does the Audit Committee recommend or approve the selection or retention
of the external auditor?
Does the Audit Committee evaluate the independence of the external auditor?
Does the Audit Committee review the proposed scope and activities of the
annual audit plan to ensure adequate coverage?
Does the Audit Committee review the effect of significant changes in
accounting principles, auditing standards, and SEC reporting requirements
on the scope of the audit?

2.
3.
4.
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Does the Audit Committee review the results of the completed audit?
Does the Audit Committee review the weaknesses and recommended
improvements in the system of internal control reported by the external
auditor?
Does the Audit Committee review the timetable for implementation of
these recommendations?
Do the external auditors have free access to the Audit Committee?
Are the external auditors engaged to review quarterly financial statements?
Internal Auditing Matters

Does the Audit Committee approve the hiring or termination of the chief
internal auditor?
Does the chief internal auditor have free access to the Audit Committee?
Does the Audit Committee review the proposed internal audit program and
its relationship to the scope of the external audit plan?
Does the Audit Committee review the proposed scope of any special projects
or investigations?
Does the Audit Committee review the reports resulting from internal audit
work as they relate to financial reporting?
Does the Audit Committee review the reports resulting from internal audit
work as they relate to weaknesses and recommendations for improvement in
the system of internal control?
Does the Audit Committee review the timetable for implementation of
recommendations to correct weaknesses in internal controls?
Other Matters

Is there a procedure in effect to advise the Audit Committee, on a timely
basis, of any serious breakdown in internal controls or management fraud?
Does the Audit Committee review management perquisites?
Does the Audit Committee review reports on any illegal, improper, or sensi
tive payments?
Does the Company have a code of business conduct? If so, does the Audit
Committee review the compliance procedures?
Does the Audit Committee have procedures to document its activities,
including the reasons for its decisions?
Does the Company include in its annual report to stockholders, a manage
ment report dealing with management’s responsibility for financial
statements and the system of internal accounting control?
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Implementing SAS No. 55:
An Interim Report
W illiam R. Kinney, Jr., University of Texas at Austin
W illiam L. Felix, Jr., University of Arizona
SAS No. 55 may have the broadest potential impact of any o f the expecta
tions gap standards. It increased the factors to be considered in control
risk assessment (including risk at the assertions level), provided new
definitions, and altered the requirements for control testing. The related
Audit and Accounting Guide showed how the standard can be applied to
control testing in an electronic data processing (EDP) environment.
We reviewed the literature on SAS No. 55 and the implementation
guidance of several Big Six, large non-Big Six, and smallerfirms. Wefound
that auditors are being directed to consider a broader range of control
factors and to assess control risk at the assertions level. Also, EDP
guidance is now more systematic and consistent across firms. However,
the requirements of SAS No. 55 are subject to more varying interpretations
than were its predecessors. Wefound that implementation guidance across
firms is more varied, especially for control testing. Thus, SAS No. 55 may
have mixed success in narrowing the expectations gap.

Between September 1984 and April 1988 only two SASs were issued
by the Auditing Standards Board (ASB), April 1988 brought nine new
“expectation gap closing” standards, including a major revision of the offi
cial guidance on internal control—SAS No. 55. SAS No. 55, Consideration
of the Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit, was
accompanied by an unusually large number of explanations and support
statements as well as a subsequent audit guide to provide additional
guidance and elaboration (AICPA 1990). There were also expressions
of concern from ASB members and statements from auditing professors
and students.
Given the passage of time, what can now be said about SAS No. 55?
How has it been implemented? How has it affected practice? Has it been
as successful in improving auditing as the proponents claimed it would?
Have consequences been as dire as its detractors predicted? Although we
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cannot be definitive in answering these questions, we can provide an
interim review report of some changes to date.
In this brief paper, we review the claims and counterclaims made about
SAS No. 55 and select several key points of controversy for follow up. We
then review the scholarly and practice literature on internal control, SAS
No. 55, and the related audit guide. This is followed by an analysis of audit
polity and practice guidance of four Big Six and three second nine public
accounting firms, as well as an audit guide used by a large number of
smaller firms. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks.

SAS No. 55: P rom ise an d Pitfalls
Before attempting to assess the implementation of SAS No. 55 and
whether it has been successful, it is useful to review some of the claims
made about why it was needed, what it was intended to accomplish, and
why some had opposing views. Our review includes justification of the
statement by the ASB’s chairman (Sullivan 1988) and three 1988 Journal of
Accountancy articles explaining the statement to AICPA members (Guy and
Sullivan 1988; Monk and Tatum 1988; Temkin and Winters 1 9 8 8 ) .1The
opposing views are from those ASB members expressing qualified assents
and dissents to issuance of SAS No. 55, a professor and former AICPA
vice-president (Carmichael 1987), a discussant’s comments on Sullivan
(Kinney 1988), and two articles evaluating SAS No. 55 (Morton and Felix
1990, 1991).

Supporting Views
According to the ASB’s chairman, SAS No. 55 was based on an analysis
of Treadway Commission materials and some unpublished research
conducted by Coopers & Lybrand (Sullivan 1988). SAS No. 55 was needed
to correct some serious weaknesses in AU section 320 (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1)—the descendant of Statement on Auditing Procedures
(SAP) No. 54. In particular, correction was needed to (1) broaden
the auditor’s review of internal controls to consider additional types of
misstatement, especially fraudulent reporting by management; (2) focus on
financial statement assertions; and (3) encourage use of multiple levels of
control risk and not simply a “rely” or “don’t rely” approach.
Some concerns related to weaknesses in the wording of AU section 320
itself, and some involved application of the guidance in practice (table 1
1 These latter articles were reprinted in an AICPA booklet entitled Implementing the
Expectation Gap Standards (AICPA 1989).

87

summarizes both types of comments). As an example of the former, all
commentators believed that the focus of AU section 320 was too narrow. In
planning audits, auditors did not consider all possible misstatements that
might arise—notably intentional misstatement by management. Sullivan
(1988) stressed that misstatements are typically not in the transactions but
in fraudulent reporting.
It should be noted that SAP No. 54 was the source of the guidance that the
auditor should consider possible errors that might arise in the accounting
process. AU section 320, paragraph 74, described a four-step “conceptually
logical approach.” Also, paragraph 53 of AU section 320 states that an
internal control review “should be designed to provide. . . an understanding
of the control environment a n d ...th e accounting system [emphasis
added].” However, it is true that most of the AU section 320 guidance
focused on transactions and controls over transactions.

TABLE 1

Criticisms of AU Section 320
Said to Be Alleviated by SAS No. 55
Sullivan
(1988)

Guy and
Sullivan
(1988)

Temkin and
Winters
(1988)

Monk and
Tatum
(1988)

X

X

X

X

Assertions not addressed

X

X

X

X

Inadequate recognition of
effects of EDP

X

Compliance test sampling
for transactions is
over-emphasized

X

X

X

Relation of substantive
tests to compliance tests
and control weaknesses
not clear

X

X

Weaknesses in application:
Auditors implicitly rely
on internal control without
adequate documentation

X

Reliance tends to be all
or nothing

X

Criticism

Weaknesses in wording:
Focus is on transactions
and control procedures,
and not on environment
and accounting system
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X
X

X

The lack of attention to the control environment may lead to a lack of
consideration of the possibility of fraudulent reporting by management or
to lax implementation of controls by management’s employees. One might
argue that the possibility of management fraud is properly a part of the
inherent risk that exists even with excellent controls, and that (top) manage
ment fraud is within the scope of another expectations gap standard
(SAS No. 53). However, almost all would agree that the potential effective
ness of internal control procedures can be undone by a management with
fraudulent intent or that is lax in its attitude toward controls.
The proponents of SAS No. 55 also believed that the wording of AU section
320 was not clear as to the relation of substantive tests to compliance test
results and control weaknesses. Many auditors believed that compliance
tests were tests of transactions and that they applied only to individual
transactions (Temkin and Winters 1988). Monk and Tatum (1988) comment
that statistical sampling is not required to assess control risk and frequently
is used in compliance testing when it is not needed.
Other expressed concerns related to weaknesses in the application of the
guidance of AU section 320 in practice. That is, although the words might be
in AU section 320, auditors did not behave according to the standard. One very
serious claim was that, due to confusion about the requirements for reliance,
many auditors stated in their workpapers that they did not rely on controls, but
implicitly relied on them for some assertions (Sullivan 1988). Implicit reliance
might exist without even a review of the internal control “structure.” Although
this behavior was not sanctioned by AU section 320, Sullivan claims that it was
the result of the section, possibly because auditors fa iled to understand
compliance sampling. Finally, three of the four papers listed in table 1 state
that, under AU section 320, control reliance tended to be “all or nothing”
rather than various degrees of reliance, depending on the circumstances.
Overall, we interpret these comments to favor a less structured, less
detailed, more holistic approach to control risk assessment.

Opposing Views
ASB members expressed many reservations about particular features of
SAS No. 55. Two ASB members gave qualified assents to issuance and four
others dissented from issuance of the entire document. This is the largest
number of members expressing dissatisfaction with a final statement in the
history of the ASB. At issue were the definition of “control tests,” the extent
of control testing required to support an assessment of control risk at less
than the maximum, the role of evidence in control risk assessment, and the
relation of control weaknesses to substantive tests (see table 2).2

2 Note that the latter two issues were also alleged weaknesses in AU section 320 that
SAS No. 55 was designed to replace.
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TABLE 2

Response
Weaknesses in
wording:
Relation of sub
stantive tests to
control tests and
control weak
nesses not clear

Some Critical Responses to SAS No. 55
ASB Members’
Qualified Assents
and Dissents
(1988)

Carmichael
(1987)

Kinney
(1988)

Morton
and Felix
(1990, 1991)

X

X

X

X

“Evidence” is
redefined and
is ambiguous

X

Control risk
definition unclear

X

Weaknesses in
practical application:
Less rigorous
(less conclusive)
control testing
is required

X

X

X

X

Efficiency is
encouraged while
effectiveness
is slighted

X

X

X

X

Overreliance on
management
representations
and controls
is encouraged

X

X

X

X

X

Beyond concerns about the clarity of wording, some ASB members also
believed that SAS No. 55 might lead to less effective auditing and might
widen the expectations gap. Dissenting members’ concerns about effective
ness included: “Placing undue reliance on effectiveness of specific control
procedures based solely on inquiry of client personnel and inspection
of client-prepared documents” ; the need for “review and evaluation” of
internal control and not merely an “understanding” of controls; and that
SAS No. 55 “does not clearly distinguish the operating effectiveness of an
internal control structure policy or procedure from the placing in opera
tion. ..” (AICPA 1988a).
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Academic commentators raised similar concerns about wording and the
possible reduction of audit effort leading to overreliance on controls. For
example, Morton and Felix (1991) explain how auditors with different
beliefs about the possible existence of material misstatement can come to
substantially different levels of achieved audit risk. This is due to the new
definition of control risk and the role that control testing plays in its
assessment.3 Kinney (1988) laments that the focus of SAS No. 55 is on
efficiency instead of effectiveness. He cites several reminders that evidence
supporting a low-risk assessment in one area may also imply low risk in
related areas. These reminders of interconnections that reduce audit work
are not balanced by reminders of those that may increase it. For example,
recent litigation cases and Waller (1992) indicate that when misstatements
exist there are often multiple misstatements. This fact has substantial
implications for the assessment of risk.
Both Kinney (1988) and Carmichael (1987) were concerned that the
changes in wording would lead to underauditing in practice. At issue was
ambiguity as to what credit should be taken for management’s attitudes
toward controls, when reliance on controls and low inherent risk assess
ments could eliminate substantive tests, whether maximum risk meant zero
reliance, the nature and extent of control testing, and how control risk
assessments relate to substantive tests.
Overall, the ASB and academic commentators expressed beliefs that the
new guidance allows many possible interpretations with different implications
for audit effectiveness. This view may have been shared by others. The
discussant of Morton and Felix (1990) gives the rather surprising view that
“literal interpretations of SAS No. 55 can be misleading” (Kreutzfeldt 1990).

Judgm ent R esearch o n Internal C ontrols
Since Ashton’s 1974 article on internal control judgments, a significant
portion of audit judgment and decision-making research has used an
internal control setting. Student and auditor subjects have been studied
while learning internal controls, assessing control risks, making judgments
about the extent of tests of controls, and evaluating the effects of their
internal control work on planned substantive tests. As a result, a number of
useful insights have been generated. We believe some have had an impact on
the policies and practices of individual firms. Early work by Ashton (1974),
Joyce (1976), and Mock and Turner (1981), for example, suggest that auditors

3 SAS No. 55 also broadens the concept of “evidence” to include evidence about con
trols. To our knowledge, prior AICPA literature limited the concept of evidence to
that which helps to satisfy the third standard of field work (“sufficient competent
evidential matter”). Under SAS No. 55, risk assessment evidence that relates to the
risk that misstatement might occur may be confused with substantive evidence for
limiting the detection risk that misstatement has occurred.
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were not consistent in their assessments of the qualities of internal controls or
their importance. More recent studies suggest that, in line with complaints
about AU section 320 and SAS No. 55, auditors have difficulty linking
internal controls to errors (Bonner 1990).
In Frederick (1991), practicing auditors and auditing students were asked
to recall from memory internal controls that would be effective in prevent
ing or detecting specific errors. His purpose was to improve understanding
of knowledge differences between experienced and inexperienced auditors.
Experienced auditors had not only more extensive knowledge of controls,
as expected, but also organized their knowledge in memory differently.
Thus, this study provides information about auditors’ abilities to link errors
and controls.
In a study closer to SAS No. 55, Brown and Solomon (1990) specifically
focused on control risk assessments using configural (or combination pattern)
knowledge to compensate and amplify controls. The auditors did use internal
control information in a “configural” manner, suggesting that internal control
risk assessment guidance should be sensitive to the system of internal controls.
This evidence supports continued inclusion of the accounting system as part of
the internal control structure, as defined by SAS No. 55 (and AU section 320).
Two recent papers (Waller 1990, 1992) investigated auditor assessments
of both inherent and control risk across all five major assertions for three
commonly material accounts—Trade Accounts Receivable, Inventory, and
Trade Accounts Payable. In an experiment, Waller (1990) found judgmental
dependence between inherent and control risk assessments, and a strong
association between risk assessments across both inherent and control risk.
The latter occurred despite the fact that the rate of detected misstatements
varied significantly over the assertions. In an analysis of audit workpapers,
Waller (1992) investigates the effects of second-order uncertainty (Waller
and Felix 1984), or the evidence sufficiency of control risk assessments. He
finds that auditors do address second-order uncertainty in control risk
assessment, and that the contribution of separate assessments is an
unresolved issue. The results of this study indicate that the call by Morton
and Felix (1991) for clarification of the control risk definition is potentially
important in the auditor’s assessment and use of internal control risk.
Waller’s papers also identify significant issues in applying SAS No. 55.
Separate assessments of inherent risk and control risk present at least
two problems (see also Kinney 1984). First, in both professional standards
and the firm literature for the subjects in Waller’s experiments there is
substantial overlap in the factors to consider in assessing inherent risk and
internal control risk. Thus, separation of inherent risk and control risk is
ambiguous. Second, because control risk has both preventive and detective
components, a probability theory-based decomposition is not possible
unless preventive control risk and detective control risk are kept separate.
He suggests that a combined “auditee” risk be assessed in place of separate
assessments of control risk and inherent risk.
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Finally, related to the overall thrust of SAS No. 55, Waller (1992) finds
that there is considerable positive co-occurrence among and between
misstatements in the assertions. For example, if overstatement is discovered
in an earnings assertion for one account, it is likely to be accompanied by
overstatements of earnings in other assertions or accounts. This implies that
when the auditor becomes aware of misstatements, he or she should
consider reevaluating the prior probability of misstatement (or the product
of inherent risk and control risk) for other assertions and other accounts.
Kreutzfeldt and Wallace (1990) investigate the association between inter
nal control risk assessments and detected errors. Their study was motivated
by contradicting evidence in the early literature (see Willingham and Wright
1985). Kreutzfeldt and Wallace conclude that their data strongly suggest
that control risk assessments are linked to errors at the account level (Waller
1992 elaborates on this linkage). They also note that joint consideration of
inherent and control risk factors is useful.
Another issue is how auditors’ control judgments should be combined.
Libby and Libby (1989) obtained expert auditors’ judgments about control
risk for a set of cases. They then conducted experiments asking less expert
auditors to evaluate the same cases. One group made global judgments
about control risk and a second group made judgments about individual risk
elements that were then combined using a mechanical algorithm to yield an
overall risk assessment. Libby and Libby found that the individual risk
assessments combined mechanically were closer to the experts’ judgments
than were the global judgments. This implies that global judgments of less
experienced personnel may be improved through structure such as can be
provided in professional standards, as well as the guidance of firms.
In two separate papers, Morton and Felix (1990, 1991) suggest that the
ASB’s combination of risk assessments and evidence sufficiency judgments
in one construct, “assessed internal control risk” in SAS No. 55, was an
unexpected and potentially confusing choice. The choice was unexpected
because there is no literature indicating that such a combination is a sensible
and efficient approach to considering the two elements. They suggest the
choice may be confusing because the result is an auditing planning element
that has different meanings in different contexts.

Analysis of A udit Policy M aterials
To assess the implementation of SAS No. 55 in practice, we reviewed
the audit practice and policy guidance statements of several large public
accounting firms. Included were four Big Six firms and three firms from the
second nine. We also reviewed the guidance in Practitioners Publishing
Company’s Guide to Audits of Small Businesses (Carmichael, McMurrian,
and Anderson 1991), which is used by many smaller firms. Thus, we had
input from a wide range of accounting firms.
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Our review covered several topics, but we focus on the thirteen areas
noted in tables 1 and 2. As might be expected, the results are mixed. Some
problems or alleged problems seem to have been mitigated by SAS No. 55
and the audit guide, whereas others have not. And, some predictions of both
the supporters and the detractors for SAS No. 55 are supported by our
review, whereas others are not. Table 3 summarizes our findings.

TABLE 3

Score Sheet for Claims of Proponents
and Opponents of SAS No. 55
__________________ SAS No. 55__________________

_____________________________ Successful_______________ Unsuccessful______

Proponents (Table 1)
Broader focus of
control risk (CR)
assessment
Assertions basis
EDP recognition
Less transaction
compliance testing
Relation of control
effectiveness to
substantive tests
Reduced implicit
reliance on controls
Variable reliance
on controls
Opponents (Table 2)
Relation of control
effectiveness to
substantive tests
“Evidence” ill-defined
“Control risk” ill-defined
Less rigorous
control testing
Efficiency unduly
encouraged
Overreliance on
management repre
sentations encouraged
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Supporters
We find successes for SAS No. 55 and the audit guide in resolving four
of the five alleged difficulties caused by the wording of SAP No. 54 and
AU section 320 (the first five issues in table 1). First, all manuals give
attention to the control environment and the accounting system. As
discussed in both sections above, it is arguable that aspects of the control
environment relate to inherent risk and not to control risk. However, there
is particular attention given to assessing the risk of management fraud and
to the likely attention of management to any control deviations or fraud
by employees. As to recognition of all possible types of errors, we did not
find evidence that auditors are instructed to list systematically all possible
errors. Furthermore, one firm has formally reduced the scope of its internal
control work. Prior to SAS No. 55 it required the auditor to identify,
document, and evaluate basic controls in the control environment. Now,
the required work is limited to controls over completeness and accuracy
of records.
Second, the policy guidance of all firms indicates an assertions-at-theaccount-balance-level evaluation of control risk.4 Third, there is evidence of
increased attention to electronic data processing (EDP) and to lower control
risk assessments due to EDP. All of the firms surveyed prescribe a separate
workpaper section evaluating EDP. One Big Six firm that previously had
used a transactions level approach defines EDP as “inherently reliable”
under specified conditions, and has worksheets to help assess EDP features
and controls for virtually all audits. Furthermore, the same guidance states
that EDP should lead the auditor to focus on controls over EDP pro
grammed controls and not on transactions directly. Although one could
argue that technological change and not SAS No. 55 is the cause of the
change, SAS No. 55 (especially the audit guide) encourages such an
approach since the controls over controls (i.e., supervisory controls) may
be relatively easy to test and may eliminate costly tests of controls over
transactions. Finally, as discussed below, use of audit sampling in tests of
controls is a “last resort” effort in six of the seven firms studied.
On the other side of the ledger, we find that the ties between control risk
and substantive tests are still rather vague. Part of the problem may be in
SAS No. 55 itself. For example, the Practitioners Publishing Company
guide states: “The auditor’s task in assessing control risk is to link control
policies and procedures with assertions. SAS No. 55 provides no guidance
on methods for establishing that link [emphasis added].”
Given the lack of linkage in the SAS, firms have developed their own. One
second tier firm states simply that for low control risk, the auditor will

4 Three firms have modified the approach by including “cutoffs” and “accuracy” along
with the five assertions from SAS No. 31 to yield seven “objectives” for each account.
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“typically rely on analytical procedures as the primary test.” For maximum
control risk, use of analytical procedures as the primary procedure will be
limited, whereas for moderate risk, a blend of procedures is common.
Interestingly, the same firm provides structured audit programs for moder
ate risk but requires that the auditor generate his or her own program for
low and maximum risk. Thus, the auditor is encouraged to assess control
risk at the moderate level. Further encouragement for a moderate risk
assessment is offered in control testing. For moderate risk, firm policy
states that control testing can be limited to a “walk-through” of three to five
items selected from the accounting period.5 Apparently this is a control test
over the design of the system. There are no required tests to support an
evaluation of moderate risk for “operating effectively.” For an assessment
of “low” control risk, a sample of fifty to sixty items is required, but the
auditor can judgmentally evaluate whether the sample deviation rate is
sufficiently below the tolerable deviation rate to justify the “low control
risk” assessment. The auditor could decide that two, three, or even five or
six deviations might be acceptable evidence that the population rate does
not exceed 10 percent, for example.
Whether positive or negative, a trend away from audit sampling for
control testing is obvious in all three of the Big Six firms reviewed. One
states, “Examination of evidence, coupled with in-depth inquiry and
observation, often provides sufficient evidence about the effective design
and operation of controls without using sampling techniques.” Further, the
focus is on whether “individuals responsible for a control understand it
and are diligent in its execution, and for computerized controls,. . . how the
client ensures that it is properly implemented, maintained, and operated.”
This firm also states that inquiries, observations, and examinations of
evidence are “normally sufficient” to assess whether the control is operat
ing effectively. Cases of required reperformance of a procedure are not
the normal case and no guidance is offered as to how such procedures
are to be applied.
Another Big Six firm limits audit sampling for control testing to “possi
ble use for testing manual controls if high reliance is to be placed on them”
and the minimum sample size is set at twenty. For this firm, “a moderate
degree of control satisfaction” can be obtained from a review of controls,
“supplemented by a process of inquiry and observation, possibly including
the tracing of a few items through the system (to provide evidence regarding
the operating effectiveness).”
A third Big Six firm that prior to SAS No. 55 had strongly encouraged
broad use of audit sampling, now has guidance that states: “Sampling is not
5 On the other hand, the Practitioners Publishing Company’s guide is very explicit in
warning that walk-throughs “[r]arely provide enough evidence about operating
effectiveness by themselves to allow reduced control risk assessment.”
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necessarily required for tests of controls.” Rather, the judgment about
control risk often “involves many control procedures operating together
and does not necessarily require a separate judgment about a particular
procedure.” However, if sampling is deemed important for an individual
procedure, then a sample of twenty-five is to be taken and a single deviation
indicates that the procedure does not support an assessment of low control
risk assessment. Thus, if sampling is used for control tests, the criteria for
assessment is clear.
We find improvement in practice in the required consideration and
documentation of controls for most of the firms surveyed. By focusing on
assertions, the control environment, and the accounting system, there is at
least some consideration of the reliance on controls to satisfy the complete
ness assertion and implicit reliance on controls is more explicit. In fact, one
firm states that reliance on controls for completeness is often essential and
may require a control risk assessment.
Finally, we find evidence that auditors are relying on controls to a varying
degree. The most common classifications used by auditors are “maximum
risk,” “moderate risk” and “low risk.” Some firms also use a “slightly less
than the maximum” category. The latter category yields a 20 percent reduc
tion in substantive sample size with very little auditor effort at control risk
assessment. This level is a new one for the firm (i.e., new with SAS No. 55)
and it should be noted that “maximum” means 1.0 risk or no control
reliance for this firm. For some other firms, the “maximum” risk is clearly
less than one. Thus, substantive tests and achieved audit risk will vary
across firms even when they agree that control risk is at the “maximum.”

Opponents
As to the critics of SAS No. 55, we find that their concerns were justified
(at least the six listed in table 2). There is now no confusion about
the meaning of compliance tests (since the term has been deleted),
but, there is now confusion about control tests and how they are to be
considered. The varying interpretations are especially apparent for tests of
whether controls are operating effectively. For example, one firm warns
against overreliance on management inquiry for evidence about “operating
effectively,” whereas two other firms require no tests for effectiveness if the
assessment is moderate risk. In contrast to the latter two, the smaller firm’s
guidance was particularly strong in warning that inquiry and observation
are persuasive only while the auditor is present, and that “persuasiveness
of evidence from prior audits is limited because effectiveness may
have changed.”
A review of the policy guidance clearly indicates that many auditors have
reduced the extent and relaxed the nature of control testing. This comes in
three forms. One, given increased emphasis on EDP and programmed
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controls, detailed sampling of individual controls is properly reduced. This
may be in part balanced by more testing of the design and operating
effectiveness of EDP controls and supervisory controls (i.e., supervisory
controls over transaction controls). Second, we found many references to
“ inquiry” and “observation” of control procedures and relatively little
about “reperformance.” Thus, risk of overreliance on controls that are not
operating effectively may be increased. Third, as discussed above, we did
not find any firm that requires (or even encourages) audit sampling for
control tests.
The emphasis on audit efficiency in SAS No. 55 is also evident in the
firms’ guidance on the relation among controls. As examples, one firm
states “certain controls over completeness and existence may also reduce
the risk of cutoff errors at year end,” and “information used to make
valuation judgments may be subject to controls. .. [and].. . may provide
evidence about the reliability of that information, thus reducing the
evidence needed from other tests.”
As to the linkage of control risk to the substantive audit, there appears to
be a trend away from audit sampling and tests of details.6 One firm’s
guidance states that “normally” it is not necessary to perform substantive
tests of details of transactions in the income statement. Rather, when
the risk of material misstatement is not high, the balance sheet work and
analytical procedures provide the necessary assurance.
One concern about SAS No. 55 was that credit would be taken for a “good
attitude” toward internal control (Carmichael 1987; Kinney 1988). We did
not find firm guidance references to control risk reduction for good attitude
alone. On the positive side, one Big Six firm now states that in a good con
trol environment the “evidence obtained by inquiry of client personnel is
more persuasive.” The same guidance also cautions the auditor that inquiry
ordinarily will not support reliance on effective operation of a control
procedure. On the other side, we did not find similar cautions in the other
firms’ guidance. Nor did we find cautions about the co-occurrence of errors
problem documented in Waller (1992).
We were unable to locate any comprehensive transition documents
bridging the firms’ guidance from AU section 320 to SAS No. 55. This
would have been helpful in determining at least the initial interpretation
of the new guidance and how it might affect practice. We did get contem
poraneous input from one Big Six partner who called us when his firm’s
guidance was changed. He said, “Bill, you will be interested to know that
our firm has just issued new guidance that substantially reduces the amount

6 Concerning the linkage, the Practitioners Publishing Company guide states: “The
auditor’s task in assessing control risk is to link control policies and procedures with
assertions. SAS No. 55 provides no guidance on methods for establishing that link
[emphasis added].”
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of auditing that our personnel are required to do.” Bill said, “Really, what
do you call it?” He responded, “We call it ‘implementing SAS No. 55,’ but
the effect is to reduce our required effort in order to be competitive.”

C onclusions
In conclusion, based on our review of the objectives and the guidance of
SAS No. 55, we find that implementation has had mixed success at best.
Clearly, there is more attention being given to assertions at the account
balance level, to documenting the control environment and accounting
system, and to reliance on supervisory controls including EDP-based
controls. Also, there is a broader focus overall for control risk assessment.
This reliance on a combination of controls is probably well placed.
There is still confusion about what control tests mean, especially tests
of operating effectiveness, and about the links between controls and
substantive tests. Also, it is clear that there is more flexibility allowed in
control testing to support an assessment of low control risk than was
required for a “high-reliance” assessment under AU section 320. There is
great variation in the basis for a “moderate-risk” assessment.
It is difficult to determine whether SAS No. 55 and the related audit guide
have improved audit practice on the average. Audits should be better in that
a broader range of risk factors is being considered at the planning stage.
However, this possible improvement may be more than balanced by less
rigorous control testing and looser links to substantive tests.
There is considerable risk that the variance of audit practice has been
increased by SAS No. 55, especially given recent competitive pressures
to lower audit fees. Different interpretations of the minimum requirements
for determining operating effectiveness of controls can lead to dramatic
differences in the audit effort expended on control risk assessment. In turn,
there will be different levels of detection risk with a final result of different
levels of achieved audit risk.
Since audit quality is not easily observed in the short run, any large
differences in average audit effort across audit firms may drive high-quality
auditors out of business. In the long run, the low-quality auditors may also
fail due to unmet expectations. We remain concerned that reliance on more
general, subjective, and impressionistic control risk assessments may lead
to significant variation (if not reduction) in audit effectiveness.
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An Evaluation of SAS No. 53,
The Auditor's Responsibility
to Detect and Report
Errors and Irregularities
W. Steve Albrecht, Brigham Young University
John J. Willingham, KPMG Peat Marwick
The purpose of this paper is to review the relevant research, litigation, and
state of practice to determine if SAS No. 53 has been successful in narrowing
the expectation gap with respect to auditors ’ responsibilities to detect and
report errors and irregularities. The paper concludes that SAS No. 53 can
be successful if (1) users, the SEC, and the courts accept SAS No. 53 as
defining the auditor’s responsibility to detect and disclose fraud or (2) if
SAS No. 53 effectively changes the way auditors conduct audits so that
audits actually provide “reasonable assurance” that irregularities have
been detected. The evidence concerning both possibilities seems rather
negative. Indeed, SAS No. 53 contains three limiting caveats that appear to
be unacceptable to users, the SEC, and the courts. Accordingly, lawsuits
against accountants appear not to have decreased. In addition, the quality
o f an audit is being questioned today more than ever. Users ’ expectations
of auditors to detect fraud appear to be deeply rooted in the profession’s
earlier undertakings to detect fraud. Changes made by auditors because of
SAS No. 53 appear to be rather cosmetic at best. In addition, this paper
provides empirical evidence about the effectiveness o f the risk factors
identified in SAS No. 53 in identifying financial statements where material
misstatement is likely.

Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 53 provides guidance on the
independent auditor’s responsibility for the detection of errors and
irregularities in the audit o f financial statements. It was effective for audits
o f financial statements for periods beginning on or after January 1, 1989.
One o f the purposes motivating its issuance was the need to narrow the
expectation gap between what independent auditors actually do and what
the users o f financial statements perceive that they do.
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The purpose of this paper is to review the relevant research, litigation,
and state of practice to determine if SAS No. 53 has been successful in
narrowing the expectation gap with respect to errors and irregularities.
In meeting this objective, the paper is divided into ten sections. In the first,
the relevant parties (players) involved in the expectation gap controversy are
identified. In the second, a brief history of auditing standards relating to
errors and irregularities is presented. In the third, SAS No. 53 is analyzed
to determine how it differs from previous standards and what promise it
holds to close the expectation gap. In the fourth, the guidance provided in
SAS No. 53 to identify risk factors that may signal financial statement
fraud are examined and empirical research that tested their reliance is
presented. In the fifth, evidence concerning whether auditors have changed
their practice because of SAS No. 53 is presented. In the sixth, evidence
regarding the views of the public—one of the primary groups of users
of audits—about SAS No. 53 is discussed. In the seventh, evidence describ
ing the views and expectations of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) with respect to errors and irregularities are discussed. In the eighth,
lessons learned about SAS No. 53 from lawyers’ perceptions are pre
sented. In the ninth, litigation evidence relating to SAS No. 53 issues is
presented. The paper concludes with a short summary and implications
for the profession.

Parties Involved in the
Expectation Gap Controversy
There are five primary parties (players) involved in the expectation gap
controversy. On one side are (1) the AICPA with its professional standards
and (2) practicing independent auditors. Together, these groups promulgate
auditing standards that articulate the necessary care that must be exercised
when conducting an audit and issues audit opinions used by the public.
On the other side are three independent groups: (1) the public, usually
represented by investors and creditors, (2) the SEC, to which all public
companies must report, and (3) the courts, which make determinations,
usually in civil cases, about whether auditors have been negligent in
conducting an audit and/or whether or not they should pay penalties to
plaintiffs (usually investors and creditors) who have suffered damages.
Each of these five groups has had significant input in determining the
level of responsibility an auditor has to detect errors and irregularities
when conducting an audit. The public, usually through opinion polls and
editorials, has stated its position about auditors’ responsibilities to detect
irregularities. The SEC, through various releases, has also stated its
position about auditors’ responsibility to detect irregularities. The courts,
through their rulings in numerous cases where the quality of auditors’
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work has been questioned, have made determinations as to the extent of
responsibility an auditor has to detect irregularities.
As will be discussed, the positions of the public, the SEC, and the courts
have been relatively consistent over time. The position of the AICPA
and auditors, on the other hand, has been quite fluid, changing consider
ably over time. Thus, for purposes of this paper, the expectation gap
is the perceived difference between the three parties (public, SEC, and
courts) and the public accounting profession (AICPA and auditors) with
respect to an auditor’s responsibility to detect errors and irregularities while
conducting an audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS).

Auditors' Responsibility to Detect Errors
and Irregularities: A Brief History
During the early part of this century there was universal agreement, even
among auditors, that the detection of fraud (irregularities) was one of the
primary purposes for conducting an audit of financial statements. Indeed,
as noted in Carmichael and Willingham (1971), the function of detecting
fraud is deeply rooted in the historical role of auditors, dating back
to the early 1500s. As late as the 1930s, most auditors emphasized the
detection of fraud as a primary purpose of an audit. Mautz and Sharaf
(1961) stated, “Until recently there was substantial acceptance of the idea
that an independent audit had as one of its principal purposes the detection
and prevention of fraud and other irregularities.” An early edition of
Montgomery1 listed three objectives of the audit: (1) “The detection
of fraud,” (2) “The detection of technical errors,” and (3) “The detection of
errors in principle.”
By the late 1930s, there was a very visible change in the auditing profes
sion’s willingness to accept responsibility for detecting fraud as a purpose
of an audit of financial statements. This revolutionary change culminated in
the issuance of Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) No. 1, Extensions
of Auditing Procedure? SAP No. 1 contained the following statement:
The ordinary examination incident to the issuance of financial
statements accompanied by a report and opinion of an independent
certified public accountant is not designed to discover all defalca
tions, because that is not its primary objective, although discovery
of defalcation frequently results... .To exhaust the possibility of
1 Carmichael and Willingham, p. 7 (citing R.H. Montgomery, Auditing Theory and
Practice, 1912). This provision also appeared in Montgomery’s second (1923) and
third (1927) editions.
2 Sullivan, Gnospelius, Defliese, and Jaenicke, pp. 121-122.
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exposure of all cases of dishonesty or fraud, the independent audi
tor would have to examine in detail all transactions. This would
entail a prohibitive cost to the great majority of business
enterprises—a cost which would pass all bounds of reasonable
expectation of benefit or safeguard therefrom, and place an undue
burden on industry.3
Since the issuance of SAP No. 1, the profession has struggled, some would
say without much success, to refine and articulate its position on detecting
irregularities and to establish standards that are capable of convincing users
that auditors should have only a limited role in detecting fraud.
During the late 1950s, SAP No. 1 and the profession came under vigorous
attack and pressure mounted for the AICPA to consider its official position
as stated in SAP No. 1. The AICPA’s response was to issue a new standard,
SAP No. 30, Responsibilities and Functions o f the Independent Auditor in
the Examination o f Financial Statements, in 1960. SAP No. 30 was viewed
by many as being unresponsive to user concerns because it added no new
responsibility to detect fraud. Specifically, SAP No. 30 stated an auditor’s
responsibility to detect irregularities as follows:
The ordinary examination incident to the expression of an opinion
on financial statements is not primarily or specifically designed,
and cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other simi
lar irregularities, although their discovery may result. Similarly,
although the discovery of deliberate misrepresentations by manage
ment is usually more closely associated with the objective of the
ordinary examination, such examination cannot be relied upon to
assure its discovery.4
Although the standard did stress that an auditor had an obligation to “be
aware of the possibility that fraud may exist,” it also made it clear that an
auditor had no affirmative responsibility to go beyond that minimum duty
and design tests that would detect fraud. As Costello (1991) states, “Indeed,
the language contained in SAP No. 30 was so negatively stated that it justifi
ably led auditors to conclude they had little or no obligation to structure
their tests to detect fraud.” Because the goal of a GAAS audit is to determine
if the financial statements conform to generally accepted accounting

3 As stated by Costello (p. 272), the fact that this standard cut across the grain of
common understanding concerning the role of auditors has had a troublesome
significance for the profession. The public’s expectations today are still deeply rooted
in the profession’s earlier undertakings to detect fraud. Costello believes that because
of the earlier stated purpose to detect fraud, attempts by the profession to renounce
or amend those undertakings may ultimately prove futile. As he states, “As a
minimum, more will be required than the promulgation of new and often esoteric
standards which fail to reach the public consciousness.”
Statement on Auditing Procedures No. 30, paragraph 5.
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principles (GAAP), even strict adherence to GAAS would have provided
little assurance that fraud would be detected. As Carmichael and Willin
gham (1971) stated, SAP No. 30 failed as the controlling standard for audi
tors because it was regarded by many auditors as an inadequate vehicle to
avoid liability. The courts appeared to ignore SAP No. 30 and allowed
numerous actions to be brought against auditors for failing to detect and
disclose fraud.5
Although the courts were holding auditors responsible for failing to
detect fraud, it took the Equity Funding Case and its associated scrutiny
of the profession to determine that SAP No. 30 was inadequate. Because
of Equity Funding, in 1975, an AICPA committee was established to
re-examine the auditor’s responsibility to detect management fraud. That
committee concluded that “no substantive change in the degree of responsi
bility was necessary.”6
The Cohen Commission (comprised largely of non-AICPA members)
reached a different conclusion. According to the Cohen Commission,
the auditor:
. . . has a duty to search for fraud, and should be expected to detect
those frauds that the examination would normally uncover.
They went on to say that
.. .users of financial statements should have a right to assume that
audited financial information is not unreliable because of fraud.
. . . An audit should be designed to provide reasonable assurance
that the financial statements are not affected by material fraud.7
In 1977, SAS No. 16, The Independent Auditor’s Responsibility for the
Detection o f Errors or Irregularities, was issued, which admitted some
obligation to search for fraud in the normal course of a GAAS audit. As
stated in SAS No. 16:
The independent auditor’s objective in making an examination of
financial statements in accordance with (GAAS) is to form an
opinion on whether the financial statements present fairly financial
position, results of operations, and changes in financial position in
conformity with (GAAP).. . .Consequently, under (GAAS), the
5 During the period SAP No. 30 was effective, actions against auditors became quite
common. Some of the more famous cases litigated during this period include Schact
v. Brown, Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, United States v. Simon, United States
v. White, Fischer v. Kletz, Western Surety Co. v. Loy, Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers
& Lybrand, Rosenblum v. Adler, National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, MaduffMortg. v.
Deloitte Haskins & Sells, and Bonhiver v. Graff.
6 Treadway Report, p. 50.
7 Cohen Commission Report, p. 36.
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independent auditor has the responsibility, within the inherent
limitations of the auditing process,. . .to plan his examination to
search for (material) errors and irregularities.8
Although SAS No. 16 required the auditor to “search for” fraud, it did not
require the auditor to “detect” fraud. Even after SAS No. 16, auditors
remained unwilling to accept or even acknowledge a substantial respon
sibility to detect fraud. SAS No. 16 contained some of the same kinds
of “defensive and qualifying” language that was included in SAP No. 1
and No. 30. Phrases such as “inherent limitations of the auditing process”
and “unless the auditor’s examination reveals evidentiary matter to the
contrary, his reliance on the truthfulness of certain representations and
the genuineness of records and documents obtained during the examination
was reasonable” allowed auditors to justify an unwillingness to detect
fraud. Madison and Ross (1990) stated that “the language of SAS No. 16
was ambiguous. It did not provide adequate guidance and therefore did not
meet the needs of the accounting profession or the business community.”
Costello (1991) agrees when he states “These qualifying provision(s)
undermined the integrity of SAS No. 16 and rendered any requirement
that an auditor was obligated to search for management fraud virtually
meaningless. .. .Consequently, under SAS No. 16, substantial reliance on
the audit by users of the financial statements to detect management fraud
would have been unwarranted.”

SAS No. 53: Does It Solve the Problem?
By the mid-1980s it was obvious that SAS No. 16 was not doing the job
and that auditors’ unwillingness to accept increased responsibility to detect
fraud was increasing the expectation gap. “Many corporate and banking
debacles once labeled as ‘business failures’ were increasingly being dubbed
‘audit failures,’ a situation shamefully underscored by an epidemic of
lawsuits leveled against auditors for, among other things, failing to uncover
and disclose management fraud” (Costello, 1991). The public, the courts,
and even Congress demanded that auditors accept a greater responsibility
to detect irregularities. In 1988, SAS No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility
to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities, was issued.
SAS No. 53 differs from SAS No. 16 in that it requires an auditor to
“design the audit to provide reasonable assurance of detecting errors
and irregularities.” It also requires auditors to “exercise. . .the proper
degree of professional skepticism to achieve reasonable assurance that
errors and irregularities will be detected.” Unlike prior standards, this
8 Statement on Auditing Standards No. 16, paragraph 5.
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professional skepticism requires the auditor to assume management is
neither honest nor dishonest.
SAS No. 53 holds out two possibilities for reducing the expectation gap.
First, it will result in a narrowing of the gap if users (including investors and
creditors), the SEC, and the courts accept the standard as defining the
auditor’s responsibility to detect and disclose fraud. Indeed, if CPAs can
now be assured that compliance with SAS No. 53 insulates them from
further liability and scrutiny, the standard has been successful. Second,
SAS No. 53 will help close the expectation gap if it effectively changes the
way auditors conduct audits so that audits actually provide “reasonable
assurance” that irregularities have been detected. This latter solution would
require a change in audit approach to be successful. The first case requires
user expectations to change; the second requires that auditors change their
attestation behavior.

Guidance Provided by SAS No. 53
Before discussing any changes in auditors’ attestation behavior, some
evidence about the effectiveness of the guidance contained in SAS No. 53
must be discussed. If the twenty-one factors listed in SAS No. 53 that
should be considered in combination to assess the risk that irregularities
may cause the financial statements to contain a material misstatement
are not the set of factors that should be considered, a change in the way
auditors conduct audits will be ineffective in assessing this risk. In addition,
SAS No. 53 includes no guidance for the auditor about the importance of
each risk factor. How does the auditor combine the factors? How much
weight should be given to each?
KPMG Peat Marwick initiated research to tackle two problems: rele
vance of the factors presented in SAS No. 53 and the question of how they
should be combined.9 The research studies concentrated on management
fraud (i.e., fraudulent financial statements). Judgments about the presence
or absence of “red flag” indicators were collected from engagement part
ners on seventy-seven fraud cases and 305 nonfraud cases. The relevant
fraud indicators were then combined using a statistical model.
Table 1 lists the auditor judgments about the presence of the twenty-one
SAS No. 53 indicators of management fraud in both fraud and nonfraud
companies. Eight of the factors listed in the SAS are not statistically
significant indicators of fraud. Table 2 lists auditor judgments about the
presence of fraud indicators not included in SAS No. 53 that were obtained
by searching the management fraud literature. There are nine red flags in
(continued on page 113)

9 KPMG study of SAS No. 53 risk factors.
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•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

%

Present

%___

33.8
41.6
28.6

39.0
31.2
39.0
32.5
11.7
29.9

87.0
36.4
9.1
36.4
13.0

64.9

57
21
77

35
83
75
59
6
30

195
13
18
14
6

47

5.9

25.3

27.2
24.6
19.3

Fraud Cases Nonfraud Cases
(N=77)
(N=305)

Auditor Judgments for Factors From SAS No. 53

50
Management Characteristics
Management decisions dominated by a single person or small group
67
Management’s attitude unduly aggressive
28
Management turnover is high
7
Management places undue emphasis on earnings projections
28
Management’s reputation in the business community is poor
10
Operating and Industry Characteristics
Inadequate profitability relative to industry
30
Sensitivity of operating results to economic factors is high
24
Rate of change in industry is rapid
30
Industry is declining with many business failures
25
Organization is decentralized without adequate monitoring
9
Doubts about entity’s ability to continue as a going concern
23
Engagement Characteristics
Many contentious or difficult accounting issues
26
Significant difficult-to-audit transactions or balances are present
32
Significant and unusual related party transactions are present
22

• Weak Internal Control Environment

Factors From SAS No. 53 Present

TABLE 1

(continued)

18.7
6.9
Not Significant

11.5
Not Significant
Not Significant
Not Significant
2.0
9.8

63.9
4.3
Not Significant
4.6
2.0

15.4
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1

Management has been overly evasive when responding to audit inquiries
Management has engaged in frequent disputes with auditors
Compensation arrangements are based on recorded performance
Accounting personnel exhibit inexperience or laxity in performing duties

39.0
20.8
19.5
41.6

30
16
15
32

•
•
•
•

Other Red Flags From Paragraph 12

19.5

15

%___

5.2

Present

35

29

5

(continued)

4

%

53

Fraud Cases
(N=77)

Auditor Judgments for Factors From SAS No.

• Misstatements detected in prior period’s audit
• New client with no prior audit history or sufficient information not
available from predecessor auditor

Factors From SAS No. 53 Present

_

TABLE

9
3.0
6
2.0
11.5 Not Significant
34
11.2

9.5 Not Significant

1.6 Not Significant

Nonfraud Cases
(N=305)

1

Motivation

There are adverse conditions in the client’s industry
Company is subject to significant contractual commitments
Company is confronted with adverse legal circumstances
Company holdings represent a significant portion of management’s
personal wealth
• Management personnel perceive their jobs are threatened by
poor performance
Attitude
• Officers of the company have entered into collusion with outsiders

•
•
•
•

39.0
23.4
14.3
9.1
13.0
1.3

7
10
1

1-3
44.2
19.5
15.6

1
34
15
12
30
18
11

24.7
3.9

19
3

1

49

99

136
56
14

19
41
18
7

56
85

%_____

Cases

(continued)

0.3 Not Significant

16.1 Not Significant

32.5 Wrong Sign

44.6 Not Significant
18.4 Not Significant
4.6

6.2 Not Significant
13.4
5.9
2.3

18.4 Not Significant
27.9 Wrong Sign

Fraud Cases
Nonfraud
(N=77)
(N=305)
Present % Present

Auditor Judgments for Additional Factors

Conditions
• Company entered into one or an aggregate of material transactions
• Company involved in purchase, sale, or merger of/with another company
• Company recently entered into a significant number of acquisition
transactions
• Company is in a period of rapid growth
• Company has inexperienced management
• A conflict of interest exists within the company and/or its personnel

Additional Factors______

TABLE 2
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%

1.3
27.3 6
1.328
5.27
2.6
5.2
5.27
10.4 0
18.2
9.1 1
1.36
9.1
1.3

1
21
1
4
2
4
4
8
14
7
1
7
1

2.0

1.6 Not Significant

9.2 Not Significant
2.3 Not Significant
3
1.0 Not Significant
5
1.6 Not Significant
2.3 Not Significant
0.0
12
3.9
0.3
2.0 Not Significant
4
1.3
5
1.6 Not Significant

5

Fraud Cases Nonfraud Cases
(N=77)
(N=305)
Present
%

Auditor Judgments for Additional Factors (continued)

• There is need to cover up an illegal act
• Auditor’s experience with management indicates a degree of dishonesty
• There is undue concern with the need to maintain or improve the
reputation/image of the company
• Management displays a propensity to take undue risks
• Management personnel engage in an inappropriate lifestyle
• Top management is considered to be highly unreasonable
• Management displays a significant lack of moral fiber
• Client personnel exhibit strong personality anomalies
• Management places undue pressure on the auditors
• Management has engaged in opinion shopping
• Management displays a hostile attitude toward the auditors
• Management displays significant disrespect for regulatory bodies
• Management displays significant resentment of authority

Additional Factors______ Present

TABLE 2

this list not included in SAS No. 53 that appear to be indicators of
management fraud. When assessed individually, SAS No. 53 includes some
red flags that appear to be poor indicators of management fraud and
excludes some red flags that are good indicators of fraud.
The weight that should be assigned to each relevant fraud indicator is a
very complex problem. Ultimately, a complex set of statistical models was
used by KPMG researchers to determine weights. Based on the research
results, guidance about a combination of fraud indicators is beyond the
capability of an SAS.

Have Auditors Changed the Manner in Which
Audits Are Conducted as a Result of SAS No. 53?
The evidence as to whether or not SAS No. 53 has caused a change in the
way audits are conducted is skimpy and mixed. According to a recent survey
by the New York insurance broker Johnson & Higgins (Caprino 1990), four
out of five certified public accountants have cut back on the services they
provide. The poll of 500 accountants nationwide showed that 56 percent
have ceased doing business with clients considered at “high risk” for initiat
ing lawsuits, and 98 percent ask clients to sign protective contracts before
work begins. It is not clear whether it has been the increased fraud-detection
requirements of SAS No. 53 or the fear of lawsuits that has motivated CPAs
to be more cautious. Certainly one way to provide “reasonable assurance”
that fraud does not exist is not to accept high-risk clients.
On the other hand, Madison and Ross (1990) do not believe that SAS No.
53 has caused a change in the way audits are conducted. In their article, they
ask the question “does anyone who is familiar with the audit planning and
development procedures of the larger accounting firms really think this
requirement (SAS No. 53) represents a substantive change from existing
practice?” The response they received to this question from three firm
partners in charge of practice unit audit operations was that their firm’s
reactions were largely in the semantics of the audit programs and planning
meeting agenda. It was their opinion that no substantive changes would
occur in the actual audit procedures or applications. Madison and Ross
(1990) go on to conclude that “.. .one would logically presume this would
generally be the reaction in most of the larger accounting firms.”

Does SAS No. 53 Satisfy the Public's (Investors
and Creditors) Expectations of the Auditor's
Responsibility to Detect Irregularities?
The public’s perception of auditor responsibility to detect and disclose
irregularities has not changed over time. The public has always expected
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auditors to detect all financial statement fraud. This expectation has
been restated several times. A 1974 poll conducted by Opinion Research
Corporation (1974) for Arthur Andersen & Co. revealed that “66 percent of
the investing public believe that the audit is conducted primarily to uncover
fraud .” The poll also revealed that most segments of the public expect audi
tors to detect management fraud.
This same expectation was restated in a subsequent poll conducted by
Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. in 1986 for the AICPA. That poll stated
that “solid majorities of all the principal public groups are convinced that
a ‘clean’ opinion also means that the auditing firm has found no fraud."
After studying auditor litigation and audit service quality, Palmrose
(1988) concluded that the value of extended audits stems from financial
statement users’ expectations that auditors will detect and correct (or reveal)
any material misstatements or omissions of financial information.
The Dingell Committee (1986) expressed its findings by noting, “The
public expects that the independent auditors will make reasonable efforts
to assure that fraudulent corporate activity will not go undetected or
unreported.” The Dingell Committee subsequently initiated a bill that
would have required auditors to perform “specific and substantial proce
dures to reasonably ensure the detection.. .of any material fraud.”
Although SAS No. 53 does acknowledge an affirmative duty to detect
fraud, it probably will not satisfy the “public.” Whereas the public requires
the detection of “all material financial statement fraud,” SAS No. 53
contains at least three limiting caveats. First, SAS No. 53 limits the
auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud where the fraud is concealed by
management collusion and forgery. As SAS No. 53 states, “because of the
characteristics of irregularities, particularly those involving forgery and
collusion, a properly designed and executed audit may not detect a material
irregularity.” Second, SAS No. 53 appears to limit the auditor’s responsi
bility to design the audit to detect fraud where there are no suspicious
circumstances suggesting that fraud might be present. SAS No. 53 states,
for example, that the auditor at the beginning of each audit engagement
should “design the audit to provide reasonable assurance of detecting errors
and irregularities that are material to the financial statements.” However,
according to the standard, the audit “design,” including setting the scope of
the audit and designing specific audit tests, should be formulated based on
an assessment of the “risk that [fraud may exist] may cause the financial
statements to contain material misstatements.” A reasonable interpretation
by an auditor would lead him or her to believe that the responsibility to
detect fraud is relieved when the risk assessment for a particular client
provides no indication that fraud may be present.
The third limiting caveat of SAS No. 53 places substantial limitations on
the auditor’s obligation to disclose fraud to the investing public once fraud
has been detected. As stated in SAS No. 53, “disclosure of irregularities to
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parties other than the client’s senior management and its audit committee or
board of directors is not ordinarily part of the auditor’s responsibility..."
In addition, the standard goes on to say that such disclosure “.. .would be
precluded by the auditor’s ethical or legal obligations of confidentiality.”
The standard provides three circumstances when an irregularity can be
disclosed: (1) to the SEC and a successor auditor where there is a change in
auditors, (2) in response to a subpoena, and (3) to a governmental agency
when the audit is conducted in accordance with requirements for the audits
of entities that receive financial assistance from a government agency.
All three of these limiting caveats are contrary to the expectations of the
public who expect allfraud to be detected and disclosed. As a result, unless
auditor actions change as a result of SAS No. 53 in ways that will detect all
fraud, it is doubtful that the standard will narrow the expectation gap with
respect to the “public.”

Does SAS No. 53 Satisfy the SEC's Perception
of the Auditor's Responsibility to Detect
and Disclose Irregularities?
Similar to the public’s position, the SEC’s perception of auditor responsi
bility to detect fraud has remained constant over time. The SEC views the
detection of fraud as a major purpose of the audit. Probably the first public
statement by the SEC about the fraud detection responsibilities of an audit
was Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 19, In the Matter o f McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., issued in 1940, wherein they stated:
.. .accountants can be expected to detect gross overstatements of
assets and profits whether resulting from collusive fraud or other
wise. . .we feel that the discovery of gross overstatements in the
accounts is a major purpose of such an audit even though it be
conceded that it might not disclose every minor defalcation.
In 1974, in response to the Equity Funding case, the SEC issued ASR No.
153 (1974) in which it restated its position on the auditor’s responsibility to
detect and disclose management fraud in exactly the same terms used in
ASR No. 19. In addition, in his first speech after being named as the current
SEC enforcement director, William McLucas outlined several areas of
stepped up SEC attention. In doing so, he warned auditors that “you should
assume the division of enforcement will take a look at you to be certain that
. . . independent auditors are aggressive in preventing fraud at corpora
tions” (Salwen 1990).
Nowhere is there evidence that the SEC accepts any of the limiting
caveats in SAS No. 53. Since 1940, its stated position has been that auditors
should detect and disclose all material financial statement fraud.
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Does SAS No. 53 Satisfy the Court's Perception
of Auditors' Responsibility to Detect
and Disclose Irregularities?
It does not appear that SAS No. 53 satisfies lawyers’ perception of
auditor responsibility to detect and disclose fraud. As stated by Costello
(1991):
Lawyers representing CPAs inevitably will be asked to advise their
clients on whether compliance with SAS No. 53 will be an effective
tool for avoiding liability in the area of management fraud. Their
advice should be simple. Neither GAAS nor SAS No. 53 constitute
the controlling measure of an auditor’s liability. The door remains
open in auditor malpractice suits for plaintiffs to introduce evidence
indicating that the auditor should have done more than the profes
sion’s self-imposed standards dictated. Complicating the situation
is that the auditor’s obligations for detecting and disclosing fraud
under SAS No. 53 fall short of those previously imposed on
auditors by the courts. Perhaps the best advice for auditors is to
design their audits to detect all forms of fraud, regardless of the
cause and regardless of whether suspicious circumstances are
present. Further, to the degree that courts perceive CPAs as owing
their allegiance to the investing public and view the public’s right to
know as outweighing the auditor’s ethical obligations of confiden
tiality, CPAs may, under certain circumstances, find compliance
with the fraud disclosure provisions under SAS No. 53 inadequate
protection from liability.
Costello makes a very persuasive argument that professional standards,
such as SAS No. 53 can never be dispositive in deciding whether a defen
dant exercised due care.10 As stated by Costello, “professional standards
should not and do not replace the role of the jury in determining either what
constitutes due care or whether, under the particular circumstances, the
defendant exercised that due care.” Therefore, although a CPA defendant
may establish compliance with SAS No. 53, he or she does not thereby
establish as a matter of law that due care was exercised. Attorneys argue that
allowing professional standards to play a conclusive evidentiary role would
reduce a jury to “.. .the mechanical process of applying the self-imposed

10 The only exception to this rule is in the medical profession, where medical standards
are generally considered the controlling measure of liability in medical malpractice
cases. In medical malpractice cases, failure to establish non-conformity is fatal to the
plaintiff and the defendant who establishes conformity is entitled to a directed
verdict. The same cannot be said for auditors. Costello was unable to locate a single
court decision directing a verdict for the auditor merely upon a showing of compli
ance with the auditing standards.
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standards of the defendant’s profession.” Furthermore, they argue that if
professionals, such as auditors were to have their esoteric standards define
the measure of liability for the profession’s members, a two-tier system of
justice between the haves (professionals) and the have-nots would be
created (Morris 1942).
Costello very eloquently traces the legal precedence through such
auditor-liability cases as Escott v. Bar Chris Construction Corp., Rhode
Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yauner &
Jacobs, and Maduff Mortgage Corporation v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells
to show that auditor negligence is a matter for courts to decide, not
professional standards. As was stated in the latter case:
The AICPA standards are only evidentiary.. .They are principles
and procedures developed by the accounting profession itself, not
by the courts or the legislature. They may be useful to a jury in
determining the standard of care for an auditor, but they are not
controlling. The amount of care, skill and diligence required to be
used by defendants in conducting an audit is a question of fact for
the jury, just as it is in other fields for other professionals.11
The result is that as long as the professional standards for detecting and
disclosing irregularities differ from the public’s expectations, failure to
detect fraud by auditors will be litigated. And, it appears that SAS No. 53
differs considerably from those public expectations.

The Litigation Evidence
While it is too early to establish a clear trend and know for certain what
the impact of SAS No. 53 has been on litigation, there is no evidence that
the number of lawsuits against accountants is decreasing. As is shown
in table 3, most of the cases being reported in recent public reports as
being filed, settled, or litigated are for years prior to the effective date
of SAS No. 53. Table 3 represents a cross-section of auditor liability suits
discussed in the current popular press. Most likely, it will take four or
five more years before lawsuits filed for 1989, 1990, and 1991 are litigated
and/or settled.
There is some evidence, however, that lawsuits against accountants are on
the rise. Caprino (1990) states “lawsuits targeting accountants—filed by
businesses challenging audits or shareholders claiming to have received
faulty financial information—are on the rise, and the threat of litigation is
(continued)

11 Maduff Mortgage Corp v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, p. 502.
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TABLE 3

Year of
Problem
91
87
83-88
86
88
86
85, 86
88
87
87
88
79-84
87
85, 86
86
85
84
88
83, 84

Year
Reported
in News
91
89
91
91
90
90
91
90
91
90
89
89
90
90
91
91
90
90
90
90
90

Suit
Filed

Settled
Out
In
of
Court
Court

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

82
80
85
82-86
81
80
85

84-91
88-90
89
90

91
90
90
91
90
89
90
90
90
90
89
91
91
90
91
91
90
91
91
91
91

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

Sampling of Recent Litigation

Acctg.
Firm

Company Audited

EY
EY
EY
EY
DT
DT
DT
DT
DT
PM
CL
CL
CL
S
EY
PW
CL
EY
EY
DT
DT
GT
GT
CL
AA
PW
EY
PW
DT
LH
CL
PM
PM
MH
CL
DT
DT
PM
DT
EY
PM
EW
DT
EW
DT

Mutual Benefit Life
Bradford White Corp.
Lincoln Savings and Loan
Republic Bank Corp.
Southeastern Insurance Group Inc.
Poly-Dura Inc.
Inter-Regional Financial Group
Baker’s PTL Ministry
Frank B. Hall & Co. Inc.
Scottish Heritable Inc.
Insurance Exchange of America
Thomas McKinnon Inc.
Stotler Group Inc.
Universal Casualty & Surety Co.
4 Tennessee Savings and Loans
United Bank of Arizona
Silverado
FP Investments
Western Savings Association
Beverly Hills Savings
Sunrise Savings
Sunbelt Savings of Dallas
Rooks County Savings
First Federal S&L of Shawnee
Indutril Tectonics
AM International
Small World Greetings
Brictard & Co.
Inter Regional Financial
Herman Fiesod
Overseas Trust Bank
Penn Square Bank
Holt Leasing
Continental Illinois
Inland Power & Light Co.
Columbia Savings & Loan
First Executive
Central Bank
FNN
W. L. Jackson
Eagle Trust
Monarch
First South
Imperial Savings Assoc.
Commonwealth Federal

Legend: EY—Ernst & Young; DT—Deloitte & Touche; PM—KPMG Peat Marwick; CL—Coopers &
Lybrand; S—BDO Seidman; MH—Main Hurdman; EW—Ernst & Whinney; GT—Grant Thornton; PW—Price
Waterhouse; AA—Arthur Andersen & Co.; LH—Laventhol & Horwath.
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Being Reported, Settled, or Litigated

Industry of Audited Co.
Insurance
Water Heater Manuf.
Savings and Loan (S&L)
Banking
Insurance
Portable Toilets
Brokerage
Religion
Insurance
Manufacturing
Insurance
Brokerage Firm
Brokerage
Insurance
S&L
Banking
Banking S&L
Exotic Plants
Banking
S&L
S&L
S&L
S&L
S&L
Ball Bearings
Graphics Group
Gift Company
Development
Brokerage
Limited Partnership
Banking
Banking
Banking
Banking
Utility
S&L
Insurance
Banking
Network
Manufacturing
Film
Insurance
Thrift
Thrift
Thrift

$ Millions
Sought

$ Millions
Awarded

Fraud

Negligence

X

1.2
1.5

X
X

x
x

10
Purchased
19.75

X

14 total

x
x

X

X

X
X

160

X
X

15.7
250
600

X
X
X

18.9

X

560
300
250

X
X
X

X
X

5

X
X

19.75
13.0

X

X
X

20
Unspecified

16
15.2
5
2.5

X
X
X
X

1.2
£70
165 total
400
26
50

1.2

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
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having a chilling effect on the profession.” Lawsuits have been filed recently
in such cases as Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., Financial News Net
work, Infotechnology Inc, Monarch Life Insurance Co., Central Bank, and
First Executive for audits performed subsequent to the implementation of
SAS No. 53.
Increasingly, lawsuits are being brought by the investing public who are
questioning the value of an audit (Brenner 1991). They are alleging that
either (1) the audits were incompetent, which suggests than an accountant’s
opinion is not worth much, or (2) as regulators and other critics charge,
some of the leading firms in the country are churning out negligent audits.
A recent article in Bowman’s Accounting Report stated, “.. .Nothing has
shaken CPAs as much as the embarrassing questions that are being asked
about the intrinsic value of the audit. This is the first time the technical
competence of the profession is being questioned by the public” (Brenner
1991, 35).12 Certainly auditors’ failure to detect management fraud and the
resulting litigation, with all its coverage in the press, is fueling the fire that
is causing the questioning of the value of the audit.

Concluding Comments
SAS No. 53 does not appear to have narrowed the expectation gap
between auditors and the users of their opinions. The evidence suggests that
SAS No. 53 has had little, if any, impact on the way audits are conducted.
In addition, at least one firm’s studies show that some of the guidance in
SAS No. 53 may be faulty and may not identify high-risk clients. Although
SAS No. 53 does require some affirmative duty to provide reasonable
assurance that irregularities do not exist, CPAs appear not to have altered
their audit planning or tests as a result of its issuance. Furthermore, there
does not appear to have been an acceptance of SAS No. 53 by public users
(investors and creditors), the SEC, or the courts. The three limiting caveats
in SAS No. 53 are not acceptable to these groups, which expect all material
financial statementfraud to be detected. As a result, SAS No. 53 falls short
of their expectations. And since compliance with professional standards,
such as SAS No. 53, does not provide the controlling evidence in negligence
lawsuits against accountants, no material reduction in the number of
lawsuits against auditors is expected. Indeed, the number of suits currently
being filed supports the claim that SAS No. 53 will not result in reduced
liability for auditors.
More than ever, the value of an audit is being questioned. In most cases,
failure by auditors to detect irregularities will lead to litigation against

12 Similar questioning of the value of the audit was discussed in Jacob.
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CPAs. This is a very serious problem for the profession given that a recent
Institute of Management Accountant’s survey (The Wall Street Journal 1990)
revealed that 87 percent of company managers who responded would
consider committing financial statement fraud under certain circumstances.
More than half were willing to overstate assets, 48 percent were willing to
understate loss reserves and 38 percent would “pad” a government contract.
What is the solution? One possibility would be for the profession to
accept responsibility to detect and report all fraud publicly. Certainly,
to do so would substantially increase audit costs. With the very low
frequency of management fraud, imposing such high costs on all clients
may not be fair. In addition, auditing for fraud would dramatically change
relationships between auditors and their clients and would require a
changed audit approach.
The other possible solution would be for the public and others to relieve
auditors of fraud detection and reporting responsibility. While this solution
is most appealing to CPAs, such a reduction in expected responsibility is not
likely to occur unless there is significant decrease in financial remedies,
class action lawsuits, and contingent fee lawsuits. As long as it is financially
rewarding to bring suit, litigation is predicted to be automatic every time a
material management fraud is missed.
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Auditing Complex
Accounting Estimates
Wanda A. Wallace, The John N. Dalton Professor o f Business
Administration and Associate Dean fo r Academic Affairs,
College o f William & Mary
Research provides insights regarding factors to consider when formulating
or auditing accounting estimates. Future dimensions o f estimates create
uncertainties that may be communicated by a variety of disclosure practices.
Although management discussion and analysis, as well as footnotes, have
been a vehiclefor disclosure, regulatory pressures are redefining the notion
of probable and estimable. Research is needed to determine how best to
identify changing risks, assess probabilities, and communicate uncertain
ties. Auditing standard setters are encouraged to use industry audit guides
for account-level guidance on estimates. Clarification of probable, estima
ble, and uncertainty communication by audit reports may be merited.

As the expectation gap standards were being drafted, a gap in the litera
ture became apparent: the audit of estimates. Although it was recognized
that soft numbers permeated the financial statements and that estimates
were an integral part of every set of financial statements, the official
pronouncements did not address separately the audit implications of
accounting estimates. Practice had been addressing accounting estimates,
but this practice development had been in the absence of a general set of
standards to guide the level and type of work performed. On the basis
of interviews with both drafters of Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS)
No. 57, Auditing Accounting Estimates (AICPA, Professional Standards,
AU sec. 342), and members of the practice community (see Appendix), the
pronouncement is principally a codification of existing practice. It plugged
a hole in the literature but had little perceptible influence on practice other
than increased attention on a category of accounts, information flows, and
accounting processes over less routine, but more than one-time transactions.
The author appreciates the assistance of the AICPA and a number of practitioners who
generously gave of their time in discussing practice-related issues—particularly Donald
L. Neebes, Ernst & Young.
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Instead, the interplay of SAS No. 57 with other pronouncements in both
the audit and accounting literature led to practice effects. Specifically,
among the practice challenges are—
• When does Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 5,
Accounting for Contingencies, require a financial statement adjustment,
and when is disclosure sufficient?
• As “tougher to estimate” numbers appear on both the financial state
ments and in footnotes, what is adequate audit evidence to form an
opinion on their fairness?
• When assisting the client in formulating estimates, how does the auditor
ensure that the client takes responsibility for the estimate and then how
should the audit process proceed?
• As the “more likely than not” threshold in SFAS No. 109, Accounting for
Income Taxes, joins SFAS No. 5, how are the words in guidance trans
lated in practice?
• How do inherent risk, accounting estimates, and control risk interrelate?
• What control practices, with respect to accounting estimates, merit
reduction of control risk in the audit process?
• Do circumstances arise in which reduction of control risk is essential
because alternative audit evidence is virtually inaccessible?
• Is more directed guidance in industry manuals sufficient, or do certain
types of estimates merit increased attention?
These and related questions begin to be answered by past research and
current practice, but also identify future lines of inquiry.
The principal objective of this paper is to communicate the implications
of existing research for establishing and implementing auditing standards
associated with the audit of complex accounting estimates. Relevant
research findings are summarized, practice implementation problems iden
tified through interviews (see Appendix) are described, and an assessment
of the implications of research and implementation problems for auditing
standard setters and promulgators of other types of guidance is offered.
Potential research issues are likewise highlighted.

Existing Literature
The formulation of accounting estimates has been the subject of a wide
array of academic research articles. Table 1 provides a representative over
view of literature concerning—
• The implications of efficient markets for standard setting, information
evaluation, and disclosure practices.
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• The ability to quantify by statistical procedures both their future orienta
tion and how they might be affected by incentives, as well as judgment
biases and related considerations.
• The accounting selection process, its determinants, and the variety of
estimates required.
• Interim reporting issues.
• The sophistication of users.
• Available valuation tools.
• Communication, interpretation, and automation.
• Independence and remaining challenges.
(continued on page 141)
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Existing Literature

Implications of Efficient Markets
“What should be the FASB’s objectives given an efficient stock market? Beaver
has stated four implications... .First, many reporting issues are trivial. Firms
should report using one method and provide sufficient disclosure to permit
adjustment to other methods. Second, the role of financial reports is to prevent
individuals from earning abnormal returns from inside information. All items
should be disclosed if there are no additional costs. Third, naive investors can
get hurt by presuming they can trade on published accounting data and earn
abnormal returns. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) should
discourage these beliefs. Fourth, the FASB should realize that accounting
reports are not the only suppliers of information. Other sources of informa
tion may be more appropriate for disseminating firm information if they involve
less cost.
The implications for FASB objectives detailed by Beaver are open to serious
question for three reasons. First, stock market agents are not the only users
of accounting information. Other consumers have financial information needs
that should concern the FASB. Second,.. .the efficient markets hypothesis is
overstated. . . [and more likely to be] partially efficient.. .Third, even if stock
markets are completely efficient in an informational sense, various reasons
suggest that stock markets are not efficient in an allocative sense” (Ketz and
Wyatt 1983/84).
“Market prices represent one approach to the collapsing of multidimensional
future benefits and sacrifices into a single number. They can reflect a rich set
of information about the future events and reflect the ‘market’s’ (i.e., buyers
and sellers) assessment of future benefits and sacrifices. Under conditions of
imperfect and incomplete markets, market prices may only imperfectly reflect
future benefits and sacrifices” (Beaver 1991). Boatsman, Dowell, and Kimbrell
(1984/85) report on whether cost is better estimated with parent share price
before a business combination is announced to the capital market or afterward.
(continued)
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They propose a simple rule: “To use the preannouncement price if the share
price declines upon announcement of the terms of combination and the post
announcement price otherwise.. .this rule minimizes error in all cases except
when the capital market is considerably more, in fact one third more, optimistic
than the negotiating parties. Such cases are expected to be rare.”
Miller (1980/81) concludes, “There is an important asymmetry in the impact
of information on stock prices. Accounting that leads to overvaluation is likely
to result in overpricing, while accounting that understates earnings probably
will not have an effect. Thus the maintenance of fair stock prices will be facili
tated by accounting conventions that resolve ambiguous situations by using a
more conservative rule.”
Lev and Taylor (1978/79) use capital market efficiency to “imply that the
information conveyed by conventional performance measures is more consis
tent with the information used by investors (and hence reflected in stock prices)
than the information conveyed by the earnings net of cost of equity measure.”
This suggests that firms’ earnings should not be charged with a cost of equity
capital, assuming certain caveats such as reasonable information costs.
Kellogg (1984) reports that “there is some support for a prediction that
changes in realizable values will, on average, be associated with less concentra
tion of stock price declines in the discovery month.”. . .Theory suggests “that
the degree of precision of information,. . .defined as the inverse of the variance,
is positively related to the concentration in time of capital market reaction”
and that “the precision of information relative to previously available informa
tion is positively related to security price variability when the information
is announced.”

Implications: Stock market prices can be used in formulating and evaluating
the reasonableness of accounting numbers but is only one source of information
and has limitations.
Disclosure Approach
Footnotes or Financial Statement?
“ [I]t may be a matter of indifference as to how lease information is presented”
to stockholders, yet a survey in 1972 indicated “the off-balance sheet nature of
lease accounting was an advantage in dealing with ‘unsophisticated’ statement
users. In this context, unsophisticated statement users included the ‘small stock
holder and the regional bank’” Martin, Anderson, and Keown (1978/79).
Murray (1981/82) concludes, “Direct capitalization seems to add little infor
mational content vis-a-vis footnote disclosure.” Consistently, Munter and
Ratcliffe (1982/83) conclude, “investment managers do distinguish among the
alternative treatments of leases.” In addition, Marston and Harris (1988) find
that “leases and debt are substitutes,” although “firms do not view leases as
displacing nonleasing debt on a dollar-for-dollar basis.” Research estimates the
displacement at from 60 to 85 cents on the dollar.
Bazley, Brown, and Izan (1985) studied the rationale for voluntary disclosure
by Australian companies of lease obligations from 1964 through 1980 and
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discovered an association with industry, firm size, and whether the lessee was
a subsidiary company of a foreign parent. Weak associations were observed
with whether the lessee entered into the Australian Institute of Management’s
good reporting award.
Tosh and Rue (1988) report that “the [unconsolidated finance] subsidiary’s
debt is reflected in the firm’s market risk.”
Nichols (1973) found no significant difference in relative forecasting ability
as it relates to future income figures, from inclusion or exclusion of extraor
dinary items.
Implications: The market is reasonably efficient in reflecting certain types of

footnote disclosures in the stockprice, butfinancial statement inclusion of such
information would be perceived as more useful for unsophisticated users.
Ability to Quantify

Behavioral Considerations
Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) and numerous citations provided in Abdel-khalik
and Solomon (1988) describe decision making in the presence of ambiguity, the
use of heuristics, framing effects, elicitation of Bayesian priors, and similar
behavioral considerations in formulating judgments. A major implication
of such literature is that decision making can be improved by understanding
common problems and studying the effect of the various decision aids.
Preferred Quantification
“A preferred quantification consists of (1) an actual increase or decrease in
cash; (2) in the absence of an actual increase or decrease in cash, a highly
probable and legally required future increase or decrease in cash; and (3) a
measurable decrease in an existing accounting quantification. . . . If an event
does not produce any preferred quantification, quantify both effects of the
event by the cash increase or decrease that would have occurred in the most
likely analogous transaction” (Sorter and Ingberman 1987).
Kinney (1983) describes “the development of statistical procedures that
reflect the nature of the population and result in effective and efficient estima
tors.” Quantitative applications in auditing are described. Kinney (1981/82)
likewise describes the use of prior-year information in formulating predictions
of future years’ adjustments. Also see Wallace (1991a,c) for a discussion of
technology and the use of both analytics (Scott and Wallace 1992) and statistical
methods.
Incentives
Accounting treatment and the choice of both accounting method and disclosure
approach is systematically related to various attributes of a firm. In particular,
Daley and Vigeland (1983) report that firms capitalizing research and develop
ment costs until 1974, when choice existed pre-SFAS No. 2, were “more highly
levered, used more public debt, were closer to dividend restrictions, and were
smaller than firms which expensed R&D costs.” The variables cited were
attempting to capture “the firms’ proximity to constraints imposed by debt
covenants, the cost of violating these covenants, and political costs... The
(continued)
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results are consistent with the hypothesis that the higher renegotiation costs
associated with public debt provide an additional incentive for firms to choose
accounting techniques to avoid constraints imposed by debt covenants.”
“During an election campaign, incumbent managers apparently exercise
their accounting discretion to paint a favorable picture of their own performance
to voting stockholders. If elected, dissidents tend to take an immediate earnings
‘bath’ which they typically blame on the poor decisions of prior management”
(DeAngelo 1988).
“Provisions in the securities acts provide incentives to purchasers of common
stocks to initiate class action lawsuits when stock prices decline at and preced
ing announcements that directly reduce, or imply a reduction in, previously
reported accounting book values” (Kellogg 1984).
This research identifies “Type 4” information releases as “realizable values
of assets reported in prior financial statements that are being reduced” and
explains the assets revalued were “receivables, inventories, capitalized product
development costs, investments in subsidiaries, and marketable securities.”
This “Type 4” information release is cited as distinguishable from other
possibilities since “there is no implication that prior financial statements were
at the time of their publication imperfect or incomplete. Realizable values
regularly change between financial statement preparation dates.. . .The
Federal courts.. .emphasize the subjective nature of estimated valuations and
their susceptibility to changing conditions.” “There is some evidence that
announcements of these revisions are associated with different patterns of
security returns than are other kinds of announcements that contribute to
lawsuit occurrence. On average, information that asset realizable values are
being revised is associated with greater abnormal returns prior to announce
ment and smaller abnormal returns in announcement months than are
announcements that fraud, mistake, or failure to separately note specific
transactions affected prior financial statements.”
Hughes (1986) observes that disclosure is a signal selected by companies
going public and that the regulatory setting plays a role in contract enforcement.
Specifically, the “investment banker is legally liable (along with directors of the
company and its auditors) for damages if the security price declines within three
years and material omissions or misstatements are in the prospectus.”

Leases
Accounting for leases and the accounting selection process pre-SFAS 13
encompassed leverage effects, management compensation, and taxes (El-Gazzar,
Lilien, and Pastena 1986).
Executory Contracts
Given the piecemeal treatment of executory contracts, Cramer and Neyhart
(1978/79) suggest “extending recognition criteria (i.e., criteria for admit
ting data to the accounts and for determining the specific information to be
included in respective financial statements) to encompass the recording of
executory contracts in situations where reasonable assurance exists that the
reciprocal promises will be fulfilled.” Such an approach would set aside
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perceived overreliance on cash basis, corporeal transfers, and the requirement
of partial performance and begin to erode another source of “off-balance sheet
financing.” Related commentary is provided by Henderson and Peirson (1984).
An analogy can be drawn between pledges at educational institutions and
certain types of executory contracts.". . .the economic value of an asset (e.g.,
a pledge or bequest) should be accounted for in the same manner regardless of
the type of nonprofit organization” (Kagle and Dukes 1988). Valuation
challenges and the role of legal enforceability are among the issues raised
regarding current practice.

Perquisites
The “SEC issued an interpretive release [the August 1977 release] stating that
perks must be included when remuneration is disclosed in SEC filings” (Weisen
and Eng 1978/79). “Three approaches were available...
(1) Including the perk amount in the remuneration table, but with no other
disclosure, e.g., a footnote description;
(2) Including the perks amount in the remuneration table, and providing a foot
note description; or
(3) Excluding the perk amount in the remuneration table, but providing a foot
note description.
Most companies did not quantify perks.. ."(Wiesen and Eng 1978/79).
“In footnoting, companies avoided specificity by stating that the ‘perks’ were:
• Directly related to job performance.
• Ordinary and necessary to the conduct of business.
• Not material.
• Impossible to value or not reasonably ascertainable.
• Not allocable between business and personal use, and indicating an approxi
mate or maximum value.”
“The independent auditor’s responsibility for the content of remuneration
tables and accompanying footnotes depends, in part, on the document
involved.” “Shareholders bring perks lawsuits, and demand disclosure on perks
by suggesting shareholder votes on the issue.”
Pensions
In describing pension liabilities, Hennessy (1977/78) observes, “This offbalance sheet liability probably now exceeds $50 billion for all American
corporations... .Whatever the complexities and uncertainties of ERISA, actu
arial cost methods, and pension plans, one thing has become clear. Corporate
employers have a legally enforceable obligation with respect to their pension
plans. An accounting system that fails to recognize such a generally
acknowledged fact can only expect its credibility to be further eroded in the eyes
of investors and creditors ”
Audit program steps for pension costs and disclosures under SFAS No. 87 and
No. 88 are detailed by Schwartz and Gillmore (1988), including how to review
clients’ key economic assumptions. Among the assumptions cited are discount
rate, rate of future compensation increase, and expected long-term rate of return
on plan assets.
(continued)
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Postemployment Benefits
“ [F]ull accrual accounting for the cost of retiree health care benefits could cut
the annual net income of many corporations by.. .30% to 60%” (Gerboth
1988). ". .accountants have never felt constrained to recognize only those
obligations that are legally binding.” Assumptions include “rates of inflation,
mortality, retirement, disability, turnover, and dependent coverage” and “rate
of increase in the general level of health care costs,” “future changes in plan
terms,” and “future changes in legal and regulatory requirements.”
Perspective as to the judgment elements in such assessments is provided
by a two-part article responding to the query “Is Social Security Financially
Feasible?” (Robertson 1987, Part I and Myers and Creedon 1987, Part II.) The
role of assumptions is particularly apparent.
Embedded Estimates
Often estimates are embedded in other estimates, such as the role of tax rates;
related issues on means of quantifying such rates are described by Stickney and
McGee (1982), Stark (1985), and Bernard (1984). Nurnberg, Thomas, and
Cianciolo (1985) describe an approach to estimating an income tax measure
ment valuation allowance account and related problems. The interplay of tax
consequences and LIFO layers is explored by Cottell (1986). Another example
is the accounting for shrinkage within continuous flow process costing systems
as a prerequisite to valuing inventory costs (see Mensah and Chhatwal 1987).
Ten causes of problems with inventory valuation are similarly outlined by
Shayeb (1986), with related solutions—problems include changing standard
costs, incorrect computation of purchase price variance, failure to expense
materials used by nonmanufacturing departments, poor controls in issuing and
receiving material, inaccurate bills of material, failing to expense monthly
material usage variance, incomplete scrap policies and procedures, inaccurate
recording of “outside inventory” (i.e., owned by one company but physically
held by another), improper accounting for demos, marketing samples, and
engineering prototypes, and a formula approach to relieving cost of sales.
Schnee and Hreha (1987) explain how boot determination and capital gains
interrelate in the accounting for reorganizations. Price Waterhouse (1991, 1992)
points out that “FAS 109 provides little guidance for management or auditors on
the issue of assessing the reliability of management’s estimate of future
taxable income.”
Interim Reporting
Deitrick and Alderman (1978/79) report that “U.S. Steel is generally credited
for being the first American corporation to report interim financial information;
this initial statement was issued in 1902. By 1920, approximately 50 percent
of all companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) reported
interim information. And by 1960, 93.5 percent of the listed companies were
issuing quarterly or more frequent reports and another 5.5 percent were issuing
semiannual reports. For most companies, publication of interim financial
information was a combination of voluntary disclosure and compliance with
new listing requirements. The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) did not
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require its listed companies to publish interim financial information until 1962.
.. .The reporting of interim results to the exchanges and to leading financial
publications is assumed to be sufficient. The SEC did not require companies
under its jurisdiction to file interim information until 1945.” The 1945 require
ments were revenue oriented, in 1955, the form 9-K required nine income
related disclosures, and in 1972 form 10-Q was adopted (filed forty-five days after
each of the first three fiscal quarters). These researchers describe pressures for
an “auditor of record” concept and related cost/benefit considerations.
A comparison of statistics for companies undergoing interim-limited reviews
by CPAs and those not reviewed indicate “no large-scale, systematic differences
between the data which had been reviewed and that which had not, leading us
to conclude that audit involvement did not have a significant effect on the
interim data” (Alford and Edmonds 1980/81).
Implications: Tools are available for estimation, factors influencing account

ing choice are identified in the literature, and pressures exist to expand and
enhance accounting estimates.
Available Approaches
Crandall (1987) outlines twelve valuation methods used to place a price tag
on businesses. “In a perfect transaction, all parties would share all the major
relevant facts, and the business would be sold for cash—but so much for fairy
tales.” This quote bears out the perceived likelihood that approximation tech
niques will have to be used to assess the reasonableness and acceptability
of proposed prices.
Weiss (1987) describes the valuation of closely held stocks, in light of a legal
decision and in so doing describes an available approach to such valuations—
discounted cash flow method vs. the market comparable approach.
“Mathematics, we are told, is ‘the subject in which we never know what we are
talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true.’ .. .‘mathematics studies
nothing but hypotheses, and is the only science which never inquires what the
actual facts are.’ ‘Mathematics is thought moving in the sphere of complete
abstraction from any particular instance of what it is talking about. . . .The
certainty of mathematics depends on its complete abstract generality.’ For the
refinement of thought, particularly deductive thought, the value of mathematics
is unquestionable.. .the model of reality on which the postulates are based may
be so imperfect that the inferences, however carefully drawn, will be mislead
in g ... .the finest acquaintance with computational technique is no substitute
for discernment and discrimination in the field of experience which we study”
(Chambers 1967).

Inventories
A large body of empirical research on LIFO begins to explain the effect of
LIFO adoptions on security prices, the differences that led to different accounting
choices, and the market’s ability to adjust for differences in inventory methods,
as reported by Lindahl, Emby, and Ashton (1988). Such research provides
insight as to empirical regularities that need consideration in exploring valua
tion differences.
(continued)
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Implications: Accounting estimates involve qualitative and quantitative
dimensions.
Sophisticated Users
“[T]hese results support the identification of loan officers as a ‘sophisticated’
user group.. .Financial statements play an important role in their responses to
information and they have a high degree of consensus and self insight into their
own cognitive processes” (Zimmer 1981).
Implications: The prudent sophisticated investor is a reasonably defined con
cept in guiding standard setting.
Communication
“A major feature of current financial reporting is that it is accounting
for assets and liabilities with uncertain future benefits and sacrifices in terms
of a format that is very deterministic in appearance.. .At a minimum, it
places a burden on the reporting of risk and uncertainties, because a single
number creates the appearance of certainty when it does not exist.. .Uncertain,
future benefits and sacrifices are inherently multidimensional in nature”
(Beaver, 1991).
“[I]t is better to be approximately right than to be precisely wrong. This
suggests the desirability of disclosing the estimated precision and reliability of
accounting measurements, instead of encouraging the reader to assume that the
figures in financial statements contain no ‘margin of error’.
“It has become the practice in Britain recently for leading practitioners to
complain that laymen fail to realize that accounting measurements are not exact.
Such remarks are intended as a defense against criticisms of the shortcomings
of financial accounts. The fault surely lies not in the eyes of the lay beholders
but in the published financial accounts, which fail to disclose the existence of
inexactitudes of measurement” (Stamp 1970).
“The more one reflects on the nature of the deficiencies in modem financial
accounting, which have given rise to controversies in Australia, North
America, and the U.K., the more it seems apparent that financial accountancy
has lost touch with the needs of the modern world. It has, in a phrase, failed to
adapt and evolve. Far too many practitioners have adopted the attitude that can
be summarized rather crudely as, ‘There is nothing wrong with accounting that
a good public relations campaign won’t cure.’ These practitioners seem to
believe that, if laymen could only be taught to understand the limitations of con
ventional accounts, they would soon stop complaining about the inadequacies
which have become so painfully apparent in recent years. These professional
apologists seem to regard the ‘limitations of financial accounts’ as immutable
facts of life with which the world has to learn to live.
“In truth such ‘limitations’ are the mark of the failure of the profession to
adapt its ‘principles’ to the needs of a modern world. Unless the profession soon
learns to adapt itself it will become, like its currently extant ‘principles,’ irrele
vant and dispensable” (Stamp 1970).
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Implications: Communications need to be enhanced, as do the underlying

valuations being communicated.
Problems With Proxies in the Absence of Valuation
“[Financial statements are seriously flawed. To reach meaningful conclu
sions, users of financial statements must adjust or supplement them with
additional information. In many cases, the problems with the statements are so
intractable that one must apply techniques that are little better than rules of
thumb in order to reach a conclusion... .Over the last several years, as annual
reports have become more complex, the number of people who can truly under
stand them has declined substantially” (O’Donnell 1986).
Houlihan and Sondhi (1984) report: “Investors consider off-balance sheet
lease obligations of lessees when making investment decisions. The methods
commonly used by investors to determine the debt-equivalent amount of those
obligations frequently overestimate those obligations, making lessees appear
more leveraged than they really are. This can increase the lessees’ borrowing
costs, decrease their debt capacity, and possibly even affect their ability to
access the public debt markets. . . . If investors are miscalculating lessees’ total
capital and leverage ratios, it follows that they may also be miscalculating their
returns on capital, interest coverage ratios, and other quantitative performance
indicators.”
Implications: Approximations inherently involve complexity and measure

ment error.
The Significant Role of Interpretation
“[T]o develop the user of those tools into a person who can look at data and
see a picture (the interpretation) rather than numbers. Establishing the facility
for translation (accounting training) is not only more easily achieved than
developing interpretive skills (economic reasoning), it seems almost to inhibit
the success of the latter.
“To begin with, financial statements are rendered entirely in monetary terms.
Yet everything beyond the cash account is further and further removed from
cash (and sometimes even from reality). This is true not only of the balance
sheet, which at least attempts to represent a real bricks-mortar-machineryand-inventory situation, but also of the income statement, which is conceptual.
While assets beyond the cash account are not cash, on the other side, the liabili
ties generally are cash obligations. The mismatch is first evidence of a potential
credit problem.
“[S]everal sources of earnings management were suggested: The selection
between alternative accounting methods is classified as source type 1 while
source type 2 is the accounting judgment required in the implementation of
accounting principles. . . .while type 1 is a visible act due to disclosure rules,
type 2 is a behind-the-scenes act,. .. SFAS No. 13 results in a conversion of type
1 into type 2 . . . .We question the wisdom of trading a visible source of earnings
management for an invisible one” (Gardella 1986).
(continued)
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“[T]wo companies could obtain materially different results with identical
leases. This can occur because these companies might have widely different
interpretations of what constitutes a bargain purchase option, bargain renewal
option, material lease, or other factors. Also, estimates of fair value, resid
ual value, economic life, implicit interest rate, incremental borrowing rate,
executory costs, etc., differ between companies. Thus, SFAS No. 13, while
successfully narrowing the range of acceptable accounting methods, opened the
door to another type of manipulation.
“A majority of the Board members expressed the tentative view that if SFAS
No. 13 were to be reconsidered, they would support a property-right approach
in which all leases are included as ‘right to use property’ and as ‘lease obliga
tion’ in the lessee’s balance sheet. If politically feasible, it would be a step in
the right direction” (Palmon and Kwatinetz 1979/80).
“Hedge accounting on a futures transaction is appropriate if the commodity
underlying the futures contract is linked, in substance, to the price risk
associated with the commodity being hedged. . . . Determining whether price
exposure exists (to be eligible for hedge accounting) must include considering
all relevant facts and circumstances. Certain anticipatory transactions create
such an exposure” (Rachleff 1984).
“[B]oth swaps and futures contracts can change from matched positions over
a period of time. . . interest rate swaps can have a significant impact on a
corporation’s financial projections. . . No accounting recognition is made at the
inception of the swap agreement. Accounting for the expanded use of option
transactions is explored by Hauworth and Moravy (1987) who explain, ‘The
basic economic purpose of options is to serve as a tool for transferring price,
foreign exchange, or interest rate risk from those wishing to avoid risk
(“hedgers”) to those willing to assume it in anticipation of making a profit
(“speculators”).’ A ‘mark to market’ approach is recommended ‘unless the
option transaction meets the criteria for hedge accounting in which case gains
and losses should be deferred and reported symmetrically with the hedged
item’ ” (Riley and Smith 1987).
Figlewski (1987) provides an overview of the interaction between derivative
securities on financial instruments and the underlying cash markets, with par
ticular emphasis on their role in the marketplace to facilitate risk management.
Contingent claims however can produce “somewhat slippery connections
among the markets for fundamental assets and the various derivative securities.”

Implications: Interpretation skills must be developed with respect to reported
numbers, as well as the underlying transactions producing such numbers.
Automating Auditing
“[E]xpert systems. . . bring knowledge of recognized experts to those who do
not possess the same level of knowledge or experience.
“The decision support system does not make any decisions; it supports and
enhances the decisions that auditors make. It is as if each staff person had a part
ner looking over his shoulder, saying, ‘This is what I would do. What do you
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think?’ The program does not give answers; it brings up questions that
help the auditor select procedures and decide how much of each procedure
is necessary.
“Overall, such systems function as checklists containing important points,
covering all the bases, and raising questions an auditor might forget to ask
because there are so many other questions—and they are interrelated and com
plex. For each account, the program guides the auditor through such questions
as.. .‘What is the amount of risk in each significant account?’
“[A] computer cannot think; it can only remember. No machine can
approach the range of the human mind. However, computers are wonderful
tools with their phenomenal memories, speed, and accuracy.. . .
“At IBM’s training sessions, the coffee-break tapes carry the message,
‘Machines should work; people should groove.’ Computers give us tools that
can handle dull, mechanical tasks and free us to focus on more important, more
interesting issues” (Temkin 1986).
Estimates and risk modeling are increasingly facilitated by electronic spread
sheet software (e.g., Togo 1987).

Implications: Technology should enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of
accounting estimations.
Independence in Auditing
“There can be little doubt that the desired product is financial disclosure
which can be tried, tested, and proven to be ‘true,’ ‘fair,’ ‘reliable,’ ‘credible,’ and
‘authentic.’ For such to be the case, financial disclosure must consist of
‘independent information;’ that is, information which can be inter-subjectively
tested... .the auditing of accounts can be likened to a process of ‘quality
control,’ a process in which a product is tested in terms of the extent to
which it conforms with prescribed specifications based on the use for which
the product has been designed. Such a testing process must be carried out
independently of both the production process itself and those who operate it”
(Wolnizer 1978).

Implications: To effectively audit accounting estimates, an independent assess
ment apart from the original formulation process is essential.
Challenges Remaining
“Accountants enter an age of anxiety” is reported as a financial press observa
tion in Australia by Birkett and Walker (December 1971). Attention is brought
to challenges facing the profession, past scandals, responsive and unresponsive
behavior, and the need for the profession not to be static but to be responsive to
changing and challenging conditions.
“Professor R.J. Chambers argues that the most significant aspect of the
financial position of a business firm is that it indicates the firm’s capacity for
adaptation to the changes in environment which an uncertain future may bring.
Accordingly, the statement of financial position should ideally show all assets at
their current cash equivalent, defined as ‘the market selling price or realizable
price of any or all goods held’” (Wright 1967).
(continued)
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Stock Compensation
Beresford and Locatelli (1983) place the problem of accounting for stock
compensation in perspective: “Theory aside, the crux of the Opinion No. 25
debate seemed to boil down to practical considerations. While many of the
adopters of Opinion No. 25 may have agreed that all compensatory plans should
result in compensation costs and that such costs should be measured at the time
the stock compensation is granted, the majority did not believe it was practical
to measure compensation according to those guidelines in all cases.
“However, a minority believed that while measurement of compensation
costs according to the theoretically pure concepts might be difficult in some
cases, it was not impossible.” The issue of how employee stock option plans
might be valued is likewise examined by Noreen (1979/80).
Bad Debt Expense
“ ‘Bad debt expense’. .. is not really a recognition, but rather a quantification
problem. Bad debt expense is not an expense in the sense that expenses are the
extinguishments of rights to utilize a resource. Rather, the bad debt expense
represents a quantification of the sales inflow in terms of the amount of inflow
that is probable and measurable” (Sorter and Ingberman 1987).
“[U]npaid bills [tied to bankruptcies] now total well over $33 billion annually
. . . Receivables can typically represent as much as 91 percent of a company’s
working capital, or 42 percent of its net worth. The protection offered by
business credit insurance goes far beyond that of bad debt reserves.
“Quite simply, the coverage insures that a company can be paid for what it
sells. Any covered excess bad debt losses are protected by the insurance policy”
(Legge 1987). This may merely substitute the risk of the insurer for the receiva
bles’ associated risks.
“Two major inconsistencies of the recognition and quantification rules were
observed. The first is that the recognition rules, while dealing with legal rights
and obligations, result in the omission of an extremely important segment of
rights and obligations. Contractual rights and obligations are not recorded as
assets and liabilities, and the assumption of those rights and obligations is not
an accounting event [unless, for example, a deposit has been received]. At a
time when contractual rights and obligations are assuming an ever-increasing
importance, it is hard to rationalize this omission from the accounting
universe.. . .
“The second major inconsistency is accounting’s ambivalent attitude toward
present value. When an activity is to be quantified in terms of future cash flows,
sometimes the required quantification is in present-value terms and some
times it’s in absolute terms. There does not appear to be any logical reasoning
for how this incongruity arose and why it is allowed to persist” (Sorter and
Ingberman 1987).
“What types of past transactions and events are considered acceptable as a
basis for conditioning beliefs about the future?.. .consider the estimation of
uncollectible accounts. How rich is the mix of information upon which the
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estimated uncollectibles account can be based?. . . a known ‘predictable’ pattern
(i.e., time series dependency). . . .Can the estimated uncollectibles reflect the
fact that delinquencies next quarter are expected to deteriorate further or are
future delinquencies ‘critical events’ that cannot be anticipated, regardless of
the expected dependency in the aging schedules?.. .What information are the
analysts reflecting in their expectations that is not reflected in the current loan
loss allowance?.. .Currently we do not have a well-articulated statement as
to what types of estimates of future events are within the current system of
financial reporting versus what types are beyond. Alternatively stated, there is
not a well-articulated statement of what types of information (i.e., past transac
tions and events) are acceptable upon which to condition the estimated effect of
future events on existing assets and liabilities” (Beaver 1991).

Green Accounting
“Standardized ‘Green Audits’ will become a key element of corporate
environmental policy and practice” (Socha and Harvey 1991).
“The International Chamber of Commerce has defined environmental audit
as ‘a management tool comprising a systematic, documented, periodic and
objective evaluation of how well environmental organization, management
and equipment are performing with the aim of helping to safeguard the environ
ment by:
• Facilitating management control of environmental protection.
• Assessing compliance with company policies which would include meeting
regulatory requirements’” (Vinten 1991).
Environmental liabilities were the subject of a 1991 Audit Risk Alert (AICPA
1991) that outlined associated “red flags” such as purchase of land below local
market prices, acquisition of increased insurance coverage against environmen
tal risks, and participation in a real estate transaction or corporate merger.
“According to SEC Regulation S-K (reg. 229.103), disclosures dealing with
the discharge of materials into the environment should be described in the legal
proceedings section of Form 10-K if:
‘A governmental authority is a party to each proceeding and such proceeding
involves potential monetary sanctions, unless the registrant reasonably believes
that such proceeding will result in no monetary sanctions, or in monetary sanc
tions, exclusive of interest and costs of less than $100,000, provided, however,
that such proceedings which are similar in nature may be grouped and described
generically’” (Freedman and Stagliano 1992).
Yet, “many firms make little or no disclosure”. Estimates of exposure for
potential Superfund sites are as high as $750 billion. Pollution control costs
for environmental programs meeting current legislative requirements will reach
nearly $160 billion a year by [the year] 2000 (FASAC 1992).
Past, Present, and Future
Sterling has the attitude that “all measurements are of past dimensions. . . .
The original purpose of making the measurement may be to predict a future
condition or retrodict [‘predict’ backward] a past condition, but this does not
negate the fa c t that measurement concerns an existing condition and that
(continued)
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predictions are of a fundamentally different nature” (Mattessich 1971). Yet, as
Mattessich observes, “Nowhere in mathematical measure theory will the
reader find definitions of ‘measure’ and ‘measurement’ restricting these
concepts to past or present events.”

Reporting Effects and Economics
“[T]he reporting requirements of FASB Statement No. 4 results in accounting
‘gains’ being reported for most discounted convertible bond exchange (DCBE)
transactions, while the economic analysis indicates ‘losses’ in most cases” (Loy
and Toole 1979/80).
In-Substance Defeasance
“When implementing an in-substance defeasance, an enterprise may have to
address the following issues: some modest reinvestment return could be
assumed when determining the amount of assets to be placed in trust. . . ; legal
counsel should be sought to determine the legal status of the assets in the trust
for any contemplated in-substance defeasance transaction. . .; (instant
defeasance on new debt is not intended despite opportunities posed through
European markets); Possible future payments on debt that remains legally
outstanding but is extinguished in a defeasance transaction give rise to loss
contingencies” (McDonald and Sutton 1984).
Mortgage-Backed Securities
“[N]o real consensus has been reached as to how.. .investors.. .account for
their investment in the Trust or Partnership.” The mortgage-backed securities
marketplace will probably continue to expand in both volume and complexity
as new products, structures, and techniques are introduced. . . . In recent years,
the mortgage-backed securities marketplace has become extremely complex in
terms of the types and structures of securities being created, the accounting,
regulatory and tax implications to investors and issuers, and the related valua
tion and yield sensitivity of these instruments” (Wertz and Donadio 1987).
Lower of Cost or Market
Consider the extensive evidence and debate on valuation: nonaccountants
have been observed to think in terms of cash flow when reading income state
ments and net realizable value when reading balance sheets (Lee 1984). The
history of the lower of cost or market vantage points is outlined by Parker
(1965), with the observation that the rule is “practical” though suffering from
“ ‘theoretically’ illogicality,” thereby surviving through embodying both cost
and value, from a conservative direction.
Purchase Audit or Review
“The ‘soft’ numbers in financial statements (e.g., allowances for doubtful
receivables, excess and obsolete inventory, and unprofitable contracts), which
are determined by management judgments and as to which there may be
reasonable difference of opinion, become hard money transferable between the
pockets of buyer and seller according to these judgments. Under these circum
stances, the materiality threshold of net worth or net income in such financial
statements may be almost anything more—or less—than zero” (Gormley 1979/80).
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Cost Implications
Research indicates “that smaller businesses pay proportionately higher
accounting costs” but begs the question of cost/benefit trade-offs and causal
factors influencing such cost proportions (Nair and Rittenberg 1982/83).
Implications: A number of challenges involving theoretical, empirical, politi
cal, and reporting dimensions exist in formulating improved accounting
estimates.

One key line of inquiry in such literature is conceptual, including valua
tion models, identification of common factors that determine value or
economic consequences, and quantification of complexity. Determinants of
the complexity of accounting estimates include the extent to which we
understand the causal factors of a particular economic event.
Consider the following observation by William H. Beaver concerning
SAS No. 57 and the intrinsic future dimension of accrual accounting:
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 57, “Auditing Accounting
Estimates,” illustrates the pervasiveness of future events and pro
vides forty examples of where accounting estimates are required in
part because “the measurement of some amounts or the valuation
of some item is uncertain, pending the outcome of future events.”
In at least one-half of the examples, the estimation problem arises
because of uncertainty regarding the outcome of one or more future
events. Future events must be addressed because of the nature of
accrual accounting. . . . Accruals can be viewed as a form of fore
cast about the future based on current and past events, and accrual
accounting can be viewed as a cost-effective way of conveying
expectations about future benefits or sacrifices (Beaver 1991).
Conceptually, we model key factors—often emphasizing parsimoniously,
elegant depictions of interrelationships—and then empirically we set out to
test those models. The latter phase of research struggles with empirical
definitions of concepts, identifying proxies that are often plagued with
measurement error, and then clarifies what insights are added by the models
and what appears to remain “unexplained.” In pursuing a theoretical frame
work, it is useful to keep in mind that:
.. .depending upon the particular assumption adopted, a set of
theories purporting to explain the same physical phenomena may
exist.. . .Conant has observed that “a theory is only overthrown
by a better theory, never merely by contradictory facts;” we are
inclined to add that the use to which a theory is put may also
generate evidence for the choice of one theory or another (Williams
and Griffin 1969).
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Practice applications of conceptual and empirical results lead to explicit
recognition of certain factors that influence or determine estimates. This
can lead to such thought-provoking comments as: “Whether the combined
explanatory power of the variables—about 58 % of the variance of annual
returns—is good or bad news about market efficiency is left for the reader
to judge” (Fama 1990). At what point are models sufficiently comprehensive
to predict and explain economic behavior? One interesting development
is the increasing recognition of the role of incentives in the form of the
potential effects of compensation arrangements, as well as the role of
monitoring. If, for example, an auditor recognizes that a bonus plan keyed
to operating income is in place, with a floor and ceiling specification, then
that auditor can better understand possible incentives affecting manage
ment’s relative aggressiveness or conservatism when formulating certain
estimates. By the same token, monitoring of practices influencing operating
income would need to be given greater attention than would practices with
out the attendant compensation effects.
Decision Making

Research has clarified the superiority of decisions among three experts
relative to an individual decision maker. It has also noted repeatedly that
mere consensus in no way implies greater accuracy. Hence, means of
ensuring against forced consensus, planned agendas, and various political
dynamics are pursued, such as Delphi-type approaches to resolving key
corporate decisions among managers with diverse perspectives.
The Bayesian context or “belief function” technology base of expert
systems has increasingly sought variations of probability estimates as a
basis for developing decision rules and guidance. Use of graphics, sophisti
cated software, and feedback mechanisms within expert systems have all
increased decision makers’ understanding of probabilities, the indepen
dence of such probabilities, or lack thereof, and their consequences for
ultimate decisions. Substantial research exists on elicitation of subjective
assessments of probabilities and when certain approaches appear to be
more effective (Abdel-khalik and Solomon 1988).
Risk Assessment

Risk assessment has been disaggregated to include the notions of inherent
risk, control risk, and detection risk. Practitioners do not hesitate to
characterize “soft” numbers as having greater inherent risk. As discus
sions explore control risk dimensions, the foremost concern is who is
making the estimate and with what information base. The more competent
the individuals involved and the more tractable and comprehensible the
information base used in developing estimates, the better the control
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environment and related procedures for estimation. Figure 1 summarizes
these key considerations. Nonetheless, most practitioners expressed a
resistance to reducing control risk to its lowest level without directing
attention to both the process and the result. Many suggested that they would
view it essential to test independently the estimate itself, regardless of how
it was achieved. Yet, anecdotes were shared that challenged the availability
of an independent means to test certain types of estimates that are peculiar
to an entity’s operations. As an example, determining product liability for
railroad car manufacturers requires records on defects in cars and potential
liability claims tied to reported defects. Whether an adequate means exists
of gathering such information from sources other than the client appears
debatable at best.
Range of Reasonableness

If the focus of the practitioner becomes the estimate itself, one question
is how to determine the breadth of reasonableness. Moreover, once a range
is considered and the client estimate is found to lie within the range, should
the point estimate alone be documented as reasonable, or is an interval
assessment preferable? The guidance in the literature states that if all proba
bilities are equally likely, the lowest bound is to be selected. Consider first
the likelihood of a “uniform distribution” of equally likely outcomes and
then pose the question of why the literature has endorsed a lower bound
rather than the more common selection in statistics of mean or median? The
answer appears derivable from revisiting history.
When SFAS No. 5 was developed, the concern was over “hidden
reserves,” whereby reserves for contingencies and the like were being
“stored away for a rainy day,” so to speak. The incentive of the regulators
was to limit the extent of accruals. Ironically, in today’s environment, the
concerns are largely the reverse: Companies appear to be avoiding accruals
for contingencies, even when probable, on the premise that estimation
is too difficult. Pressures are increasing by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), particularly in the area of environmental cleanup
responsibilities by companies, to estimate contingencies even when difficult
to measure. An appropriate perspective on the importance of estima
tion follows:
The first step is to measure whatever can be easily measured. This
is okay as far as it goes. The second step is to disregard that which
can’t be measured or give it an arbitrary quantitative value. This is
artificial and misleading. The third step is to presume that what
can’t be measured easily isn’t very important. This is blindness.
The fourth step is to say what can’t be easily measured really
doesn’t exist. This is suicide (Daniel Yankelovich, as cited in
Smith 1972).
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The avoidance of such “suicide” may lead to more frequent estimates, but
the dilemma of having gone for a limit of the bound, rather than its mean
value within SFAS No. 5 continues.
Practitioners have asked the question: Which approaches in paragraph .10
of SAS No. 57 are most commonly used by the auditor and what is the
rationale for the approach used? Responses suggest that approaches are
highly dependent on (1) the client setting, (2) the technology and informa
tion at hand, and (3) the divergence of client estimates and the auditor’s
assessments. One practitioner told of a legal suit that had implied the stated
range of “reasonableness” in the working papers should have been booked
in its most conservative form. The consequence of this litigious setting is
that at least one major international firm is contemplating no inclusion of
“ranges” in the working papers, because they audit complex accounting
estimates. Other firms report use of combinations of ranges and point
estimates, with attention paid to excessively wide intervals. The constant
balancing of audit evidence for decision-making purposes and compliance
with general standards against litigious pressures is characterized in figure 2.
Disclosure

When auditors consider the high amounts of risk inherent in certain
numbers, they are increasingly turning to footnote disclosure as a vehicle to
deliver a message on such risks. Examples of disclosures cited as particu
larly effective include those by Martin Marietta and various health care
companies, as displayed in table 2. Yet, some suggest that the use of
footnotes in this manner passes the audit judgment to the financial statement
user and strives to avoid the question of “fairness.” Disputes proliferate
as to whether disclosure of risk profiles of management’s investment
decisions, hedging activities, and the like should be value added in financial
statement filings. Consider the disclosures on the junk bond investment
practices of various financial institutions, in tandem with current markto-market discussions of standard setters. A key question appears to be
the communication of risk and activities taken to balance risk, alongside
where such communication belongs. Of course, there are those who are
skeptical of moving from price to value, including A.C. Litteton, who wrote
in 1929:
Assuredly.. .value is a vague sort of thing, subject to all the whims
of mankind and turned by the least wind of altered circum
stances. . . .Whereas value is an estimate of what price ought to be,
price itself is an established fact. . . .When accounting is loosed
from this anchor of fact it is afloat upon a sea of psychological
estimates, which, however important they may be to business
management, are beyond the power of accounting, as such, to
express (Parker 1965).
145

FIGURE 2

Litigation May Encourage Less Documentation
of the Range of Estimates

NO
INCLUSION
OF
RANGES

146

CONSERVATISM
VS.
SFAS NO. 5

TABLE 2

Footnote Disclosures

Martin Marietta Corporation
1990 Annual Report, p. 32
In the fourth quarter of 1990, the Corporation established a reserve of $78
million ($1.00 per share) associated with the Corporation’s investment in
preproduction costs for the ADATS (Air Defense Anti-Tank System) program.
The reserve was necessitated due to program delays and the increased uncer
tainties surrounding ultimate recoverability of the investment through the
production and deployment of the system. While the U.S. Army program is
currently continuing under a two-year stretch-out and reliability growth plan,
there is no assurance that the program will ultimately go into production.
Management believes that the costs associated with these preproduction efforts,
which are essential for ultimately fielding the system, will be recovered should
the ADATS system go into full production and deployment.
American Medical Holdings, Inc. and Subsidiaries
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (August 31, 1990),
pp. 41, 54

Contractual Programs
The Company’s domestic hospitals serve some patients under government
and privately sponsored insurance programs for which payment is made based
on cost as defined under the programs or at predetermined rates based upon the
diagnosis, plus capital costs, return on equity, and other adjustments rather than
customary charges. Total net revenues from such programs were 36%, 34%,
34%, and 36% of total domestic hospital net revenues for the ten months ended
August 31, 1990, the two months ended October 31, 1989 and the fiscal years
ended 1989 and 1988, respectively. In addition, the Company has other con
tracted business which represented 21%, 21%, 20%, and 17% of total domestic
hospital net revenues for the ten months ended August 31, 1990, two months
ended October 31, 1989, and the years ended 1989 and 1988, respectively.
Revenues are presented net of reserve provisions to reduce customary charges
to the estimated amounts receivable from such programs. The reserves
provided have been deducted from accounts receivable pending final audit
and settlement. Provisions for contractual allowances for the ten months
ended August 31, 1990 for Holdings and AMI were $1.195 billion and $1.125
billion, respectively. The provisions for the two months ended October 31, 1989
and the two years ended 1989 and 1988 were $238 million, $1.261 billion
and $1.263 billion, respectively. In management’s opinion, the reserves
provided are adequate to cover the ultimate liabilities that may result from
final settlements.
Professional Liability Risks
In addition to the base premium paid to the insurance company, the Company
is contingently liable for additional retrospective premiums with respect to each

(continued)
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policy year. The company includes in its professional liability reserve the
deductible portion of the professional liability risks of these hospitals which is
$500,000 per occurrence. For the ten months ended August 31, 1990, Holdings
and AMI paid $3,200,000 in premiums to this insurance company. For the two
months ended October 31, 1989 and for the twelve months ended August 31,
1989 and 1988, AMI paid $800,000, $5,000,000 and $6,200,000, respectively, in
premiums to this insurance company.
The Company is self-insured for the balance of its professional liability risks.
As of August 31, 1990 and 1989, the unfunded reserve for self insurance was
$112,300,000 and $110,900,000, respectively, of which $23,000,000 in fiscal 1990
and $16,000,000 in fiscal 1989 is included in current liabilities. The reserves for
losses and related expenses are discounted to their present value based on
expected loss reporting patterns determined by independent actuaries using a
rate of 9%.
Columbia Hospital Corporation (December 31, 1990),
pp. F12, F13, F18

Patient Revenues
Patient revenues are reported at the estimated amounts due from patients and
third-party payors for services rendered, including estimated settlements under
reimbursement agreements with third-party payors.
Columbia’s hospitals and related healthcare entities provide care to patients
in connection with agreements with third-party payors, including the Medicare
and Medicaid programs, and certain managed care providers. These agree
ments provide for payments using mechanisms that are based upon established
charges, cost of providing services, predetermined rates based upon diagnosis,
fixed per diem rates, and discounts from established charges. The following
table summarizes the percent of patient revenues from all payors in 1990, 1989,
and 1988:

Medicare
Medicaid
Managed Care
Other

Years Ended December 31
1990
1989
33%
35%
8
7
9
10
50
48
100%
100%

Inception to
December 31,
1988
42%
6
5
47
100%

Contingencies
Columbia continually evaluates contingencies based upon the best available
evidence. In addition, allowances for loss are provided currently for disputed
items that have continuing significance, such as certain third-party reimburse
ments that continue to be claimed in current cost reports.
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The principal contingencies are described below:
Patient Revenues—Certain third-party payments are subject to examination by
agencies administering the programs. Columbia is contesting certain issues
raised in audits of prior-year cost reports.
Epic Healthcare Group, Inc. and Subsidiaries
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Fiscal 1990), p. A-12

Net Operating Revenue and Uncompensated Care
Net operating revenue is recorded based on established billing rates less
allowances and discounts for patients covered by Medicare, Medicaid and other
contractual programs. Payments received under these programs, which are
based on either the costs of services or predetermined rates, are generally less
than the established billing rates of the Company’s hospitals, and the differences
are recorded as contractual allowances and/or contracted discounts. The
reserves provided have been deducted from accounts receivable pending final
audit settlement. Contractual allowances and contracted discounts amounted to
$406,013,000 and $335,033,000 for fiscal 1990 and 1989, respectively. The pro
visions for uncompensated care of $61,800,000 and $54,680,000 for fiscal 1990
and 1989, respectively, are included in operating expenses.
Contingencies
Final determination of amounts earned under prospective payment and costreimbursement programs is subject to review by appropriate governmental
authorities or their agents. In the opinion of management, adequate provision
has been made for any adjustments that could result from such reviews.
Healthtrust, Inc.—The Hospital Company (August 31, 1990), p. A-9

Net Operating Revenue
Net operating revenue is based on established billing rates less allowances
and discounts for patients covered by Medicare, Medicaid, and other contrac
tual programs. Payments received under these programs, which are based on
either the costs of services or predetermined rates, are generally less than the
established billing rates of the Company’s hospitals, and the differences are
recorded as contractual adjustments and/or policy discounts. Net operating
revenue is net of contractual adjustments and policy discounts of $804,429,000,
$633,497,000, and $487,919,000 for fiscal 1990, 1989, and 1988, respectively.
The provision for bad debts is included in operating expenses.
Note K—Commitments and Contingencies
The Company is self-insured for a substantial portion of its professional and
general liability risks. At August 31, 1990, the reserve for professional and
general liability risks was $102,581,000, of which $3,750,000 is included in
current liabilities. The reserves for self-insured professional and general liabil
ity losses and loss adjustment expenses are based on actuarially projected
estimates discounted to their present value using a rate of 6 %. HCA retains the
liability for all professional liability claims and claims which would be covered
by a policy of comprehensive general liability insurance with a date of occur
rence prior to September 1, 1987.
(continued)
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Final determination of amounts earned under prospective payment and cost
reimbursement activities is subject to review by appropriate governmental
authorities or their agents. In the opinion of management, adequate provision
has been made for any adjustments that could result from such reviews.
Hospital Corporation of America (1990), p. A-19
Liability Insurance
The general and professional liability risks of the Company are self-insured
through a wholly-owned subsidiary for losses up to $25,000,000 per occurrence.
The Company carries general and professional liability insurance from an
unrelated commercial insurance carrier for per occurrence losses in excess of
$25,000,000 with policy limits of $75,000,000 per occurrence and in the
aggregate, on a claims-made basis. The reserve for general and professional
liability risks is based on actuarially determined estimates.
Humana (August 31, 1990), pp. 27, 29
Accounting Policies
Hospital revenues are reported net of contractual allowances and are based
upon amounts receivable from Medicare and other third parties. Health plan
revenues consist of insurance premiums derived from group and individual
prepaid health benefit and managed health care products.
Professional Liability Risks
The Company insures substantially all professional liability risks through a
wholly-owned subsidiary. Provisions for such risks underwritten by the sub
sidiary, including expenses incident to claim settlements, were $64,206,000,
$64,614,000, and $55,809,000 for the years ended August 31, 1990, 1989, and
1988, respectively. Amounts equal to provision for loss are funded annually.
National Medical Enterprises, Inc. (May 31, 1990), pp. 37, 43 (Note 6)

Net Operating Revenues
These revenues consist primarily of net patient service revenues which are
based on the hospitals’ established billing rates less allowances and discounts
principally for patients covered by Medicare, Medicaid and other contractual
programs. These allowances and discounts were $1,848,000,000,
$1,420,000,000, and $1,091,000,000 for the years ended May 31, 1990, 1989, and
1988, respectively.
Payments under these programs are based on either predetermined rates or the
costs of services. Settlements for retrospectively determined rates are estimated
in the period the related services are rendered and are adjusted in future periods
as final settlements are determined. After excluding the net operating revenues
of the business transferred to The Hillhaven Corporation (see Note 2), approxi
mately 28% of the remaining fiscal 1990 net operating revenues is from the
participation of hospitals in Medicare and Medicaid programs.
Professional and General Liability Insurance
The Company insures its professional and comprehensive general liability risks
through a wholly-owned insurance subsidiary and another insurance company
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owned by several hospital companies in which the Company has a significant
financial interest. Risks in excess of $3,000,000 per occurrence for general
hospitals and corporate activities and $250,000 for specialty hospitals are
reinsured with major independent insurance companies.
The Company’s estimated liability for the self-insured portion of professional
and comprehensive general liability claims is $62,000,000 at May 31, 1990, and
has been discounted to its present value based on expected loss reporting pat
terns using a weighted average discount rate of 9.6%.
Nu-Med, Inc. and Subsidiaries (April 30, 1990), p. 25

Contractual Allowances
The Company’s hospitals participate in several governmental and privately
sponsored contractual programs that provide for different methods of reim
bursement, including reimbursement based on cost or a diagnosis-related
predetermined rate, plus a return on equity. The difference between the revenue
recorded under each program and the anticipated reimbursement is recorded
as a contractual allowance. Annual cost reports are generally submitted to
and audited by agencies operating these programs. The Company records
anticipated cost report settlements due from or to such agencies in the current
year. A charge or credit to the amount recorded is recognized in the year of
settlement as an adjustment to the provision for contractual allowances in that
year’s statement of operations. The provision for contractual allowances and
uncollectible amounts amounted to $134,075,000, $122,170,000, and
$129,395,000 for the years ended April 30, 1990, 1989, and 1988, respectively.
Malpractice Insurance Coverage
The Company maintains $50 million in professional and general liability
insurance coverage. The first $500,000 is occurrence coverage, and the remain
ing $49.5 million is a modified occurrence coverage, containing a built-in
prepaid 84-month “tail.” An unlimited reporting tail is available for an
additional premium. Certain specific facilities maintain an additional $10
million in coverage. In the opinion of management, sufficient reserves
have been established for any potential deductible portions to be paid by
the Company.
Republic Health Corp. & Subsidiaries (August 31, 1990), pp. 25, 26
Medicare and Other Reimbursement Programs
Settlement amounts due to or receivable from Medicare and Medicaid
programs are determined by fiscal intermediaries. The difference between the
final determination and estimated amounts accrued is accounted for as an
adjustment to revenues in the year of final determination. Management believes
that the provision for Medicare and other program settlements is adequate to
cover final settlements.
Professional Liability Insurance
For professional liability claims asserted, the Company assumes professional
liability risks up to $3,500,000 per claim and $10,000,000 in the aggregate. In
(continued)
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1990, the company purchased a $10,000,000 layer of excess insurance above
self-insured retentions that may be applied towards hospital professional lia
bility and comprehensive general liability. The Company also purchased an
additional $5,000,000 of excess claims-made insurance for comprehensive
general liability only. In 1989, REPH purchased an $8,000,000 layer of excess
insurance above self-insured retentions that may be applied towards hospital
professional liability and comprehensive general liability. REPH also pur
chased an additional $2,000,000 of excess claims-made insurance above the
$8,000,000 layer for hospital professional liability only and $7,000,000 in excess
of the $8,000,000 layer for comprehensive general liability only. In 1988, the
Company purchased $15,000,000 of excess claims-made insurance above the
self-insured retention. Claims-made insurance limits coverage to claims
asserted during the policy year. Actual hospital professional liability costs for a
particular period are not known for several years after the period has expired.
The delay in determining the actual cost associated with a particular period is
due to the time between when an incident occurs and when it is reported as well
as the time involved and costs incurred in resolution of such claims. Based upon
an actuarial study, the Company maintains reserves for the future payments of
asserted professional liability claims and for claims incurred but not reported
which are not covered by insurance. The reserves for all years are recorded at
net present value using a 12 % discount rate. Certain amounts of cash are set
aside and included in other assets to cover such claims.
Universal Health Services, Inc. (December 31, 1989), p. 20
Third Party Revenues
Net revenues include estimated reimbursable amounts from third-party payors
such as Medicare, Medicaid, and other contractual programs. Amounts received
under such programs are based on either cost or predetermined rates and are
generally less than established billing rates which are the basis for recording
gross revenues. The differences between the billing rates and reimbursable
amounts as well as prior year settlements are recorded as contractual
allowances. The allowances provided have been deducted from receivables
pending final determination by intermediary agencies and, in management’s
opinion, are adequate to establish third-party receivables at realizable amounts.
Medicare and Medicaid revenues represented 45%, 46%, and 45% of gross
patient revenues for the years 1989, 1988, and 1987, respectively.
Commitments and Contingencies
The Company estimates the cost to complete major construction projects in
progress at December 31, 1989 will approximate $18,000,000.
The Company is self-insured for its general liability risks for claims limited
to $5,000,000 per occurrence and for its professional liability risks for claims
limited to $25,000,000 per occurrence. Coverage in excess of these limits up to
$100,000,000 is maintained with major insurance carriers.
As of December 1989 and 1988, the reserve for professional and general lia
bility risks was $29,470,000 and $21,082,000, respectively, of which $5,436,000
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in 1989 and $3,582,000 in 1988 is included in current liabilities. Self insurance
reserves are based upon actuarially determined estimates.
Approximately $4,500,000 of cash is restricted and has been escrowed as a
reserve for potential professional liability risks as required by certain state
regulatory agencies.
Under certain agreements, the Company has committed or guaranteed an
aggregate of $40,000,000 related to options to acquire hospitals, acquisitionrelated contingencies and loans.
Various suits and claims arising in the ordinary course of business are pend
ing against the Company. In the opinion of management, the outcome of such
claims and litigation will not materially affect the Company’s consolidated
financial position or results of operations.
Charter Medical Corp. & Subsidiaries (September 30, 1990), p. F-11

Net Revenue
Net revenue is based on established billing rates less estimated allowances for
patients covered by Medicare and other contractual reimbursement programs
and certain policy discounts. Amounts received by the Company for treatment
of patients covered by Medicare and other contractual reimbursement programs,
which may be based on cost of services provided or predetermined rates, are
generally less than the established billing rates of the Company’s hospitals.
Final determination of amounts earned under contractual reimbursement
programs is subject to review and audit by the appropriate agencies. Manage
ment believes that adequate provision has been made for any adjustments that
may result from such reviews.

Unanswered Questions

Two important practice issues that continue to be largely unanswered
questions relate to interim numbers. What is the quality of interim dis
closures and to what extent is the auditor presently involved? Should auditor
involvement be extended and if it were, what associated challenges exist
with respect to interim estimates? Should all press releases including finan
cial information be reviewed by the auditor of record?

Practice Questions and Implementation Issues
Before SAS No. 57, practitioners were largely performing the procedures
detailed in the expectation gap standard. The literature noted:
the EDs [exposure drafts for the expectations gap] should be judged
by their potential contribution to audit effectiveness, a shorthand
for the larger criterion of contribution to the quality of financial
reporting (Elliott and Jacobson 1987).
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Practitioners interviewed acknowledge that the codification of SAS
No. 57 provided greater attention to (1) the inherent risk dimension of esti
mates, (2) the necessity of not only formulating accounting estimates but
also of auditing those estimates, and (3) the importance of clients assuming
responsibility for the estimates that are audited in turn by the public
accountant—especially in smaller client settings. These three effects of SAS
No. 57 are illustrated in figure 3. The visibility of accounting estimates
throughout the audit process is increasingly evident in firm literature. By
and large, increased guidance is not sought within the SAS arena, but
the industry guidance on particular estimates, such as loan loss reserves
and insurance reserves (for example, Statement of Position [SOP] 92-4,
Auditing Insurance Entities’ Loss Reserves, a supplement to Audits of
Property and Liability Insurance Companies, September 16, 1991), is
applauded and continues to be sought on newer developments. The example
of an area needing enhanced guidance is the intended meaning of “more
likely than not” and the consequence of tax assets appearing on the books
(Price Waterhouse 1991, 1992).

Small CPA Firms' Perspectives

Representatives of small CPA firms were interviewed as to whether their
perceptions aligned with those of large-firm practitioners. Smaller firms’
practitioners, as did their counterparts in larger firms, viewed SAS No. 57
as largely a “nonevent” that codified practice. They believe that they are
less likely to be able to reduce control risk in the formulation of estimates
for most small client settings, due to the informality or inadequacy of under
lying processes and information bases. Moreover, with smaller clients,
the CPAs most often assist in formulating the accounting estimates. These
practitioners viewed SAS No. 57 as being associated with the increased
boilerplate emphasis in management representation letters on the client’s
responsibility for accounting estimates, even when derived with the
assistance of the CPA. Moreover, they cited the detailed direction in SAS
No. 57 as being useful when the separate phase of auditing was conducted,
apart from the accounting estimation process. They noted that the concern
existed pre-SAS No. 57 that if a CPA helped to derive an accounting
estimate, he or she might view that estimate to be reasonable, by necessity.
The existence of SAS No. 57 makes it very clear that such is not the case;
corroboration and an audit process must accompany the accounting
assistance offered to a client. SAS No. 57 was similarly cited as a means
of motivating enhanced record keeping by the client, due to cost con
sequences attendant to having the outside auditor both formulating and
auditing estimates.
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FIGURE 3

Effects of SAS No. 5 7 More Attention to:
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Context and Exception Monitoring
The importance of context and the nature of the item being examined was
repeatedly emphasized as crucial. Indeed, these considerations helped to
guide the practitioner toward a range methodology or a point estimation
approach. Moreover, one firm described its established practice of excep
tion monitoring.
Specified ratios are computed and if an estimate represents a certain
percentage of equity or percentage of reserves, the issue is “ bumped up” for
review within the firm. That group has found that the age of the company
and the product line at hand often explain such exceptions. About 10 to 20
percent require follow-up procedures. Small companies are particularly
problematic, as are unusual types of business and insufficient data.
Although these problems are unlikely to disappear, an increasing role for
expert systems is that of screening to ensure that such “ trouble spots” are
recognized, in order to facilitate individual attention being directed to
evaluating the reasonableness of associated estimates.
The concept of a “ peer review” team of specialists to scrutinize aspects
o f developing practice was revealed in a number o f interviews with practi
tioners. For example, one firm has a group who will review all proposed tax
asset creations under the recently issued SFAS No. 109, Accounting fo r
Income Taxes.
Reduce deferred tax assets by a valuation allowance if, based
on the weight of available evidence, it is more likely than not
[a likelihood of more than 50 percent] that some portion or all
of the deferred tax assets will not be realized. The valuation
allowance should be sufficient to reduce the deferred tax asset
to the amount that is more likely than not to be realized [emphasis
added] (FASB 1992).
This requirement that management estimate and consider future taxable
income in determining a valuation allowance poses a particular challenge
(Price Waterhouse 1991, 1992).

Independent Estimation Versus Reviewing
Management's Estimation Process
As already suggested, a need exists to understand management’s estimation
process apart from routine data-processing activities. This responsibility
is clarified in both SAS No. 55, Consideration o f the Internal Control
Structure in a Financial Statement Audit, and SAS No. 57. Nonetheless,
interviews repeatedly expressed a substantive test preference as an effective
means of understanding other factors considered by management, versus
those considered relevant by the auditor. Some firms are using modeling as
an explicit way to test their estimates, relative to those of management, and
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relative to incremental approaches to testing explanations of variations
between the estimates of management and auditors. The choices among
alternatives in the verification process are well explicated in the literature
of nearly forty years ago:
Verification in research and analysis may refer to many things,
including the correctness of mathematical and logical arguments,
the applicability of formulas and equations, the trustworthiness
of reports, the authenticity of documents, the genuineness of
artifacts or relics, the adequacy of reproductions, translations
and paraphrases, the accuracy of historical and statistical
accounts, the corroboration of reported events, the completeness
in the enumeration of circumstances in a concrete situation,
the reliability and exactness of observations, the reproducibility
of experiments, the explanatory or predictive value of generaliza
tions (Machlup, 1955).

Interrelationship With Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles and Generally Accepted
Auditing Standards
SFAS No. 5 is receiving increased attention as the conceptual platform
for all accruals of uncertainties. The questions posed in this guidance
include: Did the condition exist at the relevant date, is it probable, is it
estimable, and does it have a distribution as described in FASB Interpreta
tion No. 14, Reasonable Estimation o f the Amount o f a Loss, that permits
the lower bound to be recorded? The United States General Accounting
Office (GAO) has questioned whether “ probable” has become an illdefined term that at times has been treated as virtual certainty and is
increasingly calling for a “ more likely than not” revision (Bowsher 1991;
GAO 1992). Note that two sources of measurement error are implied: (1) the
usual “ noise” resulting from subjective estimation of probabilities, and (2)
the added “ noise” from having divergent objectives in such estimates due
to misunderstanding of what the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) intended to be “ probable” (e.g., 50 or 75 percent). The intriguing
question has been posed as to why Postemployment Benefits (OPEB) had to
be a separate pronouncement given SFAS No. 5 has been in place all along?
Similar questions are being raised regarding environmental liabilities.
Many view SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter, on assertions as a critical
conceptual framework in which estimates can be evaluated and audited.
Others integrate the attention of SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality
in Conducting an Audit, and SAS No. 55, Consideration o f the Internal
Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit, to the role of the control
environment. However, interviews suggest the widely held belief that
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controls are less likely over presentation, disclosure, and valuation
assertions—the heart of the SAS No. 57 focus.
Another related pronouncement is SAS No. 61, Communication With
Audit Committees. Since this requires increased communication, an
improved understanding by the corporate governance framework is
expected. The audit committee will have an understanding of where signifi
cant evaluative judgments are used and how they are determined.
Finally, audit industry guides are applauded in the accounting estimate
area. In particular, interviewees pointed to the 1986 Auditing Procedure
Study, Auditing the Allowance fo r Credit Losses o f Banks, as having within
its pages the content o f the later SAS No. 57, issued in 1988.
Estimation challenges have and are expected to continue to grow. SFAS
No. 97, Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises fo r Certain
Long-Duration Contracts andfo r Realized Gains and Losses from the Sale
o f Investments, the tax pronouncement’s “ more likely than not” threshold,
and similar developments may merit additional accounting interpretations
to assist practice.
Regulatory pressures are likewise growing in the estimation area. Quar
terly evaluation o f numbers in reserves and increased regulatory attention
to disclosure of responsible parties in environmental matters are two areas
of present concern.

Plausible Challenges
The disclosure of accounting estimates and the associated audit process
has been increasingly directed to the Management Discussion and Analysis
(M D & A) section of public filings. It is viewed as an opportunity to narrow
the expectations gap through broadened discussion. The points highlighted
include the concept of the estimation process not being a science, a descrip
tion of the thought process actually used, and examples of the outcome of
such a process. The description of significant accounting policies is another
forum to describe estimates and the degree to which they may be influenced
by the surprise element in certain lines of business. The magnitude o f effect
is the guide in determining disclosure practice. Table 3 provides a set of
M D & A disclosures for CIG NA Corporation.
Another possible forum for disclosure is the audit report itself: uncertainty
descriptions, scope limitations, and client-imposed or circumstancesimposed limitations (and whether this distinction is relevant). Additional
practical direction is desired by some interviewees, who expressed concern
that the lack of clarity may decrease the warning capability of the auditor’s
report mechanism.
Control reports, should they become more commonplace, provide another
forum in which the role o f accounting estimates can be communicated.
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TABLE 3

An Example of Management's Discussion
and Analysis Disclosure Practices

CIGNA Corporation
Form 10-Q (pp. 8, 16, 17)
September 30, 1991

CIGNA’s businesses are subject to the effects of a changing social, economic,
and regulatory environment. These include efforts to restrict insurance pricing
and the application of underwriting standards and to expand regulation. For
example, Proposition 103, a 1988 California ballot initiative, required rate
reductions for most lines of property and casualty business and contained “ rate
rollback” provisions that could require insurers to make premium refunds to
their customers. In October 1991, the California Insurance Commissioner
ordered numerous property and casualty insurers to make premium rebates
pursuant to emergency regulations adopted by the Commissioner. CIGNA was
ordered to refund approximately $43 million in premiums and accumulated
interest. The Commissioner’s actions are being challenged in state and federal
courts on constitutional and other grounds. CIGNA intends to defend itself
vigorously and believes that any amount that it may eventually be required to
refund will not be material.
Reserves
CIGNA’s property and casualty reserves are management’s estimate of future
amounts needed to pay claims and related expenses for insured events that have
occurred, including events that have not been reported to CIGNA. CIGNA’s
reserving methodology is described in its 1990 Annual Report on Form 10-K,
beginning on page 12. The description explains case and bulk reserves, when
such reserves are established, the basis for establishing and updating them, and
the uncertainties that are inherent in the reserving process. The following
discussion addresses reserving issues that are peculiar to asbestos-related and
environmental pollution claims.
Asbestos-related Claims
Since the early 1980s, underwriting results have been affected adversely by
asbestos-related claims. The majority of claims allege bodily injury resulting
from exposure to asbestos products. A smaller number of claims allege damage
to buildings as a result of the presence of asbestos.
CIGNA recognized in late 1985 that the limits of liability of certain policies
were likely to be exhausted by claims payments on behalf of certain insureds
named as defendants in numerous asbestos cases. For those policies, CIGNA
has reserves equal to the applicable limits of liability, minus payments made to
date and reinsurance recoverables, plus an estimate of the associated future
expenses of litigation. For claims that may arise under other policies, CIGNA
has reserves for reported claims but not for unreported claims or for litigation
expenses.
Significant uncertainties prevent CIGNA from estimating the future amounts
that may be needed for these unreported asbestos-related claims. For example,

(continued)
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TABLE 3

An Example of Management's Discussion
and Analysis Disclosure Practices
(continued)

it is not possible to estimate the number and value of claims that might be made
or the universe of asbestos-related exposures. In addition, significant issues in
the building cases are in dispute, including whether insurance coverage exists
at all and, if it does, what policies provide the coverage.
In July 1991, the 27,000 asbestos bodily injury actions that were pending in
pre-trial stages in the federal courts (some of which involve CIGNA insureds)
were consolidated in a single forum. It is not known whether this consolidation,
which does not involve the much larger number of claims in state courts and
does not relate to building claims, will speed or retard the resolution of claims,
or decrease or increase the cost (including litigation expenses) of settling
claims. The uncertainties inherent in valuing asbestos-related claims are not
likely to be resolved in the near future.
Environmental Pollution Claims
Since the mid-1980s, CIGNA has experienced significant increases in the
number of claims for losses involving alleged environmental pollution. CIGNA
establishes reserves for reported environmental pollution claims.
CIGNA does not establish reserves for unreported claims or for costs of liti
gation because significant uncertainties prevent CIGNA from estimating the
amounts that may be needed for them. The courts have addressed coverage
issues regarding pollution claims and have reached inconsistent conclusions on
several issues, including the following: whether insurance coverage exists at all;
what policies provide the coverage; when an insurer has a duty to defend;
whether the release of contaminants is one or more “occurrence” for purposes
of determining applicable policy limits; how pollution exclusions in policies
should be applied; and whether clean-up costs constitute covered “property
damage.” These issues are not likely to be resolved in the near future.
These coverage issues and additional uncertainties make even the estima
tion of liability of reported claims difficult. For example, at any given clean-up
site, the allocation of financial responsibility among those potentially liable
varies greatly, depending on such factors as volumetric contribution, rela
tive toxicity, number of years active at the site, extent of impairment to
the environment and ability to pay. A “ potentially responsible party” may
have no liability, may share responsibility with hundreds of others or may bear
the cost alone. Developing the information necessary to evaluate these issues
takes years.
Financial Effect
CIGNA expects that, with the exception of losses under the policies described
above whose limits of liability are reflected in asbestos reserves, future results
will be adversely affected by losses for unreported asbestos-related liabilities,
for unreported environmental pollution liabilities and for litigation expenses for
reported and unreported asbestos-related and environmental pollution liabilities.
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Management's Point of View
It would seem desirable to pursue booking of the most likely balance.
Since estimates are more susceptible to manipulation by management,
through bias, if not a deliberate intent to misstate, care must be taken in both
assessing risk and in auditing the numbers put forward. A boundary can be
invoked between inherent and control risk. Some interviewees indicated
that they view inherent risk as driven externally from outside of the com
pany, whereas control risk is driven by internal activities of management.
Indeed, this demarcation seems to work to some extent when analyzing
guidance directed to property and liability insurance companies, since
inflation, the legal environment, and regulations are cited as inherent risk,
with control structure and data base issues cited as control risk determinants
(AICPA 1991). Such a perspective facilitates the auditor’s understanding of
what is “ opinion” and “ expectation” o f outside effects, as distinct from
controllable policy o f a firm, as various estimates are evaluated.

Industry-Level Guidance
Guidance is often viewed as an infringement on audit judgment. The
internal guidance o f a firm tends to be driven by standardization goals
from within and is expected to vary in the context of the particular firm’s
technology and structure (Wallace 1991b). Most interviewees championed
an account-by-account focus within industry guides (as in the AICPA guide
Audits o f Providers o f Health Care Services) as distinct from an “ estimates”
directed extension of guidance similar to SAS No. 57.

Regulatory Interest
Regulators increasingly understand the economic consequences of
accounting estimates and are, indeed, the creators of one source of estimates
—regulatory costs, associated compliance costs, and, potentially, litigation
exposure. Pressures increasingly challenge regulators’ oversight of the
accounting profession, as estimates are demonstrated as not being fully
reflective of eventual outcomes. The importance of communicating the
future forecast nature o f some numbers in the financials and the avoidance
of a “ Monday morning quarterback’s” mentality need to be shared across
the profession and the regulatory bodies.
One must recognize the sometimes conflicting perspectives of the regula
tory arms. Although opinion-shopping concerns lead to 8-K timely filings,
the Federal Trade Commission concurrently pushes to allow commissions
to be within the compensation framework of public accountants—at least
potentially creating conflict-of-interest perceptions. The history in the
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financial markets of Congress and regulatory bodies’ direction of regu
latory accepted accounting practices (R A A P), at increasing odds from
generally accepted accounting principles (G AAP), provides a related
perspective (Wallace 1991c). An overall governmental regulatory policy
may be useful in avoiding some of the paradoxical outcomes of recent times.

Perception Issues
A key perception problem is that some users may believe that a soft
number becomes hard, merely due to the auditor’s involvement. Clearly,
this is not the case. Steps need to be taken to help adjust the perception.
More environment-driven pressures to consider estimations are evident.
For example, increased risks exist in contracting by financial institutions,
insurance companies, and defense contracting, to name a few.
An example in aerospace, where there are more important but less pre
cise numbers, is the evolution in contracting with fixed-price arrangements.
In contrast, for health care, diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) are seen by
practitioners as easier for hospitals than cost-based settlements, in terms of
the precision of numbers tied to diagnostic reimbursement groups. Yet,
self-insurance estimates create added risks for these same clients. In other
words, the shifting of risk may be within an industry and may be among
areas of operation within a company in an industry. Many practitioners
point to the financial arena and fair value footnote disclosures as sources of
increased need for estimations and a growth in related reporting risks. Asset
securitizations are being discussed from a risk perspective, and questions
are being raised as to the adequacy of related disclosures.

Firms' Responsiveness to the Environment
The real challenge appears to be that CPA firms need to be increasingly
responsive to the environment to get ahead o f the risk curve, so to speak.
The change in the real estate markets, health care, and risk patterns in a
variety o f markets need to be identified on a timely basis and addressed
throughout the accounting and auditing process. Greater attention should
be paid to planning and supervision, since these are the phases that can best
address such shifting of risks. I f practitioners can successfully locate the
risks and not only be reactive but forward looking, the chance exists to
assess the risks as the transactions arise. Otherwise, the aftermath can
be problematic.
Two areas that seem to have implications for the profession are OPEB and
“green accounting.” Why has it taken approximately two decades to achieve
OPEB, and is the environmental area different? Consider the disclosure of
Union Carbide in its December 31, 1990 10-K:
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Estimates of future costs of environmental protection are necessarily
imprecise due to numerous uncertainties, including the impact
of new laws and regulations [such as the Clean Air Act of 1990]
the availability and application of new and diverse technologies, the
eventual outcome of insurance coverage litigation in which the
Corporation is engaged, the identification of new hazardous waste
sites, and, in the case of Superfund sites, the ultimate allocation of
costs among PRP’s. Nevertheless, the Corporation estimates that
worldwide expenses for environmental protection, expressed in
1990 dollars, should average about $200 million annually over the
next five years. Worldwide capital expenditures for environmental
protection, also expressed in 1990 dollars, are expected to average
about $120 million annually over the same period.
Can we get ahead of “ established practice” so that SFAS No. 5 can suffice
to encourage the necessary accruals and disclosures? It would appear
appropriate for standard setters to contemplate whether lessons learned
can help guide future pronouncements. A number of related research and
practice issues are detailed by Roussey (1992). As researchers struggle to set
a relevant scope for research, we should all remember:
Breakthroughs in scientific research often come from unexpected
places: therefore, it ill behooves accountants to rule out any area of
research. Instead, if we are to follow the scientific norm we will do
our individual research on the basis of our individual beliefs about
the likely source of answers, while at least tolerating, preferably
encouraging, others to do likewise. This strategy increases our
chances of achieving breakthroughs [emphasis added] (Robert R.
Sterling’s 1979 book, Toward a Science of Accounting, cited by
Stamp 1981).

Prescriptions
Audit standard setters should develop general guidance explaining when
an exposure is estimable, the extent to which footnotes substitute or com
plement SFAS No. 5 requirements, and how audit reports should be used to
communicate related uncertainties.
I join the increasing number of voices that observe:
Currently there are multiple interpretations of the term, probable,
even at a conceptual level. It has become one major source of
variation in practice in the applications of GAAP regarding loss
contingencies. Removing ambiguity in the meaning of the term
could potentially enhance the treatment of future events and
indirectly the treatment of assets and liabilities (Beaver 1991).
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Opportunities exist for clarifying the formation and audit of accounting
estimates in particular industries through industry guides. Figure 4 summa
rizes implementation problems, one reason for the emerging expectation
gap, research needs, and standard-setting needs. As we ponder how best to
approach estimates, we must recognize that limitations of accounting are
part of our reality.
There is no prospect that accounting can ever parallel the develop
ment of physics, because the nature of physical reality is so totally
different from the reality with which accountants must deal.
Nor is there any prospect that this situation will ever change. Value,
and hence (as Sterling observes) income, are future-oriented
concepts. It then is uncertain, and fraught with risk. Markets are
imperfect, and they are also incomplete. Human decision making
processes (for which accounting valuations are the input) are of
almost infinite variety, complexity, and variability. In most,
perhaps all, cases they are imperfectly understood even by the
people who use them (Stamp 1981).
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A p p en d ix
Interviewees:
Harold Monk

Davis, Monk & Company

Pat Callahan

Frederick B. Hill & Co.

George Lewis

Broussard, Poche, Lewis & Breaux

Morton B. Solomon
Vern Johnson
Pete Minan

KPM G Peat Marwick

Donald L. Neebes
R.L. Brezovec
Michael D. Giese
J.E. Katzenmeyer
L. Kramer
J.G. Weaver
W.B. Zell

Ernst & Young

Walter R. Bogan
Ralph Hoffman

Price Waterhouse

Note: Comments forwarded by James E. Brown, of Baird, Kurtz & Dobson, are

reflected in this inquiry.
166

References
Abdel-khalik, A .R ., C. Chi, and D. Ghicas, 1987/1988. “ Rationality o f Executive
Compensation Schemes and Real Accounting Changes.” Contemporary
Accounting Research 4 (no. 1), 32-60.
Abdel-khalik, A .R ., P. Graul, and J. Newton, 1986. “ Reporting Uncertainty and
Assessment o f Risk: Replication and Extension in a Canadian Setting.”
Journal of Accounting Research 24 (no. 2), 372-382.
Abdel-khalik, A.R. and I. Solomon, Editors, 1988. “ Research Opportunities in
Auditing: 1988.” The Second Decade. Sarasota, Florida: American Account
ing Association, Auditing Section.
Alford, M.R. and T. Edmonds, 1980/1981. “A Replication: Does Audit Involvement
Affect the Quality of Interim Report Numbers?” Journal of Accounting,
Auditing, and Finance 4 (no. 3), 255-264.
American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 1991. Exposure Draft
—Proposed Statement of Position—Auditing Insurance Entities’ Loss Reserves
(September 16).
______ 1991. Audit Risk Alert: General Update on Economic, Industry, Regula
tory, and Accounting and Auditing Matters. New York, AICPA.
______ 1988. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication With Audit
Committees. New York: AICPA.
1988. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 57, Auditing Accounting

Estimates. New York: AICPA.
______ . 1988. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 55, Consideration of the Internal
Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit. New York: AICPA.
______. 1986. Auditing Procedure Study, Auditing the Allowancefor Credit Losses
of Banks. New York: AICPA.
______ 1983. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality
in Conducting an Audit. New York: AICPA.
______ 1980. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 31, Evidential Matter. New
York: AICPA.
______ Audit and Accounting Guide, Audits of Providers of Health Care Services.
New York: AICPA.
Amershi, A .H . and S. Sunder, 1987. “ Failure o f Stock Prices to Discipline Mana
gers in a Rational Expectations Economy.” Journal of Accounting Research 25
(no. 2), 177-195.
Ashton, A .H ., 1985. “ Does Consensus Imply Accuracy in Accounting Studies o f
Decision Making?” Accounting Review 60 (no. 2), 173-185.
Atiase, R.K. and S. Tse, 1986. “ Stock Valuation Models and Accounting Informa
tion: A Review and Synthesis.” Journal of Accounting Literature 5, 1-34.
Bagby, J.W. and P. Kintzele, 1987. “ Management Discussion and Analysis: Discre
tionary Disclosures and the Business Segment.” Accounting Horizons 1
(no. 1), 51-60.
Balachandran, B.V., 1985/1986. Discussion of “An Analysis o f the Auditor’s
Uncertainty About Probabilities.” Contemporary Accounting Research 2
(no. 2), 283-287.
167

Bazley, M., P. Brown and H.Y. Izan. 1985. “An Analysis of Lease Disclosures By
Australian Companies.” Abacus 21 (no. 1), 44-62.
Beaver, W.H., 1991. “ Commentary: Problems and Paradoxes in the Financial
Reporting of Future Events.” Accounting Horizons (December), 122-134.
Beresford, D. and M. Locatelli. 1983. “ The Complicated Question of Accounting
for Stock Compensation.” Corporate Accounting 1 (no. 3), 5-13.
Bernard, V. 1984. “A Comment On: ‘Effective Corporate Tax Rates.’ ” Journal of
Accounting and Public Policy 3 (no. 1), 75-78.
Bierman, H. 1988. “ Extending the Usefulness of Accrual Accounting.” Accounting
Horizons 2 (no. 3), 10-14.
Birkett, W.P. and R. Walker. 1971. “ Response of the Australian Accounting Profes
sion to Company Failures in the 1960’s.” Abacus 7 (no. 2), 97-136.
Boatsman, R., C. Dowell, and J. Kimbrell. 1984/1985. “ Valuing Stock Used For a
Business Combination.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 8
(no. 1), 35-43.
Bowsher, C. A. 1991. Comptroller General of the United States. Letter to Mr. Paul
Kolton. Chairman, Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council
(September 30).
Brown, C.E. and I. Solomon. 1987. “ Effects of Outcome Information on Evalua
tions of Management Decisions.” Accounting Review 62 (no. 3), 564-577.
Callahan, P.S., H. Jaenicke, and D. Neebes. 1988. “ SASs No. 56 and 57: Increasing
Audit Effectiveness.” Journal of Accountancy 166 (no. 4), 56-68.
Carslaw, C. 1988. “Anomalies in Income Numbers; Evidence of Goal Oriented
Behavior.” Accounting Review 63 (no. 2), 321-327.
Chambers, R.J. 1967. “ The Mathematics of Accounting and Estimating.” Abacus
(no. 2), 163-180.
Choi, F.D.S. and R. Levich. 1990. The Capital Market Effects of International
Accounting Diversity. Homewood, Illinois: Dow Jones-Irwin.
Chong, S. and D. Graeme. 1985. “ Related Party Transactions: A Preliminary
Evaluation of SFAS 57 and IAS 24.” Abacus 21 (no. 1), 84-100.
Chow, C., A. McNamee, and R. Plumlee. 1986/1987. “ Practitioners’ Perceptions
of Audit Step Difficulty and Criticalness: Implications for Audit Research.”
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 6 (no. 2), 123-133.
Comiskey, E.E. and C. Mulford. 1988. “ The Influence of Accounting Principles on
Management Investment Decisions: An Illustration.” Accounting Horizons 2
(no. 2), 67-72.
Cottell, P. Jr. 1986. “ LIFO Larger Liquidations: Some Empirical Evidence.”
Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance I (no. 1), 30-45.
Cramer, J.J. Jr. and C. Newhart. 1978/1979. “A Comprehensive Accounting Frame
work for Evaluating Executory Contracts.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing,
and Finance 2 (no. 2), 135-150.
Crandall, A.L. 1987. “ Understanding Valuations.” Corporate Accounting 5
(no. 2), 42-46.
Cummings, B.K., N. Apostolou, and W. Mister. 1987. “Accounting for Interest
Rate Swaps: An Emerging Issue.” Accounting Horizons 1 (no. 2), 19-24.
168

Daley, L.A. 1984. “ The Valuation of Reported Pension Measures for Firms
Sponsoring Defined Benefit Plans.” Accounting Review 59 (no. 2), 177-198.
Daley, L.A. and R. Vigeland. 1983. “ The Effects of Debt Covenants and Political
Costs on the Choice of Accounting Methods: The Case of Accounting for R & D
Costs.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 5 (no. 3), 195-211.
DeAngelo, L. 1986. “Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes:
A Study of Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders.” Accounting Review 61
(no. 3), 400-420.
______ 1988. “ Managerial Competition Information Costs and Corporate Gover
nance: The Use of Accounting Performance Measures in Proxy Contexts.”
Journal of Accounting and Economics 10 (no. 1), 3-36.
Deitrick, J.W. and C. Alderman. 1978/1979. “ Interim Reporting Developments:
A Step Toward The Auditors-of-Record Concept.” Journal of Accounting,
Auditing, and Finance 2 (no. 4), 316-328.
Dharan, B.G. 1986/1987. “ The Effect of Sales and Collection Disclosures on Cash
Flow Forecasting and Income Smoothing.” Contemporary Accounting
Research 3 (no. 2), 445-459.
Dye, R. A. 1988. “ Earnings Management In An Overlapping Generations Model.”
Journal of Accounting Research 26 (no. 2), 195-235.
Einhorn, H.J. and R. Hogarth. 1986. “ Decision Making Under Ambiguity.”
Journal of Business (no. 3), 225-250.
El-Gazzar, S., S. Lilien, and V. Pastena. 1986. “Accounting for Leases by Lessees.”
Journal of Accounting and Economics (no. 3), 217-237.
Elliott, J.A. and D. Kennedy. 1988. “ Estimation and Prediction of Categorical
Models in Accounting Research.” Journal of Accounting Literature (vol. 7),
202-242.
Elliott, J.A. and W. Shaw. 1988. “ Write-Offs as Accounting Procedures to Manage
Perceptions.” Journal of Accounting Research 26 (Suppl.), 91-119.
Elliott, R.K. and P. Jacobson. 1987. “Assessing the ASB’s Ten Exposure Drafts.”
CPA Journal 57 (no. 12), 16-25.
Emby, C. and M. Gibbins. 1987/1988. “ Good Judgment in Public Accounting and
Justification.” Contemporary Accounting Research 4 (no. 2), 287-313.
Fama, E. 1990. “ Stock Returns, Expected Returns, and Real Activity.” Journal of
Finance XLV (no. 4), 1089-1108.
Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC). 1992. Overview of
Environmental Regulation in the United States and Nature of Environmental
Liabilities.
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 1975. Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies. Norwalk, Ct.:
FASB.
_____ . 1976. FASB Interpretation No. 14, Reasonable Estimation of the Amount of
a Loss. Norwalk, Ct.: FASB.
______ 1987. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 97, Accounting
and Reporting by Insurance Enterprisesfor Certain Long-Duration Contracts
and for Realized Gains and Losses From the Sale of Investments. Norwalk,
Ct.: FASB.
169

_____ . 1992. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109, Accountingfor
Income Taxes. Norwalk, Ct.: FASB.
Figlewski, S. 1987. “ The Interaction Between Derivative Securities on Financial
Instruments and the Underlying Cash Markets: An Overview.” Journal of
Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 2 (no. 3), 299-318.
Freedman, M. and A. Stagliano. 1992.10-KDisclosures and Superfund. Collected
Papers, 1992 Southwest Region American Accounting Association. San
Antonio, Texas and Working Paper, SUNY: Binghamton.
Gaa, J.C. and C. Smith. 1984/1985. “Auditors and Deceptive Financial Statements:
Assigning Responsibility and Blame.” Contemporary Accounting Research 1
(no. 2), 219-241.
Gardella, R.R. 1986. “ Financial Statement Analysis Is Paint by the Numbers Art.”
Corporate Accounting 4 (no. 2), 45-49.
Gaumnitz, B.R. and J. Thompson. 1987. “ Establishing the Common Stock
Equivalence of Convertible Bonds.” Accounting Review 62 (no. 3), 601-622.
Gerboth, D.L. 1988. “Accruing the Costs of Other Postemployment Benefits—The
Measurement Problem.” CPA Journal 58 (no. 11), 36-44.
Gormley, R.J. 1979/1980. “ Professional Risks in Purchase Audits and Revenues.”
Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 3 (no. 4), 293-312.
Grimlund, R.A. 1985. “A Proposal for Implementing the FASB’s ‘Reasonably
Possible’ Disclosure Provision for Product Warranty Liabilities.” Journal of
Accounting Research 23 (no. 2), 575-594.
Gujarathi, M.R. and S. Biggs. 1988. “Accounting for Purchase Commitments:
Some Issues and Recommendations.” Accounting Horizons 2 (no. 3), 75-82.
Guy, D.M. and J. Sullivan. 1988. “ The Expectation Gap Auditing Standards.”
Journal of Accountancy 165 (no. 4), 36-46.
Hall, W.D. and A. Renner. 1988. “ Lessons That Auditors Ignore at Their Own
Risk.” Journal of Accountancy 166 (no. 1), 50-59.
Ham, J., D. Losell, and W. Smieliauskas. 1987/1988. “ Some Empirical Evidence
on the Stability of Accounting Error Characteristics Over Time.” Contem
porary Accounting Research 4 (no. 1), 210-226.
Harris, T.S. and J. Ohlson. 1987. “Accounting Disclosures and the Market’s
Valuation of Oil and Gas Properties.” Accounting Review 62 (no. 4), 651-670.
Hauworth, W.P. and L. Moravy. 1987. “Accounting for Expanded Use of Option
Transactions.” CPA Journal 57 (no. 5), 56-65.
Henderson, S. and G. Peirson. 1984. “A Note on Accounting and Executory
Contracts.” Abacus 20 (no. 1), 96-98.
Hennessy, V. 1977/1978. “Accounting for Pension Liabilities Created by ERISA.”
Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 1 (no. 4), 317-330.
Holstrum, G.L. and W. Messier. 1982/1983. “A Review and Integration of
Empirical Research on Materiality.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice and
Theory 2 (no. 1), 45-63.
Hoskin, R.E., J. Hughes, and W. Ricks. 1986. “ Evidence on the Incremental
Information Content of Additional Firm Disclosures Made Concurrently with
Earnings.” Journal of Accounting Research 24 (Suppl.), 1-32.

170

Houlihan, W.A. and A. Sondhi. 1984. “ De Facto Capitalization of Operating
Leases: The Effect on Debt Capacity.” Corporate Accounting 2 (no. 3), 3-13.
Hughes, P.J. 1986. “ Signalling By Direct Disclosure Under Asymmetric Informa
tion ” Journal of Accounting and Economics 8 (no. 2), 119-142.
Imhoff, E.A. 1987/1988. “A Comparison of Analysts’ Accounting Quality Judgments
Among CPA Firms’ Clients.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 1
(no. 2), 182-191.
Izan, H.Y. 1985. “An Analysis of Lease Disclosures By Australian Companies.”
Abacus 21 (no. 1), 44-62.
Jennings, M., D. Kneer, and P. Reckers. 1986/1987. “A Reexamination of the
Concept of Materiality: Views of Auditors. Users and Officers of the Court.”
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 6 (no. 2), 104-115.
Jiambalvo, J. and N. Wilner. 1985/1986. “Auditor Evaluation of Contingent
Claims.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 5 (no. 1), 1-11.
Kagle, A.R. and W. Dukes. 1988. “ Financial Reporting for Pledges at Educational
Institutions.” CPA Journal 58 (no. 1), 38-45.
Kaplan, R.S. 1982/1983. “A Financial Planning Model for an Analytic Review:
The Case of a Savings and Loan Association.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice
and Theory 2 (no. 2), 52-65.
Kellogg, R.L. 1984. “Accounting Activities, Security Policies and Class Action
Lawsuits.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 6 (no. 3), 185-204.
Ketz, J.E. and A. Wyatt. 1983/1984. “ The FASB In a World With Partially Efficient
Markets.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 7 (no. 1), 29-43.
King, T.E. and A. Ortegren. 1988. “Accounting for Hybrid Securities: The Case of
Adjustable Rate Convertible Notes.” Accounting Review 63 (no. 3), 522-535.
Kinney, W.R. Jr. 1981/1982. “ Predicting Auditor-Initiated Adjustments Using
Paired Balance Methods.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 5
(no. 1), 5-17.
______ 1983. “ Quantitative Applications in Auditing.” Journal of Accounting
Literature 2, 187-204.
Kissin, W. and R. Zulli. 1988. “ Valuation of a Closely Held Business.” Journal of
Accountancy 165 (no. 6), 38-48.
Knapp, M.C. 1987. “An Empirical Study of Audit Committee Support for Auditors
Involved in Technical Disputes With Client Management.” Accounting Review
62 (no. 3), 578-588.
______ 1985. “Audit Conflict: An Empirical Study of the Perceived Ability of Audi
tors to Resist Management Pressure.” Accounting Review 60 (no. 2), 202-211.
Kochanek, R.F. and C. Norgaar. 1988. “Analyzing the Components of Operating
Cash Flow: The Charter Company.” Accounting Horizons 2 (no. 1), 58-66.
Krausz, J., J. Hochman, and A. Schiff. 1987. “ The Impact of Taxation on Project
Valuation for Alternative Depreciation Methods.” Accounting Horizons 1
(no. 3), 31-40.
Kreutzfeldt, R.W. and W. Wallace. 1986/1987. “Error Characteristics in Audit
Populations: Their Profile and Relationship to Environmental Factors.”
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 6 (no. 1), 20-43.

171

Krogstad, J.L., R. Ettenson, and J. Shanteau. 1984/1985. “ Context and Experience
in Auditors’ Materiality Judgments.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice and
Theory 4 (no. 1), 54-74.
Lambert, R. A. and D. Larcker. 1987. “An Analysis of the Use of Accounting and
Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts.”
Journal of Accounting Research 25 (Suppl.), 85-125.
Larsson, S. and G. Chesley. 1985/1986. “An Analysis of the Auditor’s Uncertainty
About Probabilities.” Contemporary Accounting Research 2 (no. 2), 259-282.
Lee, T. 1984. “ Cash Flows and Net Realizable Values: Further Evidence of the
Intuitive Concepts.” Abacus (no. 2), 125-137.
Legge, H.A. Jr. 1987. “ Surviving the End of Bad Debt Reserves.” CPA Journal 57
(no. 7), 52-55.
Lev, B. 1988. “ Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efficient Accounting Policy.”
Accounting Review 63 (no. 1), 1-22.
Lev, B. and K. Taylor. 1978/1979. “Accounting Recognition of Imputed Interest on
Equity: An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and
Finance 2 (no. 3), 232-243.
Lindahl, F.W., C. Emby, and R.H. Ashton. 1988. “ Empirical Research on LIFO:
A Review and Analysis.” Journal of Accounting Literature 7, 310-331.
Lowenthal, F. 1983. “ Product Warranty Period: A Markovian Approach to Estima
tion and Analysis of Repair and Replacement Costs—A Comment.” Accounting
Review 58 (no. 4), 837-838.
Loy, L.D. and H. Toole. 1979/1980. “Accounting for Discounted Convertible Bond
Exchanges: A Survey of Results.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and
Finance 3 (no. 3), 227-243.
Lys, T. and K. Sivaramakrishnan. 1988. “ Earnings Expectations and Capital
Restructuring: The Case of Equity-for-Debt Swaps.” Journal of Accounting
Research 26 (no. 2), 273-299.
Machlup, F. 1955. “ The Problem of Verification in Economics.” The Southern
Economic Journal (July), 1.
Marston, F. and R. Harris. 1988. “ Substitutability of Leases and Debt in Corporate
Capital Structures.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 3 (no. 2),
147-170.
Martin, J.D., P. Anderson, and A. Keown. 1978/1979. “ Lease Capitalization and
Stock Price Stability Implications for Accounting.” Journal of Accounting,
Auditing, and Finance 2 (no. 2), 151-164.
Mattessich, R. 1971. “ The Market Value Method According to Sterling: A Review
Article.” Abacus 7 (no. 2), 176-193.
McConnell, D.K. Jr. 1983/1984. “Auditor Changes and Related Disagreements.”
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 3 (no. 2), 44-56.
McDonald, C.I. andM. Sutton. 1984. “ In-Substance Defeasance: Implementation
Issues.” Corporate Accounting 2, 22-27.
McNichols, M. andG. Wilson. 1988. “ Evidence of Earnings Management from the
Provision for Bad Debts.” Journal of Accounting Research 26 (Suppl.), 1-31.
Mensah, Y.M. and G. Chhatwal. 1987. “Accounting for Shrinkage In Continuous
Flow Industries: An Expository Note.” Abacus 23 (no. 1), 31-42.

172

Miller, E.M. 1980/1981. “ Why Overstated Earnings Affect Stock Prices But Not
the Reverse—An Important Asymmetry.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and
Finance 4 (no. 1), 6-19.
Milliron, V.C. 1985. “A Behavioral Study of the Meaning and Influence of Tax
Complexity.” Journal of Accounting Research 23 (no. 2), 794-816.
Moses, O.D. 1987. “ Income Smoothing and Incentives: Empirical Tests Using
Accounting Changes.” Accounting Review 62 (no. 2), 358-377.
Mulford, C.W. 1985. “ The Importance of a Market Value Measurement of Debt
in Leverage Ratios: Replication and Extensions.” Journal of Accounting
Research 23 (no. 2), 897-906.
Munter, P. and T. Ratcliffe. 1982/1983. “An Assessment of User Reactions to Lease
Accounting Disclosures.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 6
(no. 2), 108-114.
Murray, D. 1981/1982. “ The Irrelevance of Lease Capitalization.” Journal of
Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 5 (no. 2), 154-159.
Myers, R.J. and J. Creedon. 1987. “ Is Social Security Financially Feasible?” CPA
Journal 57 (no. 5), 46-55.
Nair, R.D. and L. Rittenberg. 1982/1983. “Accounting Costs of Privately Held
Businesses.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 6 (no. 3), 234-243.
Nichols, D.R. 1973. “The Effect of Extraordinary Items on Predictions of Earnings.”
Abacus 9 (no. 1), 81-92.
Noreen, E.W. 1979/1980. “ Comment: Measuring the Compensation Element
in Employee Stock Option Plans.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and
Finance 3 (no. 1), 67-69.
Nurnberg, H. 1988. “Annual and Interim Financial Reporting of Changes in
Accounting Estimates.” Accounting Horizons 2 (no. 3), 15-25.
Nurnberg, H., S. Thomas, and A. Cianciolo. 1985. “The Measurement Valuation
Allowance: Help for Deferred Taxes.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and
Finance 9 (no. 1), 50-59.
O’Donnell, R.G. 1986. “ How Users Analyze Financial Statements.” Corporate
Accounting 4 (no. 3), 14-18.
Osteryring, J.S. and G. Abernathy. 1984. “ Capital Budgeting: A Review.” Journal
of Cost Analysis 1 (no. 1), 131-142.
Palmon, D. and M. Kwatinetz. 1979/1980. “ The Significant Role Interpretation
Plays in the Implementation of SFAS No. 13.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing,
and Finance 3 (no. 3), 207-226.
Parker, R.H. 1965. “ Lower of Cost and Market in Britain and the United States:
An Historical Survey.” Abacus 1 (no. 2), 156-172.
Pearson, M.W. and L. Okubara. 1987. “ Restructurings and Impairment of Value:
A Growing Controversy.” Accounting Horizons 1 (no. 1), 35-42.
Plumlee, R.D. 1985. “ The Standard of Objectivity For Internal Auditors: Memory
and Bias Effects.” Journal of Accounting Research 23 (no. 2), 683-699.
Price Waterhouse, Accounting for Income Taxes, File Reference No. 104-A,
Comments on Exposure Draft (September 13, 1991)—with related corre
spondence regarding the Expectation Gap Roundtable (faxed March 11, 1992).

173

R achleff, M .L . 1984. “ H edging in the Futures Market.” Corporate Accounting 2
(no. 4 ), 34-41.

Richardson, A.W. 1985. “ The Measurement of the Current Portion of Long-Term
Lease Obligations—Some Evidence From Practice.” Accounting Review 60
(no. 4), 744-752.
Riley, W.B. and G. Smith. 1987. “ Interest Rate Swaps—Disclosure and Recog
nition.” CPA Journal 57 (no. 1), 64-70.
Robertson, A.H. 1987. “ Is Social Security Financially Feasible? Part I.” CPA
Journal 57 (no. 4), 18-28.
Roussey, R.S. 1992. “Auditing Environmental Liabilities.” Auditing: A Journal of
Practice & Theory (Spring), 47-57.
St. Pierre, K. and J. Anderson. 1984. “An Analysis of Factors Associated with
Lawsuits Against Public Accountants.” Accounting Review 59 (no. 2), 242-263.
Schnee, E. J. and K. Hreha. 1987. “ Capital Gains and Boot in Reorganization.” CPA
Journal 57 (no. 4), 40-45.
Schwartz, K.B. and K. Menon. 1985. “Auditor Switches by Failing Firms.”
Accounting Review 60 (no. 2), 248-261.
Schwartz, R. and M. Gilmore. 1988. “Auditing Pension Cost and Disclosure.”
CPA Journal 58 (no. 6), 16-25.
Scott, D. A. and W. Wallace. 1992. Practical Experiences with Regression Analysis.
The 1992 Deloitte and Touche/University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing
Problems (May 21 and 22), forthcoming in Proceedings.
Selto, F.H. and M. Clouse. 1985. “An Investigation of Managers’ Adaptations to
SFAS No. 2: Accounting for Research and Development Costs.” Journal of
Accounting Research 23 (no. 2), 700-717.
Shayeb, D. 1986. “ Inventory Valuation Problems: Ten Causes and Solutions.”
Corporate Accounting A (no. 1), 30-37.
Shields, M.D., I. Solomon, and W. Waller. 1988/1989. “Auditors’ Usage of
Unaudited Book Values When Making Presampling Audit Value Estimates.”
Contemporary Accounting Research 5 (no. 1), 1-18.
Shpilberg, D. and L. Graham. 1986-1987. “ Developing ExperTAX: An Expert
System For Corporate Tax Accrual and Planning.” Auditing: A Journal of
Practice and Theory 6 (no. 1), 75-94.
Shriver, K.A. 1987. “An Empirical Examination of the Effects of Alternative
Measurement Techniques on Current Cost Data.” Accounting Review 62
(no. 1), 79-96.
Smith, A. 1972. The Wealth of Nations. London: Encyclopedia Britannica.
Socha, W.J. and S. Harvey. 1991. “ Mini-Green Audits.” Internal Auditor (October),
39-43.
Sorter, G.H. and M. Ingberman. 1987. “ The Implicit Criteria for the Recognition,
Quantification, and Reporting of Accounting Events.” Journal of Accounting,
Auditing, and Finance 2 (no. 2), 99-116.
Stamp, E. 1970. “ Establishing Accounting Principles.” Abacus 6 (no. 2), 96-104.
______1981. “ Why Can Accounting Not Become a Science Like Physics?”
Abacus 17 (no. 1), 13-27.

174

Stark, A.W. 1985. “ Inventories, Credit Transactions, and the Marginal Effective
Tax Rate.” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 4 (no. 3), 225-231.
Staubus, G.J. 1985. “An Induced Theory of Accounting Measurement.” Accounting
Review 60 (no. 1), 53-75.
Steinbart, P.J. 1987. “ Materiality: A Case Study Using Expert Systems.” Accounting
Review 62 (no. 1), 97-116.
Stickney, C.P. and V. McGee. 1982. “ Effective Corporate Tax Rates: The Effect
of Size, Capital Intensity, Leverage, and Other Factors.” Journal of Accounting
and Public Policy 1 (no. 2), 125-152.
Swieringa, R.J. 1984. “When Current is Noncurrent and Vice Versa!” Accounting
Review 59 (no. 1), 123-130.
Swieringa, R.J. and D. Morse. 1985. “Accounting for Hybrid Convertible Deben
tures.” Accounting Review 60 (no. 1), 127-133.
Temkin, R.H. 1986. “Automating Auditing: Auditing Will Never Be the Same.”
Corporate Accounting 4 (no. 4), 56-59.
Thompson, J.H., J. Worthington, and L. Smith. 1987. “An Inconsistency in the
Method of Accounting for Changes in Estimate: Variable Stock Plans.”
Accounting Horizons 1 (no. 4), 29-34.
Togo, D.F. 1987/1988. “ Risk Analysis for Accounting Models Utilizing an
Advanced Electronic Spreadsheet Software.” Journal of Information Systems 2
(no. 2), 61-72.
Tosh, D.E. and J. Rue. 1988. “ The Effects of Unconsolidated Finance Subsidiary
Debt on Market Estimates of Systematic Risk.” Journal of Accounting Litera
ture 7, 157-173.
Trotman, K.T. 1985. “The Review Process and the Accuracy of Auditor Judgments.”
Journal of Accounting Research 23 (no. 2), 740-752.
Trotman, K.T. and P. Yetton. 1985. “ The Effect of the Review Process on Auditor
Judgments.” Journal of Accounting Research 23 (no. 1), 256-267.
Trueman, B. and S. Titman. 1988. “An Explanation for Accounting Income
Smoothing.” Journal of Accounting Research 26 (Suppl.), 127-139.
United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Report to Congressional Com
mittees, 1992. Depository Institutions: Flexible Accounting Rules Lead to
Inflated Financial Reports (June, GAO/AFMD, 92-52).
Vinten, G. 1991. “ The Greening of Audit.” Internal Auditor (October), 30-36.
Wallace, W.A. 1982/1983. “ The Acceptability of Regression Analysis as Evidence
in a Courtroom—Implications for the Auditor.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice
and Theory 2 (no. 2), 66-90.
______ 1984. “ The Effects of Delays by Accounting Policy-Setters in Reconciling
the Accounting Treatment of Stock Options and Stock Appreciation Rights.”
Accounting Review 59 (no. 2), 325-341.
______ 1988. “ The Irony of Responding to Regulators’ Pressures: The Case of
Management Letter Precautionary Representations.” Accounting Horizons 2
(no. 1), 88-93.
______ 1991a. Handbook of Internal Controls. Second Edition. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

175

______1991b. Reconsidering the Definition of Structure As It Relates to Differenti
ation Among Public Accounting Firms. Recent Research in Psychology—
Auditing: Advances in Research. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 21-41.
______ 1991c. Auditing. Second Edition. Boston, MA: PWS-Kent—acquired by
South-Western Publishers, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Wallace, W.A. and S. Duane Smith. 1991. Accounting for Options: No Longer an
Option. Vancouver, B.C., Canada: The Canadian Certified General Account
ants’ Research Foundation.
Weiss, D. 1987. “ Valuation of Closely Held Stocks—A Recent Decision.” CPA
Journal 57, 40-47.
Wertz, W.F. and A. Donadio. 1987. “ Collateralized Mortgage Obligations.” CPA
Journal 57 (no. 11), 68-71.
Wheeler, J.E. and E. Outslay. 1986. “ The Phantom Federal Income Taxes of
General Dynamics Corporation.” Accounting Review 61 (no. 4), 760-774.
Wiesen, J. and R. Eng. 1978/1979. “ Corporate Perks: Disclosure and Tax Con
siderations.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 2 (no. 2), 101-121.
Williams, T.H. and C. Griffin. 1969. “ On the Nature of Empirical Verification in
Accounting.” Abacus 5 (no. 2), 143-180.
Wolnizer, P.W. 1978. “ Independence in Auditing: An Incomplete Notion.”
Abacus 14 (no. 1), 31-52.
Wright, F.K. 1967. “ Capacity For Adaptation and the Asset Measurement
Problem.” Abacus 3 (no. 1), 74-79.
Zimmer, I. 1981. “ Modeling Lenders’ Assessments of the Ability of Corporate
Borrowers to Repay.” Abacus 17 (no. 2), 145-160.

176

Research in Analytical
Procedures: Implications for
Establishing and Implementing
Auditing Standards
Edward Blocher, University of North Carolina
James K. Loebbecke, Kenneth A. Sorensen Peat Marwick
Professor, School of Accounting, University o f Utah
This paper presents a framework and review o f the research in analytical
procedures, with the objective o f developing the implications o f this
researchfo r revising and implementing auditing standards in this area. The
review o f the research is developed in four categories: (1) descriptive
research, which studies how analytical procedures are used in practice;
(2) methods research, which investigates the effectiveness o f different types
o f analytical procedures; (3) expertise research, which studies the decision
processes o f auditors; and (4) bankruptcy models, which have used analyti
cal procedures. In summary, the research shows that analytical procedures
are used extensively, and are perceived to be effective, although studies
have shown that preliminary analytical procedures based on simple trends
and ratios may have limited usefulness. In contrast, model-based proce
dures, such as regression analysis, have been shown to have a good degree
o f effectiveness, primarily in case studies. The findings fo r expertise show
that although expertise is related to differences in knowledge, it does not
appear to be related to conventional measures o f audit experience. Thefinal
section o f the paper presents suggestions fo r future research and a discus
sion o f auditing standards in three key areas: (1) the usage o f analytical
procedures; (2) the effectiveness o f analytical procedures; and (3) the
required expertise fo r auditors using analytical procedures. The paper
calls fo r research on the effectiveness o f analytical procedures, and study
o f the nature o f auditor expertise in analytical procedures, particularly the
role o f the auditor’s knowledge structure and outcome feedback. A discus
sion o f SAS No. 56 suggests new wording fo r paragraph 5 to give additional
focus on the estimation process underlying analytical procedures, and a
rewording o f paragraph 21 to change from a search fo r nonerror causes to
a search fo r error causes, to reduce the bias toward incorrect acceptance
in the current wording.
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Prompted in part by the increasing attention given to them by practicing
auditors (Tabor and Willis 1985), analytical procedures have been an area
of increased attention by standard setters as well. SAS No. 56 (1988) has
significantly extended and improved the guidance available to auditors
before 1988 by including the requirement that analytical procedures be used
in the planning and review phases of the audit, by providing greater speci
ficity about the role of analytical procedures in each of the three phases of
the audit, and by identifying the criteria the auditor should use in selecting
and evaluating analytical procedures. Moreover, there is evidence that the
research has provided useful guidance to the Auditing Standards Board in
the development of the current professional guidance on analytical proce
dures, SAS No. 56 (Loebbecke 1987). And we believe that further research
can serve to improve this guidance even more. It is, therefore, a timely and
agreeable task for us to review this research, and to consider the contribu
tions it has made and can still make to current professional guidance and the
practice of analytical procedures.

Research Objective
The objective of this paper is to present the implications of existing
research for establishing and implementing auditing standards in the area of
analytical procedures. The paper also reports our efforts to identify
implementation issues and issues arising from research results that were not
addressed by SAS No. 56 or that have arisen since SAS No. 56.
The second section of the paper reviews a relatively comprehensive set of
research works on analytical procedures that have appeared in the recent
two decades. This review follows the research model outlined in table 1 and
explained below. After this review, we consider the implications of this
research for professional guidance and the practice o f analytical procedures
in section three, and provide recommendations for future research in section
four. These last two sections are organized into three parts, each of which
addresses a key area of guidance and research: (1) the usage of analytical
procedures, (2) the effectiveness of analytical procedures, and (3) the
required expertise for auditors using analytical procedures.

Review of the Research
There has been a significant amount of research into the use and effective
ness of analytical procedures in recent years. Our review attempts to
provide a comprehensive look at this work, and to identify the key findings
that are relevant to consider current guidance and implementation issues. A
total of eighty-three papers were reviewed. These papers are classified into
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TABLE 1

A Research Model for Analytical Procedures

Descriptive Research—Usage of Analytical Procedures
Theoretical and descriptive research about analytical procedures
Research about the usage of different types of analytical procedures
Research about implementation issues of the use of analytical procedures
in audit practice
Analytical Review Methods—The Effectiveness of Analytical Procedures
Research that addresses effectiveness generally
Research that looks at the effectiveness of specific types of procedures
Trend analysis
Ratio analysis
Regression analysis
Other methods
Expertise in Using Analytical Procedures
Research that examines the cognitive processes of auditors using analytical
procedures
Heuristics and biases
Knowledge structures
Subjective, unaided estimation
Research into how auditors select procedures and how they develop risk
assessments
Research into the use of decision aids for analytical procedures
The Use of Analytical Procedures in Estimating Bankruptcy
Estimation models
Subjective judgment

our overall research model, which is outlined in table 1. The research is in
four broad categories. Descriptive research is the type of research that
attempts to understand the way analytical procedures are used in practice,
or how they should be used. This type of research is often based on survey
findings. Alternatively, it is sometimes based on the deductive reasoning of
the authors, or on the logic implicit in an analytical model that is developed
by the authors. This research helps us understand the nature of analytical
procedures and how they are or can be used in practice.
The second category of research, methods research, investigates the
effectiveness of different types of analytical procedures. A large portion of
these studies have looked specifically at the effectiveness of regres
sion analysis, and have analyzed the benefits of regression over other
methods, and the differences in effectiveness when regression is used with
a variety of investigation rules. Other studies in this group have looked
at ratio analysis procedures, and more recent work has looked at possible
new procedures, including those based on new technologies such as
neural networks.
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The third category of research, expertise in analytical procedures, has
the objective of understanding the decision processes o f auditors and others
when performing analytical procedures. These works have identified audi
tors’ judgment biases when using analytical procedures. Other studies have
identified certain knowledge structures or decision processes that are
associated with auditors performing analytical procedures. In addition, a
number of papers have begun to investigate the nature of auditors’ expertise
in analytical procedures.
The final category, bankruptcy prediction, reports the findings of a small
set of papers that have looked at the use of analytical procedures in assessing
bankruptcy. Although many of these papers have developed prediction
models, others have examined the usefulness of these models in auditing,
and still other papers have examined the ability of auditors to predict
bankruptcy unaided by the models.
Each research paper reviewed for this report is summarized in the Appen
dix. The Appendix shows briefly the questions addressed in each paper and
the major findings of the paper. In addition, the number of papers by
research category is shown in table 2. In this section we present some of the
highlights of this review.

Descriptive Research
A common theme for the papers in this group is that analytical procedures
are used extensively and are expected to be very effective in identifying
errors and irregularities. Papers by Biggs and Wild (1984), Daroca and
Holder (1985), and Tabor and Willis (1985), among others, document
the extensive usage of analytical procedures, even before SAS No. 56. In
addition, Coglitore and Berryman (1988) point out that simple analytical
procedures could have been used to identify the fraud in many o f the notori
ous management fraud cases in the last fifteen years. Also, Reneau (1991)
shows analytically how even relatively imprecise analytical procedures can
be expected to be useful in detecting errors and irregularities. Using a
survey of actual audit engagements, Hylas and Ashton (1982) and Wright
and Ashton (1989) find evidence that a significant portion of material finan
cial statement errors are initially signaled by analytical procedures.
In contrast, Kinney and Haynes (1990) consider the statistical and
behavioral biases in performing analytical procedures, and conclude that
there are significant inherent limitations of analytical procedures. The
authors suggest that research continues to help discover the nature of the
statistical and behavioral biases, and the means to alleviate them. On
balance, the research in this group indicates that analytical procedures are
used extensively, and there is some case-based and survey research indicat
ing that, subject to certain inherent limitations, the procedures can be
very effective.
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TABLE 2

Summary of Research of Analytical Procedures
Secondary Category (1)

Primary Category

Descriptive Research (Usage)
Analytical review in general
Analytical review methods
Various
Specific
Use of analytical review
in practice

No.

Rev.

E&E Reg.

10

3

1

1

5
3

1
1

5

2

Rat.

Empirical

1

1

4-F
1-F
1-F, 2-S

_3
21

Analytical Review Methods
(Effectiveness)
Various
Specific
Ratio analysis
Regression analysis
Other methods(2)

12

1

5
10
_9

12

4-F,3-S,1-E,1-SM

3

2-FC
4-F,4-SM
3-F,1-SM

5
6

36
Expertise in Analytical Review
Cognitive processes
Selection of procedures
Generation of expected
values
Use of decision aids

9
4

5-E,3-P
2-E,l-P

1

3-E
2-E

3
2
18

Bankruptcy Prediction Using
Analytical Procedures
Prediction model
Subjective judgment
Use of ratios

2
5
1

—

—

—

1

7

29

6_

2

2-FC
4-E,1-F
1-FC

8
83

18—[F]ield study
5-[S]urvey
17-[E]xperiment
4-[P]rotocol analysis
6-[SM]imulation
5-[FC]ield study using
55 corporate data base

Notes:
(1) Key: Rev. = Literature Review; E&E = Effectiveness and Efficiency; Reg. = Regres

sion; Rat. = Ratio Analysis.
(2) These include time series models, bivariate models, index models, general financial
modeling, and prediction from various company characteristics.
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Methods Research
The second category o f research, studies that have investigated the
effectiveness of various types of procedures, has provided useful informa
tion on the relative effectiveness of the three types of procedures. The three
principal types of analytical procedures are trend analysis, ratio analysis,
and modeling techniques.
Trend analysis consists of the analyses in which the trends of the account
balances are examined as a basis for determining whether the current period
data are potentially misstated, that is, whether they depart significantly
from the prior trend of the data. Trend analysis techniques vary in com
plexity from the simplest two-period comparisons to statistically based
time-series models. Trend analysis is the most commonly employed analyt
ical procedure. As we shall see, it is also the least effective o f the three types
of procedures.
Ratio analysis is the term used to describe procedures that involve the
simultaneous analysis of two or more financial statement accounts. Common
examples are the inventory turnover ratio and the other turnover ratios,
gross margin as a percent o f sales, and other “ common size” ratios, such as
each expense account taken as a percent of net sales. The value in using
ratios is that often the relationship between the two (or more) accounts in
the ratio is relatively stable over time, therefore, a variation in a ratio is a
direct and clear signal of an underlying unusual condition—either a fraud,
a simple error, or simply an unusual combination o f environmental events.
Ratio analysis is potentially a far more useful method for detecting error and
fraud than trend analysis because it uses the assumed stable relationship
between accounts, whereas trend analysis looks only at the behavior of a
single account. The behavior of a ratio is expected to be stable, whereas a
single account balance can change for a number of reasons related to normal
operating factors that do not reflect error or fraud.1
A third type of analytical procedure, based on modeling, can be more
effective than either ratio analysis or trend analysis. The modeling approach
is distinguished by the attempt to identify meaningful, stable relationships
between financial and operating data. Two examples of the modeling
approach are the reasonableness test and regression analysis.

1 In this paper, ratio analysis is defined specifically as the ratio between financial state
ment accounts, and, therefore, excludes ratios between accounts and operating data
or external data. The relationships between financial and operating data are impor
tant; in this instance the operating data are often used to develop a forecasting model
for the account data. Because of the modeling aspect, we refer to the use of this type
of ratio as a modeling approach. For example, the ratio of total payroll expense to
number of employees could be used to “ model” or predict the average pay rate as a
basis for assessing the reasonableness of the reported payroll expense.
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A common type of modeling approach, the reasonableness test involves
the use of selected operating data and sometimes additional financial data
and data external to the firm, to predict an account balance. Reasonableness
tests o f expense accounts are the most common. One example is, the auditor
estimates a value for utilities expense based on average temperature and
hours of operation. A second example is the estimation of payroll expense
from operating data on number of employees, average pay rates, and the
number of days of applicable operations.
The reasonableness test is effective because it links financial data directly
to relevant operating data. When, as is often the case, variations in operations
are the principal cause of variations in the related accounts (especially the
expense accounts), reasonableness tests provide a relatively precise means
of detecting errors and irregularities affecting an account. This is particu
larly true for fraud cases. When a fraud is committed, it is likely that the
reported financial and operating facts will not agree, that is, the perpetrator
will find it difficult to disguise both the financial data and the related operat
ing data. For example, a reasonableness test of payroll expense can be an
effective means of detecting fraud wherein there are “ phony” employees or
excess time charged, because operating records must also be manipulated
fraudulently in the same pattern to prevent detection.
A second important type of modeling in analytical procedures is regres
sion analysis. In regression analysis, the auditor develops a prediction
model of the account (dependent variable) from relevant financial data,
operating data, and external financial data (independent variables). In
contrast to the deterministic relationships in the reasonableness test model
described above, regression analysis is based on derived statistical relation
ships among the selected independent variables and the dependent variable.
Regression analysis is widely viewed as a potentially useful analytical
procedure, because of the benefit of modeling the auditor’s expectation and
because o f the inherent precision of the statistically derived predictions and
related measures of prediction error.
Many of the studies have assessed the effectiveness of regression analysis
vis a vis other procedures, or have considered the relative effectiveness of
different rules of investigation used in regression analysis. Kinney,
Knechel, Wilson, and many others have contributed here, with results that
broadly support the effectiveness of regression. One achievement of the
research in this area is the demonstration of the clear superiority (aside
from issues of cost/benefit and required expertise) of the regression proce
dure in detecting material errors.
A second important stream o f research in this group is reflected in studies
that have looked at the effectiveness of preliminary analytical procedures,
primarily trend- and ratio-based procedures. Papers by Loebbecke and
Steinbart (1987), Kinney (1987), and Blocher and Cooper (1988) have shown
these procedures to be relatively ineffective at detecting material error.
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On balance, the research in this category has produced results that are
consistent with our understanding of the potential usefulness of the different
procedures. The relatively simple preliminary procedures (trends and
ratios) are found to be somewhat less effective than the more extensive
model-based procedures such as regression analysis.

Expertise Research
The third category, research of expertise in analytical procedures, has
the objective of understanding auditors’ decision processes in analytical
procedures. Some of the earlier work focused on decision behaviors of
auditors, particularly the potential biases that had been observed in a variety
of decision settings, and were expected to be seen also in auditors perform
ing analytical procedures. More recently, the research has focused on
cognitive issues, to determine the knowledge structures and thought
processes of auditors using analytical procedures. A common methodology
for these latter studies is the use of protocol analysis, in which the auditor
verbalizes a trace of that auditor’s thought processes while performing
the procedures.
The research that has looked at behavioral issues has found that a number
of decision biases, which are common in decision making, are also
observed in auditors using analytical procedures. For example, Libby
(1985) observed the availability bias, the tendency to perceive events (in this
case, errors) as more or less likely depending on the perceived frequency of
the event, and the recency of an occurrence.
In a similar investigation, Kinney and Uecker (1982) found that auditors
performing simple trend analysis were subject to the anchoring and adjust
ment bias, because they relied inappropriately on prior year balances in
developing an expectation of the current year’s balance for an account.
Biggs and Wild (1985) and Heintz and White (1989) replicated this finding.
Another series of studies looked at the auditors’ ability to make unaided
predictions as part of a trend analysis procedure. Biggs and Wild (1985)
found that auditors made significant prediction errors, which were con
sistent with the errors observed by other decision makers in an unaided
prediction task. Blocher (1985), Heintz and White (1989), and Kaplan
(1988) replicated this finding. In summary, the research has shown that
auditors, like other decision makers, are subject to certain pervasive
behavioral decision biases. Little has been done, however, to study the
means by which these biases might be alleviated.
Another important set of studies investigated auditors’ use of analytical
procedures and their related decisions about the extent of detail testing. The
consistent finding of these studies is that auditors do not use analytical
procedures to reduce detail tests (Biggs, Mock, and Watkins 1988; Blocher,
Esposito, and Willingham 1983; Cohen and Kida 1989).
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Cognitive research focuses on decision processes and cognitive structures
(memory, perception, etc.) in contrast to decision behaviors. These studies
tend to look at the potential relationships among performance, experience,
knowledge, and memory structures. This is a rapidly growing area of
research. The available work shows in part that:
• Novices and experts have different memory structures (Biggs, Mock, and
Watkins 1988, 1989).
• There is apparently little association between experience and perfor
mance (Davis 1991).
The finding that experience could not be associated with performance in
analytical procedures is explored further in Blocher, Bouwman, and Davis
(1992), which observes that a crucial issue regarding performance and the
development of expertise in analytical procedures is the needfo r unambigu
ous and accurate outcome feedback. Without effective outcome feedback it
is not possible to “ learn from experience,” and, therefore, developing better
performance with analytical procedures will require experience that
includes direct and effective feedback, and information about the effective
ness of each specific procedure in each context—its ability to signal error
and irregularities. Blocher and colleagues recommend that improvements
in the performance of analytical procedures will require improvements in
education and training that focus on the causal modeling of analytical
procedures (linking the procedures to specific error types, such that the link
can be “ tested” later by direct feedback), and the accumulation of feedback
relevant data as part of the audit.
For example, when analytical review results are favorable, and overall
risk assessments are favorable, the auditor will likely not perform addi
tional investigation to discover errors. However, this action also means that
the auditor is unlikely to find out if the analytical procedure was a “ miss.”
For this reason, the auditor must follow up on at least some portion of
analytical review results that are favorable, simply fo r the objective o f deter
mining if the procedure was effective. The idea here is that for quality
control purposes, it will be important for the auditor to do some investiga
tions that are not required for a specific audit, but must be done as part of
an on-going effort to observe and calibrate the diagnosticity o f the analytical
procedures that are being used.2
We have not included comment on bankruptcy model research in the body
of this paper, although the papers we reviewed are summarized in the
Appendix. We elected to exclude this aspect of analytical procedures
because of its appropriateness to the discussion of SAS No. 59, The Auditor’s
2 Note that a similar investigation may not be necessary for detail tests, such as audit
sampling applications, since these tests have a statistically measured risk of incorrect
acceptance.
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Consideration o f an Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern,
another topic of this conference.

Issues for Standard Setting and Implementation
Recognizing that SAS No. 56 has provided a significantly greater clarity
regarding the use of analytical procedures than prior guidance, it is never
theless apparent that there are certain issues regarding standard setting and
implementation that remain. Based on the research reviewed above and on
the observations of experienced auditors, we have identified some of these
issues. The issues are presented in three parts: (1) the usage of analytical
procedures, (2) the effectiveness o f analytical procedures, and (3) auditors’
expertise in using analytical procedures. The first part addresses the nature
and extent of usage for those procedures actually used in practice. The
second part deals with the effectiveness of the procedures (apart from that
of the user), and the third part deals with the effectiveness of the user of the
procedures (apart from the effectiveness of the procedure).
When considering the usage of analytical procedures, two types of issues
emerge. The first relates to the wording of two paragraphs of SAS No. 56,
which requires clarification. The second refers to specific aspects of the
use of analytical procedures where guidance is needed, but that are not
addressed in SAS No. 56.
First, we look at paragraph 5, which contains the definition of analytical
procedures:
Analytical procedures involve comparisons of recorded amounts,
or ratios developed from recorded amounts, to expectations devel
oped by the auditor. The auditor develops such expectations by
identifying and using plausible relationships that are reasonably
expected to exist based on the auditor’s understanding of the client
and of the industry in which the client operates. . . .
Although this statement is useful, and identifies “developing expecta
tions” as a critical element of using analytical procedures, we think the
definition of analytical procedures should be clarified to put even stronger
emphasis on the role of expectation formation. Our view is that using
analytical procedures is a three-step process, involving estimation, com
parison, and judgment. The first step is to estimate the account balance or
item by developing the necessary causal links (as the SAS states) “. . . iden
tifying and using plausible relationships that are reasonably expected. . . ”
The estimation is derived from one of the three types of procedures noted
above: trend analysis, ratio analysis, or modeling-type procedure. The
second step is to compare the estimated amount with the recorded amount,
and the final step is to judge whether the recorded amount is reasonable and
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to determine any follow-up that might be necessary. The nature of follow-up
depends on the audit phase; for example, in the planning phase, the results
are used to “enhance the auditor’s understanding of the client’s business...”
and to direct attention to potential risk areas.
Our view is that the estimation step is often given insufficient attention,
that there is a tendency to jump to the comparison step and compare two
ratios, to compare a balance to the prior year or budget, etc., without
developing the causal relationships that are necessary for an effective appli
cation. We think it is important to view explicitly the use of the analytical
procedure as an application of an estimation model or approach for it to be
most effective. To focus on the estimation step assures that the auditor will
be aware of the importance of assumptions implicit in the estimation (e.g.,
is the prior year’s balance still relevant for a comparison?), and will focus
the auditor’s attention on the means that may be available to make that esti
mation more accurate, that is, to focus on the effectiveness issues developed
in paragraphs 12 through 17 of SAS No. 56. For example, while many audi
tors would view a trend analysis of the working trial balance accounts and
a comparison of current and prior-year balances as a useful analytical
procedure, we expect few would argue that the prior-year’s balance, by
itself, is a useful estimate of the current balance.
For these reasons we argue that paragraph 5 should be reworded to
emphasize the role of estimation in analytical procedures. Suggested wording
might look something like the following:
Analytical procedures are audit procedures used in planning, over
all review, and as a complement to other substantive tests, based
upon the analysis of interrelationships among a client’s financial
and operating data, industry data, and other relevant external data.
An analytical procedure requires three steps:
(1) Develop an estimation for the account balance or item under
examination, based upon a study of the interrelationships among
client financial and operating data, relevant industry data, and
other general economic data.
(2) Determine the difference obtained by comparing the estimated
amount to the amount under audit. The amount of the difference
is a direct measure of the chance of an unexpected variation as
described in paragraph 2 (which can reflect unusual transac
tions or events, business changes, random fluctuations, or
misstatement).
(3) Determine, based upon the amount of the difference and an
assessment of the precision of the estimation, the necessary
audit steps that should follow, which will depend on the phase
of the audit at which the procedures are employed. For example,
at the planning stage, the follow-up will be to design the audit
plan to reflect the risk areas identified by the procedures.
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Kinney and Haynes (1990) identify an issue regarding the wording of
paragraph 21. Kinney and Haynes argue, and we concur, that the paragraph
requires clarification, because the present wording can be interpreted in a
way that would increase the risk of incorrect acceptance.
21. The auditor should evaluate significant unexpected differences.
Reconsidering the methods and factors used in developing the
expectation and inquiry of management may assist the auditor in
this regard. Management responses, however, should ordinarily be
corroborated with other evidential matter. In those cases when an
explanation for the difference cannot be obtained, the auditor
should obtain sufficient evidence about the assertion by performing
other audit procedures to satisfy himself as to whether the differ
ence is a likely misstatement. . . .
This wording tends to suggest that, when a significant unexpected differ
ence is observed, the auditor should first consider nonerror causes, such as
how the procedure might be deficient, rather than to first consider what
might be the possible error cause. As Kinney and Haynes state:
The suggestion is to change the focus on SAS #56 paragraph 21
from a search for nonerror causes to a consideration of error
causes. That is, the suggestion is similar to the “conceptually
logical approach” of SAP #54 (para. 65) to “consider the types of
errors and irregularities that could occur” and then to consider
which controls would prevent them. For analytical procedures, the
approach would be to consider possible errors and then look for
data that would be consistent with the misstatement.
A second set of issues regarding the usage of analytical procedures arose
from our discussion of implementation issues with auditors from large
CPA firms. It became clear that at least for some of these firms, the firm’s
internal guidance goes well beyond SAS No. 56 in specificity. For example,
the internal guidance addresses such issues as (1) when analytical proce
dures are appropriate, (2) what are the types of analytical procedures,
including examples and related assumptions, (3) how precision is measured
and related to materiality and audit scope, (4) what to do if the procedure’s
precision is greater than materiality, (5) the required documentation, (6) the
nature of sufficient corroborative information from management, and (7)
how to select and use computer-based decision aids and other technology
to facilitate analytical procedures.
The existence of this internal guidance is evidence that it is valuable. The
additional guidance is consistent with the SAS and helpful to the individual
auditor in complying with the SAS. However, it is likely to be generally true
that the smaller CPA firms will not have the resources to develop and main
tain the internal guidance, so a broad issue for standard setting is whether
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or not the SAS should be delivered at a sufficiently detailed level to assist
the smaller CPA firms. A response to this issue is that the specific guidance
outside of the SAS (primarily textbooks and professional books) is suffi
cient. Our thinking is that the level of detail in the present guidance is about
right, given the availability of textbooks and professional books on the
subject. One exception is that, when analytical procedures are used as
substantive tests, the issue of the relationship between materiality and the
precision of the procedure should be addressed explicitly in the SAS. The
statement in paragraph 20 is too vague, and should be amended to say that
when the precision of the procedure exceeds materiality, and cannot be
improved by aggregation with other tests, the procedure cannot be used to
reduce other substantive tests. Kinney and Haynes (1990) present a useful
discussion of this issue.
We now consider implementation issues related to the research findings
on the effectiveness of analytical procedures. We refer specifically to the
use of analytical procedures as a substantive test, which is wherein the issue
of effectiveness primarily arises. Several of the auditors who discussed
these issues with us noted that SAS No. 56 might cause some undue reliance
on analytical procedures with the effect that other important audit proce
dures that should be done are not being done. The auditors were in effect
reluctant to place too much emphasis on analytical procedures as a substan
tive test. This view is validated by the results of the studies by Blocher,
Esposito, and Willingham (1983), Biggs, Mock, and Watkins (1989), and
Cohen and Kida (1989) that showed that auditors do not tend to reduce the
level of detail testing, even if the findings of the analytical procedure are
favorable. Part of the problem is that analytical procedures provide a lesser
type of assurance than detail test procedures. As Blocher and Willingham
(1988) state:
To evaluate the strength of the evidence from analytical review, we
must consider that analytical review provides a negative-type
assurance rather than a positive one. That is, though analytical
review can be a useful technique for detecting a material misstate
ment, it cannot be relied upon to confirm with positive assurance
that a misstatement is not present. Positive assurance comes only
from the proper application of the appropriate detail test proce
dures. Thus, the auditor can never rely exclusively on analytical
procedures when risk or materiality is high.
Also, Kinney and Haynes (1990) observe:
Even though SAP #54, SAS #23 and SAS #56 did not indicate that
analytical evidence was in any way inferior to tests of details, there
was such indication from practitioners. Ernst and Whinney placed
restrictions on the reliance that can be placed on analytical proce
dures (Grobstein and Craig, 1984, 14). . .The Tenth Edition of
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Montgomery’s Auditing stated that, relative to analytical pro
cedures, tests of details are less efficient, but tests of details
“commonly provide a higher level of assurance with respect to an
audit objective.” (Deflise, 1975, 340).
From the above, it appears that auditors take the view that analytical
procedures provide a limited, negative type of assurance, and their use
as a substantive test is therefore limited. Our view is that the expected
effectiveness of the analytical procedures depends on the assertion being
examined and the design of the procedure. Regarding the impact of the
assertion, analytical tests may be somewhat more effective than other
substantive procedures for tests of completeness and tests of reasonableness
o f reserves, where the positive confirmation of detail test procedures has
little or no value. In contrast, for the assertion of existence or ownership,
perhaps detail test procedures will be more effective. This issue is addressed
in SAS No. 56 in a very general sense, and more specific guidance on this
point would be helpful.
Regarding the impact of design, it can be said that, “ Nothing in auditing
is free.” That is, while the common perception is that analytical procedures
are a simple and inexpensive way to obtain audit evidence, we find that very
little evidence is provided if the procedures are very simple. In contrast, if
the more complex and expensive types of analytical procedures are used
(e.g., regression analysis with monthly data, wherein the input monthly
data are tested for reliability), the evidence value of the procedures goes up
dramatically. Perhaps our thought here could be expressed in the equivalent
positive form, “ You get what you pay for.” In analytical procedures, this
means if you use more complex procedures, more accurate input data, more
detailed input data, and a more complete model, your precision and, there
fore, your evidence value will be high. This leads us to argue that the usage
and effectiveness of analytical procedures might be improved if they were
not viewed as relatively inexpensive procedures, but rather, as an alter
native to detail test procedures. Perhaps the choice between detail test
procedures and analytical procedures would best be made based on the
nature of the account or assertion being tested rather than, or in addition to,
how costly or simple the procedure is.
We now consider the implications of research in auditor expertise. There
are two broad guidance issues that arise from the research—one relating
to the attenuation of the decision biases observed in auditors and the other
to the development of causal modeling skills.

Dealing With Decision Biases
The research has shown consistent evidence that auditors, like other
decision-makers, display certain decision biases—
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• Inaccurate and biased subjective time-series estimations (Blocher 1985;
Biggs and Wild 1985; Kaplan 1988; Heintz and White 1989)
• Availability bias; auditors perceive likelihood of error as influenced by
perceived and actual error frequency (Libby 1985)
• Anchoring and adjustment (Kinney and Uecker 1982; Biggs and Wild
1985; Heintz and White 1989)
• Inadequate hypothesis generation (Heiman 1990; Bedard and Biggs 1991)
Guidance to overcome or attenuate these biases would appear to be
appropriate. Professional guidance could take the form of an instruction
about the bias, including an illustration of how the bias occurs. The idea
here is that awareness of the bias is perhaps the most effective and efficient
means of improvement. Thus, decision makers can be cautioned to avoid
certain decision biases much as in the nutrition area, where we have been
sensitized to the dangers of too much fat and salt in the diet.
A second approach to guidance might be to integrate decision support
within an audit practice, in the form of checklists or similar structured
decision aids, or in the form of computer-based decision support tools. For
example, the use of forecasting software could be an effective way to deal
with the biases in subjective estimation.
Finally, the decision biases can be addressed through training and edu
cation, wherein the individual auditor practices proper decision-making
techniques, and thereby learns to reduce the effect of these biases.

Developing Causal Modeling Skills
Our view is that the ability to develop a causal model of the financial and
other data relationships for an account is crucial to the effective utilization
of analytical procedures. As Kinney and Haynes (1990) state, “ Given an
unexpected difference, the auditor would consider what error cause might
explain it. Then the auditor would consider what other readily available
data would be consistent with the error and determine whether the other
data is consistent.” Also, Blocher, Bouwman, and Davis (1992) show from
a review of the research in learning that both a causal model and clear,
accurate outcome feedback are necessary for the development of expertise
through “ learning from experience.” Moreover, the Accounting Education
Change Commission, as well as many of the Big Six firms individually and
together have spoken for the need to develop analytical skills, problem iden
tification skills, and problem-solving skills in the entrants to the profession.
We see these analytical skills and causal modeling skills as closely related.
And the skills are particularly important in performing analytical proce
dures effectively.
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The development of causal modeling skills is difficult. To begin, we do
not have good measures of these skills. Thus, it is difficult to identify
instances of good or poor application of the skills, and similarly, it is diffi
cult to measure improvement. We suggest that accounting educators and
researchers investigate the means by which these skills are measured and
the means by which they are learned. As a starting point, we might consider
the measure of field independence (Witkin, Oltman, Tashkin, and Karp
1971), which has been used to measure analytical ability. Also, we might
consider texts such as The Complete Problem Solver by John R. Hayes
(1989), to aid in developing causal modeling skills.

Recommendations for Research
We are encouraged by the success of prior research in influencing the
state of standard setting (Loebbecke 1987), and we expect this trend to
continue. Therefore, in view of what the prior research has and has not
accomplished and with a look to the observed implementation issues
regarding SAS No. 56, we find there are some areas wherein research would
be particularly useful.
First, as noted by Loebbecke (1987), Johnson, Jamal, and Berryman
(1989), and others, there is a need for research to develop a comprehensive
theory for analytical procedures. A theoretical framework is important in
that it facilitates orderly research in the area, by focusing research questions
on relevant areas and aiding in the interpretation of the results of the
research. A theoretical framework would assist researchers and auditors in
understanding and acting on some of the implementation issues noted
above, for example:
1.

What type and level of assurance does an analytical procedure provide?
How does this differ from that of other audit procedures, particularly
detail test procedures?

2.

What are the steps in performing an analytical procedure, and how
does the auditor assess the value, or precision, of a procedure?

3.

In investigating unexpected differences, what attention does the auditor
give to error causes and nonerror causes?

4.

How does the auditor develop expertise in analytical procedures? What
is the role of outcome feedback in this regard? How does an auditor
develop analytical skills, the ability to employ a causal modeling
approach for analytical procedures?

Second, as noted by Kinney and Haynes (1990) and others, research
should continue to focus on the question of how effective analytical proce
dures are in various contexts, for example, fraud detection. We learned a
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good bit from recent research in this regard, but we have far from a full
understanding of the effectiveness of analytical procedures. A related
research issue is to develop a better understanding of how precision is mea
sured for the different types of analytical procedures. A benefit of regression
analysis is that it develops its own measure of precision, the standard error
of the estimate. But, the other procedures do not provide a direct quantita
tive measure of precision. The auditor would benefit from research that
would provide guidance in knowing how to determine a quantitative mea
sure of the precision of a procedure, and how this precision measure is used
in determining the nature and extent of further audit tests.
Third, we see as an important broad area for research the investigation of
the nature of auditor expertise in analytical procedures. What is the nature
of this expertise, and how is it acquired? An important aspect o f this
research will be to determine the nature of auditors’ knowledge structures
(memory, perception, etc.), the role of outcome feedback, and the develop
ment of causal models by the individual auditor. Also, the work will need
to look at the results o f prior research on decision biases in analytical proce
dures, which have by now established a fairly predictable pattern of auditor
decision response, and follow up this work with studies directed at finding
effective ways to ameliorate these biases in practical decision settings. A
related research question is the role and effectiveness of decision support
techniques such as expert systems in facilitating decision performance or in
facilitating the learning process.
Fourth, although prior studies have investigated the use of analytical
procedures by auditors, there is now a need for study of the use of the proce
dures by internal auditors and controllers. Controllers and, to a lesser extent,
internal auditors are regular users o f financial statement analysis for the
purpose of understanding and explaining changes in financial performance
to upper management. Also, internal auditors use analytical procedures to
identify risk areas. We need to know more about the usage and effectiveness
of the procedures used by these other professionals, and how the results of
these procedures might be integrated into audit planning, and perhaps used
as a substantive test.
Finally, we see a need for education research aimed at developing better
pedagogy to help students acquire analytical skills—how to develop causal
models of the relationships affecting an account or item.
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A p p en d ix

Summary of
Major Research Findings
Questions Addressed

Major Findings
Descriptive Studies

Analytical Review in General
Neumann (1974)
What sources of information
are available to auditors in
doing analytical procedures?
Felix and Kinney (1982)
What areas of analytical
review have researchers
addressed?

Smith (1983)
What guidance is appropriate
for practitioners as to the
nature, extent, and timing of
analytical procedures?
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The sources include corporate directories,
product directories, investors’ services,
industry/business index services, industry
statistics services, and geographical statistics.

Research relating to the auditor’s opinion
formulation process can be classified by steps
of the audit process: orientation, forming prior
probability functions and planning; systems
evaluation and testing; substantive testing; and
evidence aggregation and opinion formulation.
Within each step, it can be further classified as
state description research, model/theory
development, or hypothesis testing.
Analytical procedures-related research
(through 1982) can be found in the first
three steps in the form of state description
research, and in substantive testing in
the form of model/theory development.
The greatest concentration is in this last
category and relates to the use of structured/
statistical techniques.

All practitioners surveyed perform certain
procedures that fall into the definition of
analytical procedures; however, there is wide
diversity in the amount of reliance placed
on analytical procedures. The practitioners
allocate 5 to 15 percent of total audit time to
these activities.
Most practitioners find it difficult to
determine what constitutes a significant
fluctuation or variation.

Questions Addressed

Major Findings

Use of analytical procedures is a twelve-step
process:
Designing the procedures
1. Define the accounting amount or
relationship to be reviewed.
2. Define the objectives of the review
procedures.
3. Determine the examination methods
to be used.
4. Define a significant fluctuation in
the amount or relationship being
investigated.
5. Specify the reliance desired from the
analytical review procedures.
Comparison of amounts or relationships
identifiedfor review
6. Decide between computer or
noncomputer comparison of data.
7. Control the nonsampling risk.
8. Ensure audit control.
9. Make the comparison.
Examination of significant fluctuations
10. Identify significant fluctuations.
11. Investigate significant fluctuations.
Evaluation of the results
12. Form the conclusion.
Akresh, Loebbecke, and Scott
(1988); Loebbecke (1987)
What areas of analytical
procedures have researchers
addressed, and when compared
to a framework for research in
analytical procedures, what
are the gaps in the research?

As reported in Akresh, Loebbecke, and
Scott, the Loebbecke paper reviewed
fifty-three books and articles on analytical
procedures, with the following findings:
• Analytical procedures are important
to auditing.
• Analytical procedures are used extensively,
but inconsistently.
• Analytical procedures vary in effectiveness.
• SAS No. 56 appears to be consistent with,
and to have benefited from extant research.
His recommendations included:
• There is a need for a theory of analytical
procedures.
• There is a need for research on specific
industries, since the existing research on

(continued)
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Questions Addressed

M ajor Findings

commercial and manufacturing companies
cannot be generalized to others.
• There is a need for research to identify
the relationship between analytical
procedures and specific audit objectives.
Callahan, Jaenicke, and
Neebes (1988)
What are the objectives of
SAS No. 56?

Coglitore and Berryman
(1988)
How effective are analytical
procedures at detecting
management fraud?

Whittington (1990)
How and when can analytical
procedures be relied on
as substantive?

Blocher (1988)
How can the microcomputer
be used to facilitate analytical
procedures?
Kinney and Haynes (1990)
Are analytical procedures
subject to certain inherent
biases that may affect the
competency of evidence?
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The authors explain the role of analytical
procedures in the three phases of the audit
(planning, substantive test, and review),
how to document the procedures, and some
illustrative applications.

A review of court decisions and U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission actions is used to
demonstrate that simple analytical procedures
could have detected the massive fraud in
selected well-known fraud cases. The authors
argue that analytical procedures should be
used far more extensively for the detection of
management fraud.

The paper provides guidance and a few
illustrative cases to demonstrate the use
of analytical procedures to reduce other
substantive tests. The illustrations show the
effect of the use of analytical procedures on
the sample sizes used in tests of details.

The paper shows how to use audit software,
database systems such as dBASE III, and
spreadsheet systems for more efficient and
effective analytical procedures.

This paper looks at the competency of
evidence arising from analytical procedures
in comparison to evidence from tests of
details. The paper concludes with a set of
recommendations for both researchers and
standard setters to deal with this problem.

Questions Addressed

Major Findings

For Researchers:
1. What is the essential mathematical nature
of analytical procedures?
2. How reliable are analytical procedures
used in practice?
3. To what extent do behavioral biases
affect results of analytical procedures?
For Standard Setters:
1. Change paragraph 21 from a focus on
nonerror causes to a focus on error causes.
2. The auditor should take a causal approach
in investigating significant differences.
3. Auditing standards should be designed
to reduce behavioral biases.
Reneau (1991)
When employing audit
procedures, should the auditor
use confirming, disconfirming,
or random evidence selection
strategies? What is the
implication of this result for
the use of analytical
procedures?

Using a model for the design of hypothesis
tests that was developed in the psychological
literature, this paper shows that a “confirming”
type of evidence selection strategy is most
effective in many realistic audit settings. This
result is used to support the desirability of
using analytical procedures, on the basis that
the above demonstration shows a favorable
baseline performance for even the least
effective analytical procedures.

Analytical Procedures—
Various
Kinney and Felix (1980)
What analytical procedures
methods might be used, and
what would be their extent
and timing?

Hylas and Ashton (1982)
What are the causes of errors
in financial statements and
the auditor’s means of
detecting them?

Analytical procedures can be classified into
four groups, each having relative advantages
and disadvantages with respect to effectiveness
and cost. The groups are: (1) subjective
evaluation by experts, (2) rules of thumb, (3)
time trend extrapolation, and (4) structural
(regression) models.

Analytical procedures signal a large
proportion of material errors (in this
empirical study, 27.1 percent).

(continued)
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Questions Addressed

Arrington, Hillison, and
Icerman (1983)
What are the results of current
research on the use of
analytical procedures models
in auditing?

Major Findings

Research regarding limited trend, regression,
and time series models was reviewed and
analyzed. The conclusions of the authors
reviewed are found valid. In addition, the
authors conclude:
• Limited trend models may be effective
where data availability is limited;
however, where data is available, more
rigorous models should be considered.
• Regression is generally more effective
than limited trend, and auditors have
the ability to select appropriate
predictor variables.
• Regression appears most appropriate for
revenues and expenses.
• Use of time series models may be limited in
terms of current application by auditors.

Wallace (1983)
What is the nature of potential
analytical procedures?

Analytical procedures vary in effectiveness
along a continuum from “soft” to “ hard.”
A taxonomy demonstrating this is presented.
Most analytical procedures used in practice
are soft, and not very effective. The potential
for greater and more effective use of analytical
procedures is, therefore, very great.
Analytical procedures may be effective
in situations where detailed tests are not
effective, particularly with respect to
discovering fraud.
Reported field experience on five clients of
one firm indicates that regression analysis is
an effective analytical procedure that can be
implemented in practice.

Wright and Ashton (1989)
How effective are three
procedures—client inquiry,
expectations based on prior
years, and analytical
procedures—in signaling
material errors?
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The study is a follow-up of the Hylas and
Ashton study (1982). Based on a study of 186
audit engagements of a single Big Six firm,
this study found evidence confirming the
results of previous studies, that the three
procedures signaled about half the material
errors detected in these engagements.

Questions Addressed

M ajor Findings

Analytical Procedures—
Specific
Stringer (1975)
How well has regression
analysis worked in
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells’
audit practice?

Both time-series and cross-sectional
applications have been found. There were
over 10,000 applications in 1974.
Independent variables ordinarily consist of
data from the company’s accounting records
or other internal sources, or from external
sources such as industry statistics and general
economic indicators; sometimes they may
include an indicator of time and dummy
variables to indicate the presence or absence
of conditions that cannot be further quantified.
Independent variables should be plausible
and have audit significance.
Ordinarily, a base period of three years is
used in time-series analysis.
The cut-off point for identifying excesses
should be a function of materiality, reliability
levels, the standard error of prediction, and
the most adverse distribution of a material
amount of error that could occur in the
dependent variable data. The amounts of
excesses should determine the extent
of additional tests of details.
Coefficients of correlation have been very
high and discriminatory power has been good.
General acceptance has been good, but most
favorably by young, quantitatively oriented
staff. The advantages of regression analysis
include: focus on an overview and insight
into the business operation; increased
objectivity and discipline concerning the
reliance assigned to analytical procedures;
related reduction in tests of details; and the
feasibility of tests for understatements in
areas where tests of details for this purpose
are difficult to design and apply.

Chen and Shimerda (1981)
How can financial ratios be
categorized to resolve the
problem of ratio selection?

A seven-factor categorization scheme
captures the information content of the
financial ratios used in previous studies.

(continued)
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Questions Addressed

M ajor Findings

The categories are return on investment,
capital turnover, financial leverage, short-term
liquidity, position, inventory turnover, and
receivables turnover.
Bao, Lewis, Lin, and
Manegold (1983)
What research has been done to
investigate the use of time-series
techniques (particularly time
series models) in accounting?

There are a number of possible difficulties
in applying such techniques (e.g., the
availability of data and technical problems).
Only one paper (Kinney on time series models)
applies directly to analytical review and auditing.

Use of Analytical
Procedures in Practice
Biggs and Wild (1984)
What is the auditor’s
experience with
analytical procedures?

Daroca and Holder (1985)
What is the nature and extent
of use of analytical procedures
in practice?
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A high percentage of auditors used judgmental
procedures such as scanning
and ratio analysis in analytical procedures.
The more quantitative procedures such as
regression and time series tended to be used by
less experienced auditors.
The findings indicate the significant ability
of analytical procedures in detecting financial
statement errors.
There are no significant differences in the
use of analytical procedures in audits
versus reviews.
The most frequently applied analytical
procedures are:
• Working capital
• Current ratio
• Gross margin on sales
• Profit margin on sales
• Comparison of current with previous
financial statements and their relationships
with overall totals
Practitioners tend to apply those analytical
procedures not requiring an extensive
knowledge of mathematical or statistical
techniques, and analytical procedures that
utilize only data contained within the basic
financial statements.

Questions Addressed

Tabor and Willis (1985)
What analytical procedures
are used on actual audits?

M ajor Findings

(Based on a limited sample.) The use
of analytical procedures, in planning,
substantive testing, and final review,
increased significantly from 1978 to 1982,
and should be expected to continue to
increase in the future.
The amount of use of analytical procedures
varied significantly from audit to audit in
the planning and final review areas, and was
more consistent for substantive testing.
There was very little use of advanced
quantitative procedures. Nonquantitative
procedures were used more than simple
quantitative procedures in planning and final
review, with the reverse being true for
substantive testing. From 1978 to 1982,
however, a shift from nonquantitative to
simple quantitative procedures has occurred.

Methods Studies
Various Methods
Albrecht and McKeown (1976)
What are some arguments
in favor of developing more
extended use of statistical
analytical procedures,
and how do several
different statistical
techniques compare?

Kinney (1979)
What is (1) the distributional
nature of auditor-initiated

The methods considered were trend analysis,
ratio analysis, regression analysis, and
Box-Jenkins (B-J) time-series analysis. It was
concluded that all of the techniques can be
theoretically subsumed under the comprehensive
bivariate B-J methods, except for regression
where the dependent variable is a function
of more than one exogenous independent
variable.
It appears that both regression and bivariate
B-J are appropriate techniques that can be
used in performing statistical analytical
reviews. The advantage of using these is
a more objective basis on which to render
an audit opinion and also increased
audit productivity.
Based on a sample of forty-four small firms,
the basic inventory/cost of sales cycle,

(continued)
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Questions Addressed

adjustments, and (2) the
predictive ability of widely
applicable analytical procedures
that use limited and readily
available information?

M ajor Findings

general and administrative expense,
and the income tax-related accounts are
the most adjustment prone; analytical
procedures are likely to be useful for the
first two categories.
The simple methods tested appear to be
fairly effective in predicting errors, when
information about prior year’s adjustments
is included.

Coakley (1982)
What is the relative
effectiveness and efficiency
of the analytical procedures
in use by practicing auditors?

Practicing auditors use ratio and trend
techniques most frequently in practice.
In fact, the auditors surveyed did not use
structural models. The basis for their
decision rules is either absolute
differences over time or differences
relative to materiality.
Analytical procedures should address the
majority of errors that practicing auditors
expect to find that would be material.
The analytical procedures tested were
more sensitive to error distribution than
to error amount.
The predictive ability of regression-based
techniques was higher than that of the
other techniques.
However, most techniques do not adequately
capture the economic patterns in the financial
data of the test firms, leading to poor
performance given the precision intervals
commonly used.
Analytical procedures (as tested) should be
used primarily for attention-directing
purposes, and should not be entirely relied
on for substantive testing purposes.

Knechel (1986)
How effective are various
analytical procedures using
simulated data?

Regression approaches tended to have
fewer type I and type II errors than other
(nonstatistical) analytical procedures.
All models are affected by error size—
they are more effective at detecting large
nonrecurring errors rather than small
recurring errors.
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Questions Addressed

Loebbecke and Steinbart (1987)
Do preliminary analytical
procedures provide
substantive evidence, and
serve as a basis for reducing
the extent of other, more
detailed substantive tests?
Kinney (1987)
What is the attention-directing
effectiveness of analytical
procedures using selected
ratios with three decision rules:
(1) traditional percentage
change rule, (2) a statistical,
standardized change rule,
and (3) a pattern analysis of
cross-sectional changes in
several ratios?

Knechel (1988)
What is the effect of various
analytical procedures
approaches on overall audit
effectiveness (i.e., sample size
and achieved audit risk) using
simulated data?

Bell, Ribar, and Verchio (1990)
How useful are logistic
regression and neural network
computing in predicting
the failure of commercial
banks over a twelve-month
time horizon.
Coakley and Brown (1991)
What is the relative
effectiveness of analytic
procedures using neural

M ajor Findings

Preliminary analytical procedures probably
do not provide a reliable and effective basis
for reducing the extent of other, more
detailed substantive tests in most cases, and
should not be used for that purpose.

The relative size of errors is very important.
Even an error that is material to the year-end
financial statements does not lead to a large
change relative to the natural variation in
many balances and ratios.
The joint consideration of deviations in
several ratios (patterns) can be useful in
identifying a particular type of error that
might exist.
In developing ratios containing balance sheet
accounts, use of ending balances (versus
averages for the year) is desirable from an
audit perspective because it isolates potential
errors in ending balances from variation in
beginning balances.
Regression-based procedures using monthly
data had the smallest sample sizes of
those tested.
Most models that used monthly data resulted
in achieved risk that was less than desired risk.
Many analytical procedures may be effective,
but some are more efficient than others.
The results show that the two models give
comparable prediction performance.

This is a simulation study derived using data
from one company over a four-year period,
seeded and unseeded with error distributions.

(continued)
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Questions Addressed

network computing to identify
unusual fluctuations versus
conventional ratio and
regression methods.

M ajor Findings

The study reaches a tentative conclusion
that the neural network recognizes
patterns across financial ratios more
effectively than either ratio or
regression methods.

Ratio Analysis
Gupta and Huefner (1972)
Is there correspondence
between broad industrygroup financial ratios and
underlying characteristics
of the industry groups?

There is high correspondence of financial
ratios with both the judgmental
classifications of economists and with
numerous qualitatively expressed
economic characteristics of the
industries involved.
The greater the specialization of the
assets involved in the ratio, the clearer
the correspondence.
Since the characteristics are difficult to
obtain, relevant ratios may be used as
surrogates for them.

Trapnell (1977)
Is there information content
in financial ratios relative to
the identification of industry
membership?

The stratification of firms by industry does
not necessarily result in groupings of firms
whose financial ratios are significantly
different from all other industries.
The ratios that are significant in
differentiating industries are generally
balance sheet ratios, particularly relating
to current assets, total assets, and
asset turnover.

Deakin (1979)
Is there normality in the
distributions of eleven
commonly used financial
ratios (using data from 1955
to 1972)?

Assumptions of normality for
financial accounting ratios would
not be tenable except in the case of
Total Debt/Total Assets, and then the
assumption would not hold for the most
recent data observations.
It does appear that normality can be
achieved in certain cases by transforming
the data.
Financial accounting ratios might be more
normally distributed within a specific
industry group.
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Questions Addressed

Frecka and Hopwood (1983)
What are the effects of outliers
on the cross-sectional
properties of the distributions
of financial ratios?

Knechel (1988)
How effective are simple
trend and ratio procedures in
reducing sample sizes for
subsequent detail tests and in
reducing overall detection risk
when used alone and together
with dollar unit sampling
(DUS) techniques?

M ajor Findings

By deleting outliers, normality or
approximate normality usually can
be achieved for manufacturing firms
and specific industry groupings. In
addition, there is a general reduction
in relative variances.
The major findings are:
• The trend and ratio procedures combined
with the DUS strategy can increase audit
effectiveness relative to an audit approach
that does not use analytical procedures.
• Using monthly account information in
analytical review is more effective than
using annual balances alone, as long as
the accounting system is minimally reliable.
• The trend and ratio procedures alone are
not effective in detecting material errors.

Wilson and Colbert (1989)
How effective are simple
trend models, regression
models with simple
investigation rules, and
regression models with
statistical decision rules in
detecting material errors?

Using data from an actual audit engagement,
and seeding different error patterns, the
authors found that all the models were
effective in detecting the seeded error, but
that the regression model with a statistical
decision rule provided the most accurate
predictions and fewest incorrect rejections.

Wheeler and Pany (1990)
How effective are simple
naive models, regression
models, and time-series
models in detecting
material errors?

Using a simulation method, quarterly data,
and introducing different error types, the
authors found that the time-series model and
the regression model outperformed the naive
models, as consistent with prior studies.

Regression Analysis
Deakin and Granoff (1973);
Kinney and Bailey (1976)
How can regression analysis,
coupled with Bayesian
statistical procedures, be used
to provide the auditor with
assistance in selecting those
accounts for investigation that

Demonstration was provided.

(continued)
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Questions Addressed

M ajor Findings

are most likely to result in
significant audit findings?
Kinney (1977)
What is the conceptual basis
for integrating the results of
auditor’s analytical procedures
using time-series-based
regression and tests of details
using a “ partitioned”
DUS plan?

Elliott (1978)
Why is regression analysis not
commonly used in auditing?

When looking at monthly data, the presence
of a material error in a single month is
relatively easy to detect with analytical
procedures while an equal or proportionate
distribution may be virtually impossible to
detect using analytical procedures alone.
An approach for combining regression-based
analytical procedures and DUS-based tests
of details for an income statement account
is developed analytically and then validated
with a limited simulation.
There are three general considerations as to
why regression analysis is not commonly
used in audits:
High costs
Training must be extensive.
Model building requires a great deal
of time.
Data acquisition is generally costly.
Low benefits
Regression models typically have low
resolving power compared with audit
precision requirements.
Technical validity
There are a number of technical concerns
that must be dealt with when regression
analysis is used.

Kinney and Salamon (1978)
What are the effects of errors
in the independent and
dependent variables on the
application of regression
in auditing?

Neter (1980)
How does regression perform
in practice, using two case
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Random measurement error in the independent
variable does lead to increased type I and
type II errors, while uncorrected accounting
errors in the base period leads to reduced
type I errors but increased type II errors. The
latter effect is particularly pronounced when
there are several small uncorrected errors.
In neither of the two cases did the auditor
appear to have particularly difficult problems

Questions Addressed

studies that explore statistical
issues—one on assessing the
reasonableness of accounts
receivable using time-series
analysis, and one on selecting
locations to visit using crosssectional analysis?

M ajor Findings

in identifying potential independent
variables.
In both cases, variables not included in the
financial statements were found to be useful
for explanatory purposes.
The fitting of the regression models and
examining them for aptness presented no
major difficulties in either case.
The predictive ability of the regression
models for the cross-section case tended to be
better than for the accounts receivable models.

Akresh and Wallace (1980)
How does regression perform
in practice in limited review
and audit planning, including
technical validity, effectiveness,
and costs?

Regression analysis proved to be a useful tool
for time-series analysis of the revenue-related
accounts of a public utility. Major advantages
over nonstatistical techniques were added
discipline, magnitude as well as direction of
error, and long-term perspective.
Thirty-six-month models performed well,
although were improved upon by an eightyfour-month model in some cases.
Stepwise analysis can be supported as an aid in
model building in the initial year, but the auditor
should specify a logical model after that point.
The major cost was training. Cost savings in
other procedures, however, result in an overall
5 percent decline in audit hours (drops in
sample size approaching 60 percent can be
anticipated). The use of regression requires
active partner and manager participation.

Collins (1980)
What is the impact of model
specification errors on the
effectiveness of stepwise
regression analysis in auditing?

Kinney and Salamon (1982)
What is the relative
effectiveness and efficiency of
the “ Stringer” (DH&S)

Model specification error does occur when
using the stepwise regression method. The
specification error results in biased estimates
of the model parameters and inefficient
predictions of account balances. The auditor’s
investigation rule can be framed so as to
offset the riskiness of these effects.
The DH&S model performed quite well, is
just as effective as the Kinney model (both
controlled type II errors at or below the

(continued)
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investigation rule (monthly
expected value to monthly
materiality construct) to the
“ Kinney” investigation rule
(annual expected value to
annual materiality construct
with a monthly “ filter” ) in
the application of regression
analysis in auditing
using simulation?
Wilson and Glezen (1989)
What would be the difference,
if any, of using the Kinney
and Salamon (1982)
regression-based decision
rules on actual client data, in
contrast to the simulated data
used in the prior study?

M ajor Findings

nominal level), and more efficient (i.e., fewer
type I errors).

Using the three regression models
examined in the prior study, and using
similar error seedings, the authors
replicated the prior study on actual client
data. The findings supported the relative
effectiveness of the rules as shown in the
prior study, although there were some
differences in the number of type I and
type II errors and number of months
investigated, due to the greater variability
of the actual data.

Other Methods
Kaplan (1978)
How feasible is it and what
judgments are required to
build a financial planning
model that will produce pro
forma statements of sufficient
accuracy that they can be used
by auditors for their analytic
reviews and perhaps to reduce
reliance on other audit tests?
Kinney (1978)
What is the relative performance
of four statistical and two naive
procedures for conducting
analytical reviews that rely on
substantially different data
sets (specifically, ordinary
least squares regression, and
three sets of time series-
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A model that used sales as an exogenous
variable was constructed (based on
monthly data) that appears promising
for income statement accounts. The
model was not sufficiently accurate for
the balance sheet.

All methods exhibit a slight prediction bias,
but the time series-based univariate transfer
function, which requires the largest
information set and the greatest computation
effort, yields the smallest mean absolute
error as well as the smallest prediction bias.
Regression predictions are second in
predictive power. Both performed

Questions Addressed

based predictions are compared
with martingale and submartin
gale predictions for a set of
monthly accounting series)?

Lev (1980)
How well do index-based
prediction models work for
analytical review?

Kinney (1981)
What is the effectiveness of
specific analytical procedures
that use information of a group
of similar companies as a basis
for comparison to unaudited
information in the subject
company (bivariate method)?
Howell, Frazier, and
Stephenson (1982)
What is the effectiveness
of using industry data for
comparisons in evaluating
small firms?

Willingham and Wright (1984)
What types of errors are found
in audits of manufacturing
firms’ accounts receivable and
inventory, and to what degree
can those errors be estimated
given knowledge of general

M ajor Findings

substantially better than the naive
methods.
Time series can be used to estimate an
independent variable value for use with
regression, when such values are not
available on a timely basis.
Time series models seem to be potentially
useful, but not as generally applicable
alternative(s) to the more traditional
time-series regression.
Index models can be useful to auditors in
generating predictions in analytical review.
Models that incorporate both industry- and
economy-wide data can be used.
The bivariate method of using paired values
from industry data as a basis for comparison
in analytical procedures holds promise as a
potentially effective method.

Aggregate industry measures of central
tendency may be highly misleading when
used as standards of comparison.
A high degree of similarity among the firms
making up the industry aggregate data
(including the subject firm) is indispensable.
In industries where significant variations in
marketing strategy exist, the chances of aggre
gate industry data being misleading is high.
A moderate degree of explanation of errors in
accounts receivable and inventory can be
achieved given information on the magnitude
of the error (if any) in the previous period
and information on a few other basic
characteristics of the company, in particular,

(continued)
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and account-specific company
characteristics?
Wild (1987)
How effective are structural
models in generating
predictions for analytical
procedures?

Wilson, Glezen, and
Cronan (1988)
Since prior research has
shown that the Optimal Linear
Correction (OLC) factor can
improve the precision of time
series models, will analytical
procedures using time series
models on components of net
income (sales, cost of sales,
expenses) be improved by the
inclusion of the OLC factor?
Harper, Strawser, and
Tang (1990)
Can investigation thresholds
used with analytical procedures
be established using bivariate
statistical distributions, and if
so, will these investigation
thresholds improve the
effectiveness of the procedures?
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the quality of the entity’s accounting staff
and measures of aspects of the quality of
management.
Using actual data for a large manufacturing
company, the paper develops and tests a
twenty-two-equation structural model that
utilizes the interpendencies among financial
statement accounts. Comparisons are made
to univariate time series models. The author
concludes that the results support the
development of structural models for
analytical review. The results are, however,
not supportive for the aggregate accounts
(gross margin, expenses, income). Also,
because the degree of misspecification and
parameter estimation errors can be significant
in certain applications, the usefulness of
the structural model should be assessed in
each application.

Using actual data, time series models
(with and without OLC) were developed
for eighteen data series, with the result
that OLC provided little improvement in
the models. The authors conclude that, while
time series methods are potentially useful for
analytical review, the OLC factor is not
necessarily helpful.

The authors develop a bivariate normal
distribution model (using the balance
predicted by analytical procedures and the
balance determined by detail tests) to model
the relationship between these audit estimates
and the recorded amount of the balance. The
model is used to determine the amount of the
investigation threshold that optimally controls
for the two types of audit detection risk.

Major Findings
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Expertise Research
Cognitive Processes
Libby (1975)

What is the role of prior
knowledge o f financial
statement errors in the
generation o f initial diagnostic
hypotheses in preliminary
analytical procedures, what
are the knowledge structures
that underlie the decisions of
experienced auditors, and
what is the manner in which
diagnostic hypotheses are
generated in analytical
procedures?

There appears to be a strong relationship
between the availability o f hypotheses in
memory and their perceived frequency
o f occurrence.
There appears to be a positive relationship
between perceived error frequency and actual
error frequency in practice.
Errors that overstate income or liquidity are
perceived as more likely to occur than the
equivalent understatement errors.
There appears to be a positive relationship
between recency o f experience and the
likelihood o f generation o f a particular
hypothesis.

Blocher and Cooper (1988)

What is the nature o f the
auditor’s predecisional
behaviors in employing
analytical procedures?

The decision processes o f five auditors were
studied using protocol analysis. There were
relatively few differences between them.
However, one was “directed decision maker,”
who also was the only one who postponed
his final decision after all information had
been gathered. The others were “ systemic
decision makers,” and also made their decision
at some point as they went along. There was
also a wide range o f decision-making times.
The directed decision maker took 37 minutes;
the others took 60 to 106 minutes.
Ratios and trends were used extensively. The
most frequently used (to search for material
error in inventory) are gross profit percentage
ratio, total inventory trend, trend o f the gross
profit percentage ratios, sales trend, and
inventory turnover ratio.
O f seven decisions, one got four correct, three
got three correct, and one got one correct.
There was a positive correlation between
time, directness in decision making, and

(continued)
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decision maker’s length o f experience
(reflecting the qualities o f an “ expert decision
maker” ). The more experienced decision
maker had more correct decisions than
the others.

Biggs, Mock, and
Watkins (1988)

How do auditors use analytical
procedures, what differences
exist between expert and
novice auditors, how do they
represent problems, and what
is their knowledge base?

The subjects apparently relied heavily
on analytical procedures in making
their decisions.
Experts seem to have more complete
memory structures related to the
audit problem, these memory structures
seem to allow a more efficient processing
of case information, and they may have
made audit program decisions that were
more cost effective.

Bonner (1990)

How does task-specific
knowledge affect analytical
risk assessment?

Task-specific knowledge is used to study
the effects o f experience in two audit
tasks: analytical risk assessment and
control risk assessment. The findings
are reported for two dependent measures—
cue selection and cue weighting, and for
two participating CPA firms. The results
for cue selection are not significant for
Firm 1 and not significant for control
risk assessment for Firm 2; there is
significantly higher performance by the
experienced group for analytical risk
assessment for Firm 2. However,
Firm 2 uses a decision aid for analytical
review, whereas Firm 1 does not,
which could account for the results.

Heiman (1990)

What is the effect on the
likelihood assessments
(o f the cause for an unusual
account change) o f differences
in the number o f available
explanations o f unusual
changes in financial statement
relationships?
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The findings showed a decrease in the
assessed likelihood o f a given hypothesized
cause when alternative explanations are
provided to the auditor. Also, varying the
number o f alternative explanations had an
effect on the likelihood assessments, while
varying the strength o f the alternatives
had no effect.

Questions Addressed

Major Findings

Davis (1991)

What is the impact o f the
auditor’s knowledge base and
experience on the ability to
identify material errors?

Using a protocol approach and experimental
testing, the author examined the auditor’s
information search patterns and found no
apparent experience-related differences in
the organization o f the auditor’s knowledge
bases. However, an error-sorting task
revealed experience-related differences in
the organization o f accounting knowledge.
Also, general audit experience was not found
to significantly affect the auditors’ ability to
identify material errors, although there was
some evidence that formal education in the
use o f analytical procedures was associated
with better problem identification ability.

Bedard and Biggs (1991)

The study analyzes how
decision processes, including
both hypothesis generation
and pattern recognition, o f
auditors are associated with
performance in analytical
procedures. The research
questions are:
• Are auditors able to
generate correct
hypotheses?
• What processes lead to
correct performance?
• I f the correct hypothesis
was not selected, was the
pattern o f discrepancies
recognized?
• What specific processes
o f hypothesis generation
inhibited subjects
from explaining the
recognized pattern?

The study involved both an experimental
design and protocol data collection. The
results showed that o f the twenty-one
auditors, three failed to attend to critical cues
in the experimental case, and four failed to
combine these cues properly. O f the fourteen
auditors who correctly recognized the cue
pattern, six proposed a hypothesis consistent
with the pattern. Thus, hypothesis generation
was the stage o f the decision process where
most errors occurred in this task context.
The authors conclude that the design allowed
insight into the auditors’ decision processes,
and provides focus for further research and
decision aid development.

Blocher, Bouwman, and
Davis (1992)

What is the role of causal
modeling and outcome
feedback in learning analytical
procedures from experience?

This paper reports the findings o f a review of
the research in accounting, auditing, clinical
psychology and learning, and the implications
o f this research for how auditors learn

(continued)
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analytical procedures from experience. Based
largely on the research in clinical psychology
and the psychology of learning, it develops
a theory for how auditors learn analytical
procedures from experience. The theory
posits the necessity of causal models and
unambiguous outcome feedback for effective
learning from experience. The implications
of this theory within the context of the
current practice of analytical procedures
is that there is little or no learning from
experience, since (1) outcome feedback
regarding the effectiveness o f analytical
procedures is incomplete in the typical
audit, (2) there is a general lack o f causal
modeling in the analytical procedures used
today and in the education and training o f
the procedures, and (3) outcome feedback
regarding the performance o f analytical
procedures is not sufficiently timely to be
effective for learning. Recommendations
are presented and discussed: (1) the need for
greater emphasis on the development o f
causal models in education, training, and
professional guidance, and (2) the need
for the development, as part of a firm’s
quality control program, of a process for
systematically obtaining relevant perfor
mance data for analytical procedures.

Selection of Procedures
Holder (1983)

How do practitioners select
and apply analytical procedures
in planning an audit?

A wide range of analytical procedures was
selected by practitioner-subjects. Extensively
or frequently used analytical procedures in
this study are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Inventory turnover
Gross margin ratio
Accounts receivable aging analysis
Plant asset level trend
Inventory level trend
Accounts receivable level trend
Current ratio
Bad debt level trend
Interest expense to debt

Questions Addressed

Major Findings
• Financial statement element
fluctuation analysis
• Interest expense level trend
• Days outstanding revenue
• Depreciation level trend
The analytical procedures selected focused
on liquidity and profitability, as well as the
reasonableness o f specific account balances.
There was no significant difference in
selection based on firm size.

Blocher, Esposito, and
Willingham (1983)

What is the nature o f the
auditors’ decision making
when (1) planning for the use
of analytical procedures, and
(2) applying analytical
procedures to a given set
of audit circumstances?

There is considerable variability in auditor
judgment concerning the allocation of
budgeted hours between analytical
procedures and tests o f details, reflecting
different preferences for the approach to use.
Trend analysis was a widely chosen analytical
procedure. Few chose a reasonableness test
with operating data, which would have been a
much more effective test.
In planning, auditors tended to anchor on the
given audit program, rather than to tailor it.
Use o f a checklist o f selected analytical
procedures motivated more analytical
procedures, but also motivated more detailed
tests in the same area.

Biggs, Mock, and Watkins
(1988, 1989)

How do experienced and
inexperienced auditors design
and conduct analytical
procedures and revise audit
programs as a result of
these procedures?

The findings are that both experienced and
inexperienced auditors identified the crucial
audit problems embedded in the experimental
case. However, there was little evidence that the
auditors used the analytical procedures to reduce
the extent o f other substantive tests, even if the
results of the procedures were favorable. Also,
there was evidence that the more senior auditors’
decision processes were more systematic and
focused than that o f the less experienced
auditors who appeared to “ respond to surface
features of the problem” and to search less
efficiently through the case data.

(continued)
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Cohen and Kida (1989)

In a follow-up to the Biggs,
Mock, and Watkins (1988)
study, this research looks at
similar questions:
• Do auditors use the results
o f analytical procedures to
reduce as well as extend
audit testing?

The findings corroborated those o f the prior
study by Biggs, Mock, and Watkins (1988).
Also, there was evidence that analytical
procedures were valued more highly by the
more experienced auditors, while there was
greater reliance on control risk assessment by
the less experienced auditors.

• Does the reliability of
data affect auditors’
judgments?
• Does experience affect
auditors’ judgments?

Generation of
Expected Values
Biggs and Wild (1985)

What is the nature o f the
judgments made by practicing
auditors in conducting
analytical procedures tasks
(specifically, generating
expected values and
noninvestigation intervals)?

Experiment one showed that auditors’
judgments were biased in the direction of
the unaudited information. However, this
bias was moderated when additional audited
information was available.
Experiment two showed that the auditors’
extrapolations were more accurate for those
time-series patterns that are more likely to
be encountered in practice.

Blocher (1985)

What is the auditor’s ability
to determine subjectively
expected values and credible
intervals, based on seven prior
years’ data?

The auditors’ predictions were significantly
too high when no trend was present, and
significantly too low when a trend was
present. The predictions were less accurate
under the high variance condition. Confidence
bounds were affected by the variance treatment
in the expected direction.
There appear to be important individual
differences among auditors and other subjects
when making predictions and assessing
confidence bounds. There also appear to
be strong differences among auditors in
the nature of the decision process employed
in making predictions and in setting
confidence bounds.
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Heintz and White (1989)

The study replicates the prior
work o f Kinney and Uecker
(1982) and Biggs and Wild
(1985). Are auditors’
predictions in analytical review
influenced by unaudited
values? And, does a decreasing
series o f unaudited values
have a greater or lesser impact
than an increasing series o f
unaudited values?

The findings for both experimental questions
corroborate the results o f the prior studies:
(1) auditors’ judgments are affected by
unaudited values, and (2) auditors’ judgments
are more affected by trend reversals or
increases. Also, it is shown that a decreasing
series o f unaudited values has a stronger
influence on auditors’ judgments than a series
o f increasing values.

Wild and Biggs (1990)

The authors recognize the
potential problem o f bias
caused by the auditor’s use of
unaudited book values when
designing and performing
analytical procedures. What
are the audit cost and risk
consequences o f conducting
the procedures with and
without unaudited book values?

The study concludes that the advantages o f
incorporating unaudited book values into
analytical procedures appear minimal.

Use of Decision Aids
Blocher and Luzi (1987)

What is the effect o f selected
forms o f guidance on auditors’
analytical procedures decisions?

With increasing structure, guidance increases
the proportion o f auditors with correct
models (to develop expected values) and
decreases the proportion o f those having
computational misspecification.
Guidance treatment did not significantly affect
the auditors’ testing decisions, except that
more guidance provided greater confidence
in analytical procedures, which in turn
resulted in lower detailed tests.

Blocher, Krull, Scalf, and
Yates (1988)

Does a knowledge-based
decision aid for analytical
procedures have an effect on
learning or on the performance
o f these procedures by
experienced auditors?

The decision aid had a positive but
insignificant effect on performance.
However, there was no effect on learning;
this was interpreted as being consistent
with the prior research.

(continued)
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Bankruptcy Prediction

Discriminant Analysis
Beaver (1966)

What is the usefulness o f
financial ratios, and in
particular, in the prediction
of business failure?

The ratio distributions o f nonfailed firms are
quite stable throughout the five years before
failure, whereas the ratio distributions o f
failed firms exhibit a marked deterioration
as failure approaches.
The cash-flow to total-debt ratio has the
ability to correctly classify both failed and
nonfailed firms to a much greater extent than
would be possible through random prediction.
This ability exists for at least five years
before failure.
Although ratio analysis may provide useful
information, ratios must be used with
discretion. Not all ratios predict equally
well, and nonfailed firms can be correctly
classified to a greater extent than can
failed firms.

Deakin (1976)

How effective is a discriminant
analysis-based model using
the fourteen financial ratios
from Beaver (1966)?

The model developed made accurate
bankruptcy predictions as far in advance
as three years before filing for bankruptcy.
The overall classification error for both
bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy ranged from
9 to 19 percent.

Altman and McGough (1974)

How effective is a discriminant
analysis model in the prediction
of bankruptcy and the
evaluation o f going concern?

For commercial and manufacturing
companies, the model predicted bankruptcy
in 82 percent o f the cases based on the
latest available financial statements prior to
bankruptcy, and 58 percent o f the cases two
years prior to failure.

Gambola, Haskins, Ketz, and
Williams (1987)

This study considers the
importance o f cash flow from
operations in predicting
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The study found that the marginal predictive
ability o f cash flow from operations was
insignificant, and therefore, that cash flow

Questions Addressed
bankruptcy. It includes a review
of prior relevant studies, and
then conducts experiments in
which models were constructed
from bankrupt firms. These
models were then tested for
predictive accuracy with data
from other firms. Is cash flow
an important predictor?

Major Findings
from operations is not an important predictor
o f corporate failure.

Bell, Ribar, and Verchio (1990)

This paper considers the
comparative effectiveness o f
two types of models—logistic
regression and neural network
—in predicting failure of
commercial banks. The
predictor variables used are
those used by regulators and
supported by prior studies.
The focus is a one-year
prediction period, consistent
with the requirements o f SAS
No. 59. Do the models differ
significantly in prediction
performance?

The study indicates that both types of models
perform satisfactorily, with neural networks
performing slightly better for borderline cases.

Subjective Prediction
Libby (1975)

What is the predictive power
of ratio information and the
ability o f loan officers to
evaluate that information
in the business failure
prediction context?

Bankers using financial ratio information were
able to make highly accurate and reliable
predictions o f business failure.

Kennedy (1975)

What is the effect of four
financial ratios on subjective
probability judgments about
bankruptcy (by bankers) using
Bayes’ theorem?

The equity to debt ratio is very useful in the
task. The usefulness of other ratios studied
(quick, current, and inventory turnover) was
not clear.
Bankers believe that nonfinancial and financial
information are equally important, and nonratio
financial information is significantly more
important than ratio information in evaluating
bankruptcy potential.

(continued)
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Casey (1980)

What is the ability o f bank
officers to predict bankruptcy
using three years’ data, three
years in advance (the data
consisted o f five common
solvency-related ratios)?

Predictive accuracy for bankrupt firms is not
very good (average, four o f fifteen).
Individual differences in information-processing
style and confidence level could explain a
statistically significant portion o f variance in
subjects’ predictive achievement.
A composite-judge prediction model did not
outperform the average subject.
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This study communicates the implications o f existing research f o r establish
ing and implementing auditing standards related to illegal acts by clients
and proposes some topics fo r future research. To fram e the discussion o f
extant research, the study uses the following broad categories relevant to
auditors’ responsibilities regarding illegal acts: definition, prevention,
detection, evaluation, disclosure, and consequences.

It is fitting that the Expectation Gap Roundtable includes the topic of
illegal acts. Attempts to reduce the perceived gap between users’ expecta
tions and professional guidance on auditors’ responsibilities have been
the catalyst for the origination and evolution of Statements on Auditing
Standards (SASs) related to illegal acts. A separate SAS on illegal acts by
clients was first issued in response to users’ concerns with corporate
accountability (see SAS No. 17). These concerns in the mid-1970s followed
investigations that lead to disclosures by large corporations of illegal politi
cal contributions and questionable payments to domestic and foreign
government officials (Neebes, Guy, and Whittington 1991). In turn, after a
period in the early 1980s of major business failures, where some failed
businesses also had illegal acts, auditors’ responsibilities were revised as
part of the expectation gap SASs (see SAS No. 54).
The existence o f an expectations gap and an inability to eliminate the gap
is not surprising. As the Cohen Commission stated, “ the expectations of
users of financial information with respect to the auditor’s detection and
disclosure of illegal or questionable acts are unclear” (The Commission
on Auditors’ Responsibilities 1978). In addition to being unclear, users’
expectations lack consensus at any point in time and change over time.
Furthermore, as the Cohen Commission recognized, legislative initiatives
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play a significant role in clarifying users’ expectations (e.g., The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977). These legislative initiatives continue.1
Finally, assessing users’ expectations becomes complicated when consider
ing the international environment, where there is likewise concern with
auditors’ responsibilities regarding illegal acts. The International Auditing
Practices Committee (IAPC ) recently issued an exposure draft titled Illegal
Acts (December 1, 1991).2
This background provides a context for our charge, which is to communi
cate the implications of existing research for establishing and implementing
auditing standards related to illegal acts by clients and to propose topics for
future research.3We assume that readers are familiar with past, present, and
proposed professional standards (i.e., SAS No. 17 and No. 54 and the
(IAPC Exposure Draft). Although we do not review the provisions of these
standards, we include in the Appendix the practice and implementation
issues identified by the SAS No. 54 Guidance Task Force of the Auditing
Standards Board (ASB) and reported by practitioners to the Auditing
Standards Division as input for the Roundtable.
To frame our discussion of the research, we developed the following
broad categories relevant to auditors’ responsibilities regarding illegal acts:
definition, prevention, detection, evaluation, disclosure, and consequences.
Some studies overlap categories, therefore we have, for example, combined
detection and evaluation in this overview of relevant research. The remaining
sections of the paper discuss the existing research and provide suggestions
for future research.

Discussion of Research
In reviewing the literature, we confronted a paucity of theoretical and
empirical research specifically addressing auditors’ responsibilities regard
ing illegal acts by clients. Therefore, our discussion also incorporates
other research involving illegal acts from which we attempt to extrapolate
implications for auditors.

1 For example, see the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Improvement
Act of 1991, the proposed Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act (HR 4313),
and the proposed Federal Insurance Solvency Act of 1992 (HR 4900).
2 Standard-setters in some countries (e.g., Canada and the United Kingdom) are also
considering the promulgation of new guidance on auditors’ responsibilities regarding
illegal acts by clients.
3 Although illegal acts and compliance auditing issues interrelate, this paper focuses
primarily on illegal acts. Past and present standards for compliance auditing include
SAS No. 63 and No. 68. Holder and Miller (1989) and McNamee, Monk, and Sauter
(1989) describe the requirements of SAS No. 63.
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Definition
Definitions of illegal acts in the professional literature differ somewhat,
especially in emphasis. In contrast to SAS No. 54, the IAPC Exposure Draft
explicitly recognizes that illegal acts may be intentional or unintentional,
suspected or actual, and that noncompliance with laws and regulations
encompasses both acts committed and required acts not carried out. The
IAPC Exposure Draft does not use the SAS No. 54 terms direct and indirect.
Instead, the Exposure Draft states that illegal acts may affect either recorded
amounts in the financial statements or footnote disclosures.
The research literature tends not to distinguish between illegal acts using
either direct-indirect or financial statement-footnote effects. Some studies
include only intentional illegal acts. Definitions of illegal acts differ among
studies, however, and these differences require consideration when com
paring results.
Research studies on illegal acts reflect another definitional problem that
Goldwasser (1987) anticipated, namely that distinctions between irregulari
ties and illegal acts (in SAS No. 53 and No. 54) are difficult to maintain in
practice. According to Goldwasser, “ irregularities and illegal acts are not
so easily separated, as illegal actions are more often than not accompanied
by irregularities which frequently are integral parts of the illegal acts.” This
problem will resurface in the discussions of both disclosure and conse
quences research.
At a conceptual level, a research monograph by Mautz and Sharaf (1961)
illustrates an approach of working from a definition to establish indepen
dent auditors’ responsibilities. Although Mautz and Sharaf focus on
irregularities, not illegal acts,4their discussion contains concepts evident in
SAS No. 54. For example, Mautz and Sharaf acknowledge that materiality
may differ (in both kind and amount) when applied to irregularities as
opposed to representations regarding financial condition and results of opera
tions. Mautz and Sharaf recognize that auditors’ responsibilities are limited
to their areas of expertise. Finally, auditors’ responsibilities may decrease
in situations where there is no record or evidence of accountability.
Although SAS No. 54 reflects these concepts, Mautz and Sharaf conclude
that “ the characteristics of irregularities themselves [did not provide]
any significant clues which permit a precise statement o f auditor responsi
bility for detection.” This led Mautz and Sharaf to propose a prudent-man
concept of due care, whereby, “ independent auditors should accept respon
sibility for the discovery and disclosure o f those irregularities which
the exercise of due audit care by a prudent practitioner would normally

4 With the exception of Mautz and Sharaf (1961), this paper does not discuss research
related specifically to errors and irregularities (SAS No. 53), a topic of another
Roundtable paper.
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uncover.” It seems reasonable to surmise that Mautz and Sharaf would
support a similar conclusion for illegal acts.

Prevention
The professional literature, including the reports of the Cohen and Tread
way Commissions, affirms that management has primary responsibility for
prevention of illegal acts. The IAPC Exposure Draft explicitly states that
the responsibility for the prevention and detection of illegal acts rests with
management. Giving management primary responsibility still leaves a
variety of corporate governance mechanisms for carrying out and monitoring
this responsibility. These mechanisms include (outside) board membership,
audit committees, corporate codes of conduct, internal control (including
internal auditors), and special management reports on compliance. An obvi
ous research question is the viability of these mechanisms for preventing
(and detecting) illegal acts.5
A survey published by the United States Government Accounting Office
(GAO) in 1991 provides disquieting evidence on the ability of bank audit
committees to monitor compliance with laws and regulations. The GAO
studied the audit committees of the largest banks in the United States—those
with assets of ten billion dollars or more. On the basis of responses from
forty of forty-seven audit committee chairpersons, the results related to
illegal acts include:
• Nineteen audit committees (48 percent) had little or no expertise in bank
ing, although their committees were responsible for approving the bank’s
response to findings from bank regulatory examinations.
• Thirteen audit committees (33 percent) had no expertise in law and never
met independently with the bank’s legal counsel, although they were
responsible for assessing management compliance with banking laws
and regulations.
We located one study that examines the relation between the number of
outside directors and illegal acts by Fortune 500 companies. Kesner, Victor,
and Lamont (1986) find: (1) no relation between the number of outside
directors and the propensity to commit an illegal act, (2) no relation between
committing an illegal act and the propensity to then add an outside director
to the board, and (3) no relation between the propensity to commit an illegal
5 There are some studies on the prevalence of illegal acts. For example, a Fortune survey
(Ross 1980), using only five types of corporate illegalities (bribery, criminal fraud,
illegal political contributions, tax evasion, and criminal antitrust violations) from
1970 to 1980, found that 117 of 1,043 (11 percent) major corporations had at least one
important illegal act. A GAO report (1989) on twenty-six thrifts, representing the
largest actual or estimated losses to FSLIC between 1985 and 1987, indicates nineteen
of the twenty-six (73 percent) had actual or suspected criminal activities.
230

act and organizational structure (i.e., having one individual as both the CEO
and chairman of the board). Several other studies examine additional organi
zational and operational characteristics associated with corporate involve
ment in illegal acts. The results of these studies, however, may be interpreted
as providing guidance to the profession on signals that alert the auditor to
possible illegal acts. Hence, in the next section, we discuss those studies that
consider issues related to detection and evaluation rather than prevention.
Before concluding this section, we want to mention that some research
provides at least indirect support for the use of mechanisms such as internal
control for the prevention of illegal acts. For example, Kinney, Maher, and
Wright (1990) propose a broad output-based approach to determining asser
tions. In turn, “ corporate management. . .chooses cost-effective controls
for their own internal purposes, subject to the constraint that controls be
adequate to support the implicit and explicit assertions required of manage
ment by outsiders.” 6

Detection and Evaluation
In this section we discuss several types of detection- and evaluationrelated research. One type provides insights on organizational variables
associated with the occurrence of illegal acts. We discuss these studies
because of their potential relevance in alerting auditors to the possibility of
illegal acts. Another type of study provides some evidence on disclosures to
independent auditors of illegal acts detected by internal auditors. This work
is relevant to the propriety of external auditors relying on the work of internal
auditors to detect corporate illegal acts.7 Finally, we discuss a study that
addresses a specific area of illegal acts—environmental liabilities. This study
proposes that auditors consider environmental acts in planning and risk
assessment, although SAS No. 54 might characterize such acts as indirect.
An early study by Staw and Szwajkowski (1975) examines the relation
between scarcity/munificence of organizational environments and the occur
rence of illegal acts. The study uses a sample of 105 large companies involved
in trade litigation from 1968 to 1972. Trade litigation includes price fixing,
reciprocity, mergers and acquisitions in restraint of trade, refusals to deal,
monopoly, tying arrangements, price discrimination, allocation of markets,
6 This research suggests means to implement requirements such as those in the FDIC
Improvement Act of 1991, whereby
Management will report annually on its responsibility for and assessment of the
effectiveness of both the institution’s internal control stucture over financial reporting
and compliance with specified laws and regulations relative to safety and soundness.
The CPA will report separately on management’s assertions using standards for
attestation engagements (AICPA/1992).
7 We do not discuss the wide-ranging research literature on whistle-blowing. For some
discussion of this research, see Arnold and Ponemon (1991) and Graham (1986).
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and activities such as foreclosure of entry, exclusive dealing, and conspiracy.8
Scarcity/munificence is measured using several financial performance
statistics (i.e., mean return on equity, mean return on sales over the five
years preceding a trade complaint, percentage change in sales, and percent
age change in profits). Comparisons of cited and uncited Fortune 500
companies reveal that: (1) cited companies perform less well than other
firms in the Fortune 500 over the five years preceding a trade complaint,
(2) whereas cited firms perform below the average o f all Fortune 500 firms,
they perform no worse than other firms in their industries, and (3) industries
in which cited firms operate display performance far below the average for
all industries.
A study by Dalton and Kesner (1988) concludes that company size may be
relevant to the commission and recidivism of illegal acts. Again using a
sample of Fortune 500 companies (continuously listed on the Fortune 500
from 1980 to 1984), the authors report that: (1) “ large” companies are three
times more likely to engage in illegal behavior than “ small” counterparts,
and (2) “ large” firms are significantly more likely than “ small” firms to
commit a second illegal act conditional on committing a first act within the
sample period. The study also found that 74.6 percent of sample companies
did not engage in a cited illegal act over the period, 11.5 percent committed
a single act, and the remaining 13.9 percent committed multiple acts.
Baucus and Near (1991) present a more comprehensive examination o f the
association of organizational variables and illegal acts. Their sample includes
Fortune 500 companies convicted during 1974-1983 of intentional illegal
acts committed during 1963-1981. The sample consists o f 141 violations by
88 firms where violations include Title V II discrimination (49 percent),
antitrust (20 percent), product liability (12 percent), and other (19 percent)
(e.g., violations of consent decrees for securities fraud, willful patent
infringement [with punitive damages]). The authors summarize their results
as follows:9
. .. [L]arge firms are more likely to commit illegal acts than small
firms. Although the probability of such wrongdoing increases when
resources are scarce, it is greatest when resources are plentiful.
Similarly, illegal behavior is prevalent in fairly stable environments
but is more probable in dynamic environments. Membership in
certain industries and a history of repeated wrongdoing are also
associated with illegal acts.
The study found that, with a single exception, corporate culture is not a
significant determinant of the propensity to commit an illegal act. The
8 Dalton and Kesner (1988) report that trade case corporate violations account for some
40 percent of violations of criminal statutes in federal courts.
9 Accounting researchers may find the authors’ proxies for some organizational varia
bles problematic.
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exception is the finding that firms that have committed at least three viola
tions are more likely to commit a fourth. The industries found more likely
to be involved in illegal acts are food, lumber, petroleum and refining, and
transportation equipment. Finally, variables not found to be significantly
associated with the commission of illegal acts include organizational
heterogeneity (degree of diversity within the organization and internal
competitiveness), poor financial performance (return on assets), and
organizational slack (quick ratio relative to industry average).
In summary, despite being of limited scope in addressing issues related to
auditors’ responsibilities (e.g., samples comprise only Fortune 500 compa
nies and use restricted definitions of illegal acts), these studies do provide
some insights for auditors. Industry membership consistently appears as an
important variable. While reinforcing the importance of industry member
ship, more recent data, using other than Fortune 500 samples, might expand
the identified industries, in particular, to encompass financial institutions.
Interestingly, the most recent study finds both weak and strong financial
performance associated with illegal acts.
An important caveat to this work is recognized by Baucus and Near (1991):
. . . rather than revealing when illegal behavior is likely to occur,
the results of our study and of previous studies of corporate illegality
may instead reveal conditions under which illegal behavior is
detected, prosecuted, and punished. For example, regulatory agen
cies are likely to monitor firms previously convicted for illegal
activities closely. Additionally, regulatory agencies are likely to
increase enforcement during certain periods, as when the national
political climate favors enforcement; the latter provides another
explanation for the infrequency of violations in certain years just
noted. At this point, little is known about how regulatory agencies
select firms for investigation or prosecution; thus, researchers need
to begin to focus on the relationship between enforcement and
illegal activities.
These comments certainly apply to audit-related research issues on
illegal acts.10
The preceding discussion focused on the relation between firm-specific
variables and the propensity to commit illegal acts. Identifying such
relationships may be useful in directing auditor attention to those clients
most likely to be involved in illegal acts. A second area of interest concerns
the mechanisms by which auditors can effectively become aware of
such activities. O f course these mechanisms include audit procedures.

10 For example, although not limited to illegal acts, a study by Feroz, Park, and Pastena
(1991) includes anexamination of the types of accounting and auditing problems that
motivate SEC enforcement actions.
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Regrettably, we could not locate any research that systematically documents
the frequency with which auditors detect illegal acts, the procedures utilized
by independent auditors, or the effectiveness of such procedures. These
remain important areas for future research.
Independent auditors may consider some reliance on internal auditors for
detecting and evaluating illegal activities. A study by Miceli, Near, and
Schwenk (1991) examines the effect of a number of perceptual variables on
internal-auditor reporting of observed wrongdoings by employees and
managers in their organizations. The reporting by internal auditors includes
disclosing observed wrongdoing to independent (external) auditors. The
study uses data from a survey of directors of internal audit in North America
who were also members of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA ) in 1986.
The study comprises all types of organizations (public, nonpublic, not-forprofit, and governmental). Rather than illegal acts, the study examines
“ wrongdoing,” defined as engaging in theft, abusing organizational posi
tion to receive special favors, accepting bribes or kickbacks, giving unfair
advantage to vendors or contractors, tolerating a situation that endangers
public health or safety (including product development), wasting corporate
assets, covering up poor performance, making false projections of future
performance, and committing serious violations of company policy or other
illegal acts.
Miceli, Near, and Schwenk (1991) received 1,046 useable responses, of
which 756 (72 percent) observed evidence of wrongdoing in the past twelve
months. O f these 756, sixty-five (9 percent) did not report the wrongdoing
to anyone; 419 (55 percent) reported it only to someone within the
organization (e.g., to department heads, boards of directors, and to audit
committees), 164 (22 percent) reported it to the external auditor but did not
report it to any other external agency (all but two of these also reported it
internally); and 108 (14 percent) reported it to an external agency (e.g., the
media, a government agency, the IIA; all but thirteen o f these also reported
it internally). The authors summarize the factors associated with the report
ing of wrongdoing as follows:
Survey responses of Directors of Internal Auditing who observed
what they perceived to be incidents of wrongdoing show that they
were less likely to report these incidents when they did not feel
compelled morally or by role prescription to do so, when they
evaluated their job performance as below average, or when they
were employed by highly bureaucratic organizations. Also, the
Directors of Internal Auditing were more likely to report incidents
to external agencies (i.e., external auditors, the media, government
agencies) when they felt that the public or their co-workers were
harmed by the wrongdoing, the wrongdoing involved theft by rela
tively low-level workers, there were few other observers, or the
organization was highly regulated.
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A number of extensions to this line of research could be of relevance to
auditing standard setters. An interesting follow-up would be to determine
the portion of the 419 (and sixty-five) that the external auditor learned from
other sources, as well as the portion that he or she never learned about.
Other extensions include exploring which wrongdoings external auditors
should be expected to detect and determining any differences in expectation
for detection among auditors’ constituencies (e.g., management, audit
committees, investors, and regulators).
Finally, the study of most explicit relevance to considering auditors’
responsibilities regarding illegal acts is by Roussey (1992). Roussey reviews
a series of relevant environmental laws and regulations; reviews the existing
accounting and auditing guidance including generally accepted accounting
principles (G AAP), generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), SEC,
and AICPA Audit Risk Alert; and discusses the accounting measurement
and disclosure problems, and auditing issues including reporting issues.11
In attempting to apply the guidance of SAS No. 54 to this area of illegal acts,
Roussey concludes that viewing environmental acts as indirect illegal acts
would be incomplete. Roussey argues that auditors need to consider
environmental acts in risk assessment and planning and he proposes
extended auditing procedures if the client is identified as being at risk for
environmental liabilities.

Disclosure
Regulatory and international events suggest increased pressures on
independent auditors for disclosing illegal acts. The FDIC Improvement Act
of 1991 contains provisions for disclosure of illegal acts by independent
auditor attestation to management assertions of compliance with specified
laws and regulations relative to the safety and soundness of financial insti
tutions. The proposed Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act
(HR 4313) would require independent auditors to respond in certain circum
stances when senior management-boards of directors fail to take remedial
action with respect to illegal acts and where such failure is reasonably
expected to warrant modified reporting or auditor resignation. The ultimate
outcome of these situations is notification of the SEC by the client or the
auditor. Internationally, the events surrounding the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International (BCCI) have resulted in public discussions of
auditors’ responsibilities for disclosing illegal acts (see Cowan 1991).
Public companies and specific industries such as financial services and
insurance tend to be the focus of recent proposals or actual revisions in
11 Two recent studies in the Journal of Accountancy provide guidance to auditors
(Zuber and Berry 1992) and survey current corporate practices (Surma and Vondra
1992) in accounting and reporting environmental activities.
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auditors’ disclosure requirements of illegal acts. Currently a disclosure
mechanism for public companies exists in conjunction with auditor-client
disagreements in the context of auditor change. In this regard, Goldwasser
(1987) expresses concern that SAS No. 54 does not specify precisely when
auditor change (resignation) in conjunction with illegal acts results in a
reportable disagreement on Form 8-K.
For nonpublic companies, not subject to specific industry regulations,
there may be a tendency to assume in conjunction with auditor change that
the predecessor-successor auditor communication will alert potential
successors and actual successor auditors to the possibility o f illegal acts
by clients. However, a number of studies (e.g., Hull and Mitehem 1987, Niles
and Palmrose 1989, and Lambert, Lambert, and Calderon 1991) provide
consistent evidence that these communications do not always occur,
irrespective of client permission considerations.

Consequences
Empirical research provides evidence on two types of consequences—
litigation and auditor change—related to auditors’ responsibilities for illegal
acts. Legal liability might be expected as a major concern of illegal acts by
clients. Although we did not locate any studies providing direct systematic
evidence on auditors’ legal liability of illegal acts, Palmrose (1987) provides
some indirect evidence. In a sample o f 472 observations involving auditrelated litigation during 1960-1985 for the largest fifteen or so audit firms,
seven (1 percent) observations involve only illegal acts (i.e., illegal acts not
in conjunction with other errors or irregularities). Most of the seven obser
vations consist of illegal political contributions and foreign payments
(before the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977). Palmrose
reports resolution information for a few o f the seven observations; all are
resolved by courts dismissing auditors or by auditors declining to contribute
to settlement funds.
In using litigation evidence to examine auditors’ responsibilities, including
changes over time in responsibilities, it is important to consider auditor
litigation relative to the overall level of litigation in the particular area. For
example, not only does litigation relating exclusively to illegal political and
foreign payments represent a small subset of auditor litigation, auditors do
not appear to be defendants in a major portion o f the overall litigation that
occurred in this area. Olson (1982) reports that more than 200 companies
had foreign and domestic bribes and kickbacks in the early 1970s. Although
he does not report the number of companies that also had shareholder class
and derivative actions over these matters, the number likely includes a
majority of the 200; a number much greater than the number o f auditor
legal actions. What appears to be a low level of auditor involvement in this
area of litigation represents an issue for further research. It also suggests

236

the possibility that clients’ corporate governance structures are important
(ex-post) for risk sharing, as well as (ex-ante) for prevention o f illegal acts.
Further research is also required to assess the nature and extent o f auditor
involvement in other types of illegal act litigation, as Roussey (1992)
suggests with respect to environmental acts.
Before completing this discussion of litigation, we want to mention that
one of the authors’ casual reviews of a data base expanded from that in
Palmrose (1987) does not substantially change the evidence reported. The
data base consists o f about 900 audit-related litigation observations from
1960 to 1992 for the largest audit firms. Perhaps ten observations relate to
illegal foreign and political payments. Considering all types of illegal acts,
there appears to be an important industry component associated with illegal
acts. For example, litigation involves clients in financial service industries
including brokerages and insurance, utilities, waste disposal, and govern
ment contracting. A few municipalities have auditor litigation in connection
with violations of investment regulations. In the expanded data base, there
are a few instances o f relatively substantial settlement payments by auditors
in connection with illegal acts by clients.
Furthermore, the expanded data base supports Goldwasser’s (1987)
comments. Most illegal acts appear together with other irregularities such
as management fraud. Therefore, in assessing litigation consequences, it is
necessary to identify the impact o f various types o f claims. For example,
allegations against auditors for failure to detect and disclose clients’ illegal
activities may be deleted in amended complaints or dismissed by courts. If
so, such allegations have little impact on outcomes when litigation continues
against auditors for other allegations, although the illegal act claims still
entail some defense costs. On the other hand, illegal act-related claims may
substantially affect legal negotiations and outcomes even when such claims
occur along with claims for failure to detect and disclose client irregularities.
Finally, some clients’ illegal activities, whether alone or together with
irregularities, have secondary impacts. They affect other entities. These
effects may likewise produce auditor litigation. Secondary impacts appear
most prevalent for clients in financial services industries (e.g., Penn Square
and ESM). When secondary impacts occur, regulatory pressures on auditors
may increase.
A study in progress by Christensen and Byington (1992) pursues the
issue o f auditor change in connection with illegal acts. Unfortunately, the
authors define illegal acts quite broadly. Their sample includes as illegal
acts any mention of litigation in corporate annual reports (i.e., in the fin
ancial statements, footnotes, president’s report, or audit report). O f the
11,788 companies listed on Compact Disclosure, 1,923 (16.3 percent) have
some type of litigation disclosure (by definition an illegal act) and 305
(2.6 percent) changed auditors. Using the authors’ data, we computed the
following proportions:
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Percentage of Auditor Changes With Litigation
Disclosures (80 of 305)

26.2 percent

Percentage of No Auditor Changes With Litigation
Disclosures (1,843 of 11,483)

16.0 percent

Percentage of Companies With Litigation Disclosures
That Changed Auditors (80 of 1,923)

4.2 percent

Percentage of Companies With No Litigation
Disclosures That Changed Auditors (225 of 9,865)

2.3 percent

Since the study is preliminary, it does not provide any evidence after
controlling for confounding events. Also, the authors note that the study
does not determine who initiated the change, the auditor or the client.

Future Research
In our discussion of extant research related to the definition, prevention,
detection, evaluation, disclosure, and consequences of auditors’ responsibili
ties regarding illegal acts by clients, we made a number of suggestions for
future research. We conclude with some additional suggestions based on
the effectiveness of SAS No. 54 and issues that arise from its implementation.
Some of the issues come from our discussions with colleagues and
practitioners. This does not imply unanimity that SAS No. 54 needs to
be reconsidered. Some believe it does not. This belief was supported,
for example, by arguing a paucity of significant auditor litigation involving
illegal acts. Yet, some perceive a lack of agreement on what should be
or is the auditor’s responsibility for detecting and revealing illegal acts
by clients.
In considering SAS No. 54, there is a fundamental question. Why continue
to have a separate SAS for illegal acts? Determining the nature of the demand
for a separate SAS and understanding changes in the demand since promul
gation of SAS No. 17 and No. 54 may alter or eliminate current guidance.
The most frequently identified difficulty with SAS No. 54 is in classifying
a law or regulation as direct or indirect. Since this classification determines
the auditor’s responsibilities, any difficulty is worrisome. If, indeed, the
direct/indirect categorization is problematic, alternatives should be pro
posed and discussed. For example, Roussey suggested the following alternate
structure to us and we include his suggestion as an illustration:
• Calculation of financial statement amounts (such as under tax laws and
government contracts)
• Accrual of loss contingencies (such as for uncertainties where a loss
contingency can be estimated for environmental or other requirements)
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• Disclosure of loss contingencies (such as for asserted or unasserted
claims or assessments for job discrimination or health and welfare laws
and regulations)
Left unspecified is the auditor’s responsibilities within each category.
Yet, it is both the classification scheme for laws and regulations and the
auditor’s responsibilities under any such scheme that involve unresolved
controversy. While current GAAS limit auditors’ responsibilities, in partic
ular, for indirect illegal acts, not all proposed schemes would provide either
similar or any limitations on auditors’ responsibilities for detecting and
revealing material illegal acts.
Irrespective of the categorization of laws and regulations, empirical
evidence on the efficacy of audit procedures in detecting illegal acts is
required. This evidence is particularly important under the procedural
approach used in SAS No. 54 to delineate auditors’ responsibilities for
indirect illegal acts. Future research can help assess whether procedures
designated in SAS No. 54 are effective or optimal.
We discussed the continuing emphasis in regulatory initiatives for auditors
to externally disclose clients’ illegal acts. This emphasis reinforces the need
to examine the viability and implications of such reliance on independent
auditors. For example, the profession has expressed concern that any
expanded responsibility for independent auditors to report publicly on illegal
acts will inhibit traditional, and important, communications between audi
tors and clients (Neebes, Guy, and Whittington 1991).
Although disclosure discussions focus on external disclosures, there are
also internal disclosure issues. For example, perhaps consensus is lacking
on auditors’ responsibilities regarding illegal acts. I f so, it may be useful for
auditors to explicitly communicate audit scope-related matters to clients
and their audit committees.
There are legal and market concerns in addition to the issues already dis
cussed. For example, what are the implications of a proliferation outside
GAAS to the auditors’ responsibilities regarding illegal acts under the due
care standard? Do differential requirements that exist outside GAAS pose
the risk that any non-GAAS requirements will be extended, ex post, to
GAAS engagements? Since illegal act issues pervade all clients, this seems
possible, although the possibility may be mitigated by auditors internally
communicating scope-related matters.
On the other hand, Guy and Whittington (1990) comment on potential
benefits from expanding the auditor’s detection responsibility outside of
GAAS by legal requirements for audit reports on the application of agreedupon compliance procedures. From a research standpoint, they suggest that
these requirements provide a new setting to examine contracting for audit
services and to explore the demand for assurances regarding compliance
with laws and regulations.
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These are just a few suggestions for future research. Considering the
importance o f the issues and the paucity of research specific to auditors, we
hope that this study motivates additional research on auditor’s responsibili
ties regarding illegal acts by clients.
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Appendix

Practice and
Implementation Issues
SAS No. 54 Guidance Task Force
(AICPA File Reference No. 3035, May 8, 1991)
1.
2.

Should the definition of illegal acts in SAS No. 54 be changed?
Should the term and focus of SAS No. 54 be changed from “ illegal acts” to
compliance with laws and regulations? (Illegal acts covers both intentional and
unintentional violations of laws and regulations; however, regulators and
others misunderstand the term to cover only intentional violations.)
3. Should the direct versus indirect approach be clarified or amended (e.g., should
a procedural approach be followed)?
4. Should the implication that direct-effect illegal acts may involve any of the five
financial statement assertions be clarified? (SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter, lists
five assertions that are embodied in financial statement components; however,
direct-effect illegal acts may affect only some of these assertions.)
5. Should the auditor’s responsibility for detecting illegal acts having a direct and
material financial statement effect be discussed in SAS No. 54 rather than be
cross-referenced to SAS No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and
Report Errors and Irregularities?
6. Should SAS No. 54 be amended to recognize compliance tests that auditors
perform (e.g., capital adequacy tests in financial institutions), which are not
tests for direct-effect illegal acts?

Practitioner Comments
1.
2.

3.

Is additional guidance needed to differentiate between illegal acts and instances
of noncompliance that are not illegal?
Should there be specific limitations with respect to the types of data to which
a practitioner may attest regarding compliance when compliance does not have
a financial statement effect?
Are the components of the audit risk model applicable to compliance attestation?
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Auditor Attestation
to Management Reports
on Internal Control—
Should It Be Required?
William F. Messier, Jr., Price Waterhouse Professor,
University of Florida

O. Ray Whittington, Professor o f Accounting,
San Diego State University

This paper debates whether auditors should be required to attest to manage
ment reports on internal control. It sets a stage fo r the debate by providing
a brief history o f the proposals f o r issuance o f managment reports on
internal control and auditor attestation to those reports. Arguments fo r
auditor attestation are presented based on the demand f o r the service and
the public interest argument. The demand f o r the service also provides a
basis fo r arguments against auditor attestation, as well as the cost and
benefits o f the service.

The question of whether management should be required to issue reports
on internal control that are attested to by auditors has been debated for a
number of years. Congress, the SEC, and various commissions have
proposed such requirements in the past for all public companies, but none
has been adopted. Recently, legislation has been enacted that will require
management of large financial institutions to issue reports annually that
include management’s assessment of the institution’s internal control
over financial reporting. The legislation also requires management to
engage an auditor to attest to the reports. In this paper, we debate the issue
o f auditor attestation o f management reports on internal control, providing
arguments for and against, and leaving the reader with the obligation to
draw a conclusion on the issue. Our debate centers around the issue of
whether it is desirable to require companies to issue reports on internal
control to regulators or the investing public, or both, that are attested to
by independent auditors.
This paper begins with a history of the proposals for management reports
on internal control and auditor attestation. A discussion of prior research is
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presented next. This is followed by two sections that discuss the arguments
for and against auditor attestation of these reports. The last section contains
concluding comments.

The History
The first formal proposal for management reports on internal control came
in 1978 and was included in The Report o f the Commission on Auditors’
Responsibilities (the Cohen Commission). The Cohen Commission recom
mended that audited financial statements be accompanied by a report by
management that included, among other assertions, an assessment of the
company’s accounting system and controls over it (The Commission on
Auditors’ Responsibilities 1978). The Cohen Commission also recom
mended that auditors expand the study and the evaluation of internal control
performed as part of the audit of a company’s financial statements to
form a conclusion on the functioning of the internal accounting control
system. Under the Cohen Commission’s recommendations the auditor’s
report on the financial statements would be expanded to express a conclusion
about whether the management’s report disclosed all material weaknesses in
the internal accounting control system. Underlying these recommendations
was a belief that “ users of financial information have a legitimate interest in
the condition of the controls over the accounting system and management’s
response to the suggestions of the auditors for corrections of weaknesses.”
In 1979, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued its first
proposal for reports by management. This proposal would have made asser
tions about the effectiveness of the company’s internal accounting control
a mandatory part of the report by management. It also called for auditor
attestation of the assertions made by management. The proposed rule
suggested that information and assurances about the effectiveness of a
company’s internal accounting control system are necessary to enable
investors to better evaluate management’s performance o f its stewardship
responsibilities and the reliability of interim and other unaudited financial
information. The SEC’s proposed rule was criticized sharply primarily
because of the irrelevance of the information contained in the reports and
the cost of auditor attestation (Wallace 1981).
The SEC returned to the topic of reporting on internal control in 1988
by issuing a proposed rule that would require a report by management
containing the following assertions:
1.

Management’s assessment of the entity’s internal control structure over
financial reporting

2.

A description of management’s response to significant recommenda
tions of internal and independent auditors about the internal control
structure
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3.

An acknowledgment of management’s responsibility for preparing the
financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles (G AAP), and establishing and maintaining a system of
internal control over financial reporting

The SEC also solicited comments on whether an attestation to the
management’s report by the independent auditor would be desirable, but
that requirement was not included in the proposed rule.
Once again, the proposal for auditor attestation of management’s report
was met with overwhelming opposition (Solomon and Cooper 1990).
Although there was strong support for an acknowledgment of manage
ment’s responsibility for the financial statements and the system of internal
control, most o f the respondents did not support inclusion of management’s
assessment o f internal control or management’s response to recommenda
tions for improvement in internal control.
Proposed legislation has also contained requirements for auditor attesta
tion of management reports on internal control. As early as 1985, legislative
initiatives were proposed that included requirements for management
reports on a company’s internal accounting control and auditor attestation
to the reports. More recently, Representatives Wyden and Dingell
introduced legislation that would have required management to report on
the effectiveness of their company’s internal control over financial reporting
and mandated a report by the independent auditor on the management’s
report. This 1990 proposed legislation was not adopted.
In December 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
Improvement Act o f 1991 (PL 102-242) was signed into law (Moraglio and
Green 1992). This legislation, which applies to financial institutions with
total assets of $150 million or more, mandates an annual report by manage
ment that includes an assessment of the institution’s internal control over
financial reporting. The law also includes a requirement for a report by the
institution’s auditor attesting to management’s assertions about internal
control. These new requirements are effective for fiscal years ending
December 31, 1993. This represents the first legislation requiring any type
of entity to provide periodic reports on its internal control over financial
reporting that are attested to by the entity’s auditor.
Recent recommendations about reports on internal control have also
come from the accounting profession. In 1985, the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (Treadway Commission or COSO) was
created to identify causal factors that lead to fraudulent financial reporting
and to make recommendations to reduce its incidence.1As one of its recom
mendations, the Treadway Commission called for an SEC rule that would
1 The Treadway Commission wasjointly sponsored by the American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants, American Accounting Association, Financial Executives
Institute, Institute of Internal Auditors, and Institute of Management Accountants.

246

require all public companies to include in their annual reports a management
report containing an acknowledgment of management’s responsibilities for
the financial statements and internal control, a discussion of how these
responsibilities were fulfilled, and management’s assessment o f the effec
tiveness of the company’s internal control. The recommendation indicated
that management’s assessment should encompass the entire system of inter
nal control, and it called on the organizations sponsoring the commission
to cooperate in developing “ integrated guidance” on internal control.
Although the Treadway Commission did not recommend an auditor’s
attestation to the management’s report, it did state that the Auditing
Standards Board (ASB) should provide guidance for the auditor when he or
she disagrees with management’s assessment on the basis of information
gained in the course of the audit o f the financial statements.
A project to develop integrated guidance on internal control is being
completed by Coopers & Lybrand under the supervision of a committee of
the sponsoring organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). A
revised exposure draft, Internal Control— Integrated Framework (COSO
1992), has been issued and includes criteria that can be used to assess the
effectiveness of an entity’s internal control structure. The following five
components serve as criteria for assessing internal control structure:
1.

Control environment

2.

Risk assessment

3.

Control activities

4.

Information and communication

5.

Monitoring

The exposure draft does not take a position on whether management
reports on the effectiveness of internal control should be required or
whether auditors should attest to those reports. It does recommend,
however, that where such reports are issued they should be restricted to
internal control over the preparation o f published financial statements.

To provide guidance to an independent auditor who is engaged to attest to
management’s assertions about internal control over financial reporting, the
ASB has recently issued an exposure draft o f a Proposed Statement on
Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) titled, Reporting on an
Entity’s Internal Control Structure O ver Financial Reporting (AICPA
1992). This proposed attestation standard defines an entity’s internal
control over financial reporting as “ those policies and procedures that
pertain to an entity’s ability to record, process, summarize, and report
financial data consistent with the assertions embodied in either annual
financial statements, interim financial statements, or both.”
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) also has under
taken a project to develop criteria for internal control to be used by auditors,
management, and regulators. In August 1991, the CICA released a paper
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titled, Assessing the Effectiveness o f Management Control—A Systems
(C IC A 1991) as an exploratory step toward examining the poten
tial of the systems perspective for assessing the effectiveness of internal
control. Similar to the COSO project, the objective of the CICA project is
to develop comprehensive internal control criteria.

Perspective

Prior Research
Only a few studies have examined issues related to management reports
on internal control and auditor attestation of such reports. Wallace (1981)
reports that there were 950 negative responses to the SEC’s 1979 proposal
for a management report on internal control. She provides an analysis o f the
SEC’s position through literature citations, market evidence, and survey
findings. Wallace’s analysis points out that there are two major flaws in the
position of the SEC on the value of reporting on internal control: (1) reliable
financial statements are possible in spite of inadequate controls, and
(2) evidence exists that the cost of such reporting exceeds the benefits.
The first flaw points out that the SEC’s contention that an effective system
of internal accounting control is necessary to produce reliable financial
statements is contrary to current auditing practice. Under current auditing
standards the auditor is not required to audit the entity’s internal control
structure. The auditor can choose not to rely on internal control and per
form a substantive audit. Wallace (1981) points out that a review o f filings
with the SEC showed only ten companies receiving qualified opinions or
disclaimers for inadequate internal control systems.
Second, the evidence indicates that the costs of management reports
on internal control accompanied by auditor attestation is likely to exceed
the benefits. Wallace (1981) reports that market forces have led to attesta
tion reports in only two public companies’ annual reports. This suggests
that there is little demand (i.e., benefits) for such reports. Wallace (1981)
also suggests that the SEC’s focus on actual costs excludes a number of
relevant cost factors. She reports elsewhere that preparers and users believe
that audit costs will increase by 30 percent if such reporting is required
(Wallace 1982b).
Wallace (1982a) surveyed a number of user and preparer groups regarding
internal control disclosure policies including issues related to reporting on
internal control. In general, there were a number of significant differences
between the user and preparer groups regarding control policies judged to be
material weaknesses. For example, the producer group judged the absence
of adequate bonding of employees to be more negative than the user group.
The groups were also asked to rank their preference for the form o f inter
nal control reports. There were considerable differences in the groups’
preferences. Two examples will illustrate the differences. First, commercial
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lending officers preferred an opinion on internal control with materiality
limits more than the other user groups. Similarly, CPAs were the group
most opposed to an auditor’s report on internal controls without materiality
limits. Second, mutual fund officers and commercial lending officers
preferred the use of a management letter-type disclosure, whereas boards of
directors, CPAs, and controllers were opposed to this form of reporting. On
the basis of the analyses of the survey data and written comments by the
respondents, Wallace (1982a) concluded there was a general attitude that
reports on internal control should not be made available.

Auditor Attestation to Management Reports
on Internal Control
The Pro Side
There may be potential benefits to auditors from attesting to management
reports on internal control. This section attempts to outline arguments that
support auditor attestation. This type of service is new to the profession and
auditors may be reluctant to consider the potential favorable outcomes from
providing such services.
T h e D e m a n d fo r A u d ito r A ttestation. On the basis of initiatives of
Congress, the SEC, and some members of the accounting profession, an
argument can be made that each of these groups sees merit in management
reports on internal control. In 1989, 25 percent of all public companies and
60 percent of the Fortune 500 companies included management reports in
their annual reports to stockholders (COSO 1992). The majority of these
published management reports addressed management’s responsibility for
internal controls over external financial reporting, along with a number of
other assertions.
The initiatives for auditor attestation of management reports, however,
are mixed. As described earlier, the Cohen Commission and the SEC’s
1979 proposal called for auditor attestation of management reports. The
SEC’s 1988 proposal did not include a requirement for auditor attestation
but requested comments on its desirability. The FDIC Improvement Act
requires that the auditor attest to management’s report on the financial insti
tution’s internal control system. Finally, the current COSO document does
not take a position on whether management reports or auditor attestation of
those reports should be required.
In the absence of a regulatory requirement for auditor attestation of
management reports, why would a company see a need for such services?
One possible reason is that the auditor’s attestation will add value to
management’s assertions about internal control. From an investor point of
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view, the auditor’s attestation provides an opinion about the reliability of the
that generated the financial information. This can be viewed as an
extension o f the auditor’s monitoring o f the agency relationship that exists
between the managers and the absentee owners o f the company.

process

T h e P u b lic In terest A r g u m e n t. Currently, generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS) do not require an auditor to test the reliability of a com
pany’s internal control structure. Under Statement on Auditing Standards
(SAS) No. 55, Consideration o f the Internal Control Structure in a Finan
cial Statement Audit, the auditor needs only an understanding o f the internal
control structure sufficient to plan the audit. The remaining audit effort can
focus on testing the ending financial statement balances.
Hooten and Landsittel (1991) have argued that this focus on financial
results, and not the process that generated the results, does not meet the
public’s interest. They argue that the public wants more information on
“early warning signals” of potential business problems, and that controls
are critical indicators of a business’s future success. Hooten and Landsittel
(1991) further claim that investors are interested in knowing whether
companies are in control or not. It might be argued that many o f the
recent financial scandals (e.g., Miniscribe, ZZ Z Z Best, and the S&Ls)
are examples of companies that were out of control. Auditors can add value
by helping to identify increased business risks that are present in poorly
controlled companies.
C lie n t a n d U s e r Expectations. One reason why there may be a lack
o f demand for reports on internal control is the client and user assumption
that they are receiving assurances from the auditor on the entity’s internal
control structure. One o f the primary motivations for revising the standard
auditor’s report was to clarify what an audit involves. Note that the scope
paragraph makes no mention o f the extent of work performed on the client’s
internal control structure. As a result, it is possible that clients and users
assume that an audit provides assurance on the reliability of the entity’s
internal control structure. As an example o f such an interpretation, one of
the board of director respondents in Wallace’s (1982a) study commented
that “ The auditor’s certificate is all the reassurance needed.”

The Con Side
There may be some benefits derived from auditor attestation to manage
ment reports on internal control. This is not sufficient reason, however,
to endorse broad proposals without considering the usefulness o f the infor
mation to users, and the relationship between the cost and benefits of
attestation. This section presents arguments against auditor attestation
of management reports on internal control.
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T h e D e m a n d fo r A u d ito r A ttestation. It is difficult to evaluate the
demand and, thus, the usefulness of a service that is not currently being
provided on a broad scale; however, one important indicator of usefulness
is the existing demand for that service. For example, before the passage of
the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, most public companies were issuing
audited financial statements. According to M o o d y ’s Manuals, 82 percent of
the firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange were audited by CPAs in
1926 (Benston 1969).
The demand for auditor attestation to reports on internal control has not
paralleled the demand for attestation to financial statements, despite the fa c t
that a framework for attesting to internal control has existed for some time.
SAS No. 30, Reporting on Internal Accounting Control (AICPA 1980),
established a framework for auditor attestation to internal accounting con
trol (i.e., those controls with the broad objectives o f providing management
with reasonable but not absolute, assurance that assets are safeguarded
from unauthorized use or disposition and that financial records are reliable
to permit the preparation of financial statements). The first Statement on
Standards for Attestation Engagements, Attestation Standards (AICPA
1986), issued in March, expanded the SAS No. 30 framework. This state
ment provides a broad framework for expansion of attest services beyond
the expression of opinions on financial statements. Under this standard, the
auditor may express an opinion on management’s assertions about internal
control using any appropriate concept provided that—

• The auditor has adequate knowledge in the subject matter of the assertion.
• The assertion is capable of evaluation against reasonable criteria that
have either been established by a recognized body or are stated in the
presentation o f the assertion in a sufficiently clear and comprehensive
manner for a knowledgeable reader to be able to understand them.
• The assertion is capable of reasonably consistent estimation or measure
ment against the criteria.
Despite the existence o f these standards, there has been little demand for
auditor attestation to reports on internal control. Reports on internal
accounting control prepared in accordance with SAS No. 30 are rarely
encountered. One might argue that this lack of demand is related to the lack
o f a well-developed criteria for evaluating internal controls beyond those
related to financial reporting. However, it would be hard to argue that
generally accepted accounting principles were very well developed as
criteria for financial statements in the 1920s.
Generally, the demand for reports on internal control has come from
regulators, and the reports primarily cover only a segment o f the entity’s
internal control structure. Examples include reports on internal control over:
• Safeguarding customers’ cash and securities by broker/dealers and stock
clearing companies.
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• Managing federal financial assistance programs by entities that receive
federal financial assistance.
• Financial reporting by large financial institutions.
Some of these reports are based on the work performed in auditing the
entity’s financial statements with no additional testing of internal controls
required. Others are based on special studies requiring the performance of
additional procedures.
What creates this demand for auditor attestation to reports on internal
control for regulators? Regulators have an oversight function that allows
them to influence directly the entities under their jurisdiction. If regulators
believe the entity’s internal control system is deficient, they may take
steps to compel management to improve the system. Regulators may with
hold funding, apply sanctions, or even cause the entity to cease operations.
The information and assurances provided in auditors’ reports on internal
control assist the regulators in meeting their responsibilities. Such assur
ances cannot be derived from the auditors’ reports on financial statements.
Also, attestation requirements designed for regulators, by regulators, are
likely to be cost effective, because they can be tailored to the regulator’s
specific needs.
T h e C o s t a n d B en efits o f A u d ito r A ttestation. In considering a
requirement for auditor attestation to management reports on internal con
trol for the investing public, it is important to examine what will
be achieved (i.e., benefits) by the assurances provided by the reports.2
A traditional argument for requiring attestation o f management reports on
internal control is that this service will encourage businesses to improve
their internal control structure, resulting in increased reliability o f the
annual and interim financial reports of the companies. However, auditors
already directly attest to annual financial statements. I f additional assurance
is needed about the reliability of interim financial information, auditors
could be required to attest to that information. Providing assurances about
the output of a system would appear to be more cost effective than providing
assurances about the process used to generate that output.
Another argument for auditor attestation to management reports on
internal control in this setting stems from a belief that such reports would
provide an “ early warning system” for the financial health of businesses.
Underlying this argument is a presumed association between the financial

2 Consideration of the cost and benefits of additional reporting requirements is
especially important given the status of international securities markets. The high
cost of complying with the SEC filing requirements has already been identified as a
factor that has diminished the ability of the United States to compete as a capital
market (Fleming 1991).
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health of a business and its system of internal control. I f a broad concept
of internal control that includes both financial and operational controls
is considered, the presumption of an association is reasonable. However,
it is doubtful that this association is close to perfect; it is difficult to believe
that a control system, no matter how comprehensive, could completely
eliminate bad business judgments. If only financial reporting controls are
considered, it becomes more difficult to argue a strong association between
the quality of internal control and financial health of the business. Without
a strong association between the internal control structure and the financial
health of the business, attestation by auditors could create an expectations
gap that will far surpass any that the profession has experienced to this date.
Individuals (Hooten and Landsittel 1991) who advocate reporting on
internal control as an early warning system really appear to be advocating
it as a way to communicate information about business or investment risk.
Again, management reports appear to be an indirect method of communi
cating this risk. I f financial reporting is deficient in this respect it may be
better to improve the disclosures of business risks and uncertainties in
financial statements.3 Financial forecasts could even be required, and the
auditor could attest to any of this information directly.
Another issue that arises when considering a requirement for auditor
attestation to management reports on internal control is the user’s ability to
use the information provided by management reports. An important factor
that will affect the usefulness of the information is the form of the report.
If the reports are standard in form and assert that no high-level control
weakness (e.g., material weakness) exists, it is doubtful that there will
be much information content in the reports. For example, consider the
communications that were required under SAS No. 20, Required Communi
cation o f Material Weaknesses in Internal Accounting Control (AICPA
1977). That SAS required auditors to communicate to boards of directors or
audit committees deficiencies in internal control that were considered to be
material weaknesses. Because the information content o f such reports was
considered to be inadequate, the ASB issued SAS No. 60, Communication
o f Internal Control Structure Related Matters N oted in an Audit (AICPA
1988), which requires communication of reportable conditions, a lowerthreshold weakness in internal control. The fact that a material weakness in
internal accounting control constitutes a violation of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act further complicates the use of that threshold of reporting.
Finally, if the reports cover both financial and operating controls, there is

3 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) recently formed a
special committee on financial reporting to suggest ways to improve the nature and
extent of information provided to users of financial statements. A part of this
committee’s charge is to evaluate the range of information and assurances that could
be made available (AICPA 1991).
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the problem o f defining the concept of a material weakness for controls that
do not relate directly to financial reporting.
I f management reports on internal control are of a “ free form,” similar
to Management’s Discussion and Analysis required in filings with the
SEC, the reports may have additional information content. But how will an
investor use this information? Presumably, management will have some
rationale for deciding to accept certain weaknesses in internal control. For
example, management may decide to invest available funds in research and
development as opposed to internal control. Management should be in the
best position to assess the risks and uncertainties o f the business and make
cost-benefit judgments about the nature and extent o f appropriate internal
controls for the business. Investors do not have the options available to regu
lators; they cannot directly influence management. Investors can only make
buy or sell decisions based on the information about investment risk and
return that is available to them. It is hard to believe that investors can effec
tively factor information about weaknesses in internal control into their
investment risk assessments. Therefore, management reports on internal
control in any form would be of questionable value to typical financial
statement users.

Concluding Comments
In this paper, we reviewed the history of management reports on internal
control and auditor attestation to those reports. We cited arguments both for
and against auditor attestation of management reports. Regardless of the
reader’s point of view on this issue, we feel that some systematic research
effort should be undertaken to examine the issues raised in this paper. Based
on the recent FDIC legislation, it seems likely that further legislative or
regulatory actions are possible. The profession can best react to these
demands if all the issues are properly understood based on objective
consideration and relevant research findings.
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Illegal Acts—
The Current Position
of the United Kingdom
David J. Hatherly, Professor, University of Edinburgh
Robert Charlesworth, Secretary, Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales

A n exposure draft on “ The auditor’s responsibility in relation to illegal
acts” was issued in the United Kingdom in October 1990. Responses from
the profession indicated concern that the draft might extend the auditor’s
responsibility too far. The new Auditing Practices Board (formed in April
1991) is now considering how to proceed with this topic. Issues include the
auditor’s responsibility fo r considering —

• The entity’s compliance with certain laws and regulations.
• The impact o f potential illegal acts on the true and fair view.
A n important feature is the auditor’s common law right in the U.K.
(which is also, in certain circumstances, a statutory right) to report directly
to third parties where matters o f public interest are involved.

Introduction
In 1991 the Auditing Practice Committee (APC) of the United Kingdom
was replaced by an Auditing Practices Board (APB). The significance
of the change is that nonpractitioners became a major influence—
previously, 100 percent of the APC’s voting members were auditing
practitioners; this percentage has now been reduced to 50 percent. In
October 1990 the “ old” APC had issued an exposure draft, The Auditor’s
Responsibility in Relation to Illegal Acts. Concern has been expressed
at this roundtable that the U.K. exposure draft might take the auditor’s
responsibility too far. Similar concern was expressed in the comments
on the exposure draft received from professional firms. However, it remains
to be seen how the “ new” APB responds to these practitioner concerns
now that it is responsible for developing the auditing standard on
illegal acts.
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Audits generally contain a compliance element assuring that the auditee
follows certain laws and regulations, and a qualitative element, which in a
U.K. company audit setting requires the auditor’s judgment on the true
and fair view given by the financial statements. The U.K. exposure draft
on illegal acts followed this distinction by addressing separately illegal
acts that the auditor is concerned with on grounds of compliance alone
and those where the auditor is concerned by the effect on the true and fair
view. However, it should be remembered that the two categories are not
mutually exclusive and some illegal acts may require consideration under
both headings.

Compliance
Dealing with the compliance issue, the U.K. exposure draft set out the
following detection standard. The auditor must properly plan, perform,
and evaluate the audit so that he or she has a reasonable expectation of iden
tifying noncompliance with—
1.
2.
3.

Laws and regulations relating to the preparation of the financial
statements.
Laws and regulations (e.g., the requirement to keep proper accounting
records) where the auditor has a legal responsibility to report breaches.
Laws and regulations (e.g., relating to dividends and directors’ loans)
that govern the management o f the financial operations of the business.

Other laws, such as those concerned with the environment and with
health and safety at work, are not considered sufficiently proximate to the
financial records and financial control systems to require the auditor to plan
for detection of breaches as part of a compliance audit.
A highly controversial aspect of the exposure draft, particularly in respect
to category 3, was a requirement on auditors not only to report details of the
breach (unless adequately disclosed in the financial statements), but also to
report the fact that the transaction concerned was, or might be, illegal.
Thus, for example, the auditor might highlight the illegality of a loan to a
director. Most of the professional firms, in their comments on the exposure
draft, argued that judging the legality of such a transaction was a matter for
the courts and not the auditors to decide. It is probable that the APB will
accept the arguments of the professional firms on this matter.

The True and Fair View
In the exposure draft, it was stated that the auditor’s responsibility with
respect to illegal acts that could have consequences material to the true and
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fair view was to be aware o f laws and regulations having a fundamental
effect on the entity’s operations and to design the audit to give a reasonable
basis for concluding that there are no material misstatements in the financial
statements as a result of breaches. The exposure draft explained that
the auditor assesses the risk of any material misstatements arising from
an illegal act and designs the audit work accordingly. Thus, the audit
is designed to provide positive rather than negative assurance based on
set procedures.
Illegal acts that could have consequences to the true and fair view include
breaches that have a material affect on financial statement numbers or that
establish a material contingency. For example, failure to observe planning
consents could affect the valuation of a property development, whereas
failure to observe environmental laws could establish a contingent liability.
Comments on the exposure draft expressed concern that such breaches,
although creating contingencies material to the true and fair view, might be
isolated events not capable of detection without extensive audit work.
Serious doubts were expressed as to whether such audit work was justified
in cost-benefit terms.
The exposure draft also required the auditor to consider illegal acts that
are “ significant to an understanding of how the entity is managed.” The
concern here was to detect and disclose situations where breaching the law
is part of the strategic thinking o f management so as to gain a commercial
advantage over law-abiding competitors, or is deemed necessary to keep up
with non-law-abiding competitors or foreign competitors not subject to the
same restrictions. Once again this requirement was objected to by profes
sional firm commentators. Nevertheless, if the true and fair view is about
understanding the financial performance and position of the business, a key
question is whether financial performance can be understood properly
without an appreciation that a material amount of the profit derives from or
is conditional on, activity that breaches the law. The exposure draft was
uncompromising on this issue. Where the true and fair view is affected, the
auditor should not refrain from qualifying the report because o f potential
adverse consequences to the client’s business as a result of disclosure.

Public Interest Reporting
Public interest reporting has existed in the United Kingdom for a long
time, but it is understood that there is no parallel in the United States and
it, therefore, may be o f interest to the roundtable. Confidentiality is an
implied term of the auditor’s contract but it is not an absolute requirement
if there are serious matters of public interest. The exposure draft clarified
the matters to be considered by the auditor when deciding whether or not
to disclose an illegal act in the public interest. Primarily the auditor needs to
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weigh the public interest in confidentiality against the public interest in
disclosure to a proper authority. The detailed considerations set out in the
exposure draft include:
• The relative size of the amounts involved and the extent of the likely
financial damage.
• The extent to which the illegal act is likely to affect members of the
public.
• The extent to which the nondisclosure of the illegal act is likely to enable
it to be repeated with impunity.
• The gravity of the matter.
• Whether there is a general management ethos within the entity of
disregarding the law and regulations.
• The weight o f evidence and the degree of the auditor’s suspicion that an
illegal act has been committed.
It should be noted that reporting in the public interest is ad hoc and
at the auditor’s initiative. The auditor receives the protection o f qualified
privilege (he or she cannot be sued) provided the report is in good faith and
to a proper authority. There is no requirement for the auditor to report
in the public interest. It is an option that the auditor may use. O f course,
if the auditor does not use the facility he or she may have to justify this
decision at a future time, if the problem surfaces in the public domain.
The principle of public interest reporting is recognized within U.K.
common law and appears to be accepted by practitioners in the United
Kingdom, but there is little evidence as to how often, and for what purpose
the facility is being used. As far as the other issues discussed in this paper
are concerned, the APB has yet to decide how to respond to the objections
of practitioners to the exposure draft.
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Special Reports on Regulated
Financial Institutions
Frank J. Kelly, Chairman, Auditing Standards Board,
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants

Donald E. Jeffreys, Assistant Director, Auditing Standards Board,
The Canadian Institute o f Chartered Accountants

Appropriate auditor responsibility fo r evaluating and reporting on uncer
tainties, including the going concern status o f a client, has long been
debated. M o st recently, Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs) N o. 58
and No. 59 were issued and deal with this area. In this paper we discuss the
historical development o f auditor responsibility fo r reporting on uncertain
ties, summarize relevant research, discuss implementation issues, and
suggest future research.
In summary, our historical review reveals the increasing extent o f form al
ization o f standards on uncertainties in the United States, especially those
relating to a client’s going concern status. Consistent with the auditing
profession’s attention to the topic, several studies seem to indicate that
investors depend on audit reports to highlight significant uncertainties. Yet
especially in the area o f going-concern uncertainties, many companies
continue to receive a report not modifed fo r going-concern status the year
prior to filing fo r bankruptcy. In addition, terminology used in the standards
(for example,

going concern and substantial doubt) may currently be inter

preted in various ways by CPAs. Also, a number o f difficulties involved in
implementing the new standards are presented.

Introduction
Since late 1989, the Auditing Standards Board (AuSB) o f The Canadian
Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) has had a Task Force on Auditor
Communication with Regulators. The Board has just released its first
specific guidance in this area—a guideline entitled “ Special Reports on
Regulated Financial Institutions.” 1
1 Auditing and Related Services Guideline: “ Special Reports on Regulated Financial
Institutions,” CICA Handbook. Toronto, Canada: Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants, May 1992.
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The objective for this presentation is an overview of the guideline and the
events leading up to it, which is organized as follows:
• Some history and background to put the guideline into context
• The major features of a “derivative reporting engagement”
• Some contentious issues
• Plans for further work

History and Background
Regulatory framework

The regulatory framework in Canada includes—
• Corporations legislation (provincial and federal).
• Securities legislation (provincial only).
• Financial institutions legislation (provincial and federal).
Focus in AuSB work

Our focus has been the federal legislation and regulation that governs
financial institutions. The institutions subject to federal requirements
include—
• Banks, all of which are federally chartered and regulated.
• Insurance companies.
• Loan and trust companies, which are similar to S&Ls in some respects.
Legislation and regulations that include various provisions—
• Requiring an auditor to report certain matters to the regulator as a result
of the audit of financial statments.
• Providing for the auditor to carry out specified procedures and report to
the regulator.
Events

For many years, there has been a provision in the Bank Act for an auditor
to report matters affecting the well-being of a bank. But the failure of
some financial institutions (especially two Western Canadian banks) in
the mid-1980s focused attention on legislation and regulators and, in turn,
focused the attention of regulators on what the auditor could or should do
to help the regulator.
The CICA Commission to Study the Public’s Expectation of Auditors, June
1988, identified a perception on the part of the public and regulators that—
• Auditors know a lot about an entity (financial health, operations, quality
of management) that is not reflected in the statements.
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• Auditors should tell them what they know (based on a GAAS audit—no
expectation of extending the auditor’s work beyond this).
These expectations are now being reflected in legislation and regulations
as they are revised and brought up-to-date. Auditors had (and have) real
concerns about this type o f reporting.
The guideline is only a first step and—
• Highlights the special reporting responsibilities for auditors and makes
auditors aware of the implications of these responsibilities.
• Provides general purpose guidance (not a case-by-case approach) and
encourages consistency in the approach taken by auditors.
• Provides a focus for continuing discussion between the CICA, auditors,
and regulators.

CICA Guideline, May 1992—Special Reports
on Regulated Financial Institutions
The guideline deals with two types of reporting: derivative and non
derivative.
Derivative reporting is described in the guideline as circumstances
in which—
• There is a requirement in legislation for the auditor to communicate in
writing transactions or conditions relevant to the matters specified in
legislation that come to the auditor’s attention.
• The auditor does not have a responsibility to carry out procedures to
search out relevant transactions or conditions. It is a “ by-product” of the
financial statement audit.
• The auditor is not required to provide any form of assurance on the
matters specified in legislation.
Matters on which derivative reports are required include—
— Any situations or transactions leading the auditor to believe that the
financial institution has not adhered to sound financial practices
— A situation where the auditor has reasonable grounds to believe that
the circumstances of the financial institution have changed, are
changing, or are likely to change in a way that does, or might, materi
ally and adversely affect the viability of the financial institution
— Any transactions or conditions affecting the well-being of the finan
cial institution that, in the auditor’s opinion, are not satisfactory and
require rectification
In contrast, a nonderivative reporting responsibility is described in the
guideline as—
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• A reporting engagement separate from the audit of the financial statements.
• The requirement that the auditor carry out procedures relating to matters
specified in legislation or by a regulator pursuant to a statutory provision
enabling the regulator to require such a report.
• Procedures in addition to those carried out to form an opinion on
the statements.
Nonderivative reporting responsibilities can include the following
characteristics:
• The auditor may be required to provide an opinion on specific matters,
without an assertion from management.
• The auditor may be required to report directly to the regulator.
• The matters are often subjective and, thus, open to different interpreta
tions, and the auditor may not have generally accepted criteria against
which to evaluate the matters.
The remainder o f the presentation deals with “derivative reporting.”

Derivative Reporting Engagement
Some Characteristics
1.

The auditor would not perform auditing procedures in addition to those
carried out in the normal course of the financial statement audit. For
example, the auditor would normally not be required to make separate
inquiries o f management or obtain additional representations specifi
cally relating to the matters on which derivative reports are required.

2.

However, the auditor will need to take additional time in carrying out
a financial statement audit to—
• Understand the derivative reporting responsibility.
• Assess the likelihood that transactions or conditions relevant to the
matters will be encountered during the financial statement audit.
• Assess whether transactions or conditions encountered should be
included in a derivative report.
• Discuss findings with appropriate levels o f management.
• Prepare the derivative report.

3.

The auditor’s objective is to—
• Understand and clarify the derivative reporting responsibility.
• Make all the relevant parties aware o f it.
• Issue a report if any reportable transactions or conditions are
encountered.
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4.

General and subjective terms are often used in legislation. This may
lead to varying interpretations o f the matters specified in legislation
and thus, to inconsistencies in the types of transactions or conditions
identified and reported by auditors.

5.

Until guidance is developed on reportable transactions or conditions
for derivative reports, each auditor will need to—
• Obtain an understanding o f the types o f transactions or conditions
that may be of interest to the regulator.
• Assist the regulator in understanding what can be reasonably
expected from a derivative report.

6.

To obtain this understanding, the auditor should determine whether
the regulator has interpreted, or is willing to interpret, the matters
specified in legislation. The auditor should consider discussing the
matters specified in legislation with the regulator to determine if
agreement on their interpretation can be obtained. I f this is not
practicable, the auditor should interpret the matters by referring
to the CICA Handbook, other available guidance, knowledge of
industry practice, and experience gained with the particular finan
cial institution.

7.

Clearly, there are limitations in the usefulness of derivative reports:
• The auditor cannot conclude that all relevant transactions or condi
tions were encountered during the financial statement audit.
• When there is no comprehensive and precise interpretation of the
matters on which derivative reports are required, there will likely be
inconsistencies with respect to the types of transactions or condi
tions identified and reported by different auditors.
• In certain instances the nature of the matters on which derivative
reports are required may lead the auditor to conclude it is unlikely
that relevant transactions or conditions will be encountered because
a financial statement audit is not designed to address such matters.

The Report by the Auditor
The report by the auditor is titled, “ Derivative Report by the Auditor,”
and is addressed to the party specified in the legislation. It would require
the auditor to do the following:
• State that an audit of the financial statements was carried out.
• State the purpose of the report.
• Identify any interpretation of the matters specified in legislation.
• Describe the transactions or conditions encountered, or state that no rele
vant transactions or conditions were encountered.
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• State that no additional procedures have been carried out in addition to
those necessary to form an opinion on the financial statements.
• When applicable, say it is unlikely that transactions or conditions
relevant to the matters would be encountered because a financial state
ment audit is not designed to address such matters.
• When transactions or conditions are reported, state that—
— They have been discussed with management.
— No attempt has been made to determine whether other transactions
or conditions of this nature have occurred.
Timing for reporting could vary according to the legislation. For example,
it may be required without undue delay after identification of a relevant item
or may be required after completion of the audit.
For an example o f a derivative report, see the Appendix.

Contentious Issues
The following are contentious issues:
• The fact that no additional auditing procedures are necessary
• How to express the limitations in the usefulness of the report without—
— Casting doubt on the value of a financial statement audit
— Making the report so negative that it appears to be useless
• Auditor difficulty in identifying matters and transactions that should
be reported
• An auditor’s dilemma—if the auditor reports significant matters to the
regulator, what are his or her responsibilities to the shareholders?
— Financial regulator: tell me what you know and I’ll “ manage” the
situation
— Securities regulators: the shareholders (and the market) have a right
to full, true and plain disclosure

Action Now
The CICA Auditing Standards Board identifies appropriate criteria
for matters to be reported in a derivative reporting engagement (released
in November 1992). The key here is the concept of “ matters affecting
the well-being of the financial institution.” The Board addresses one partic
ular nonderivative reporting requirement in a piece of provincial legislation
(released late in 1992). The Task Force on Auditor Communication
with Regulators will maintain contact and continue discussions with
the regulators.
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Appendix
Examples of situations in which derivative reports are issued:
1. Legislation specifies the report is to be addressed to the chief executive officer
of the financial institution and a copy is to be sent to the regulator.
2. The auditor has interpreted the matters.
3. The auditor has concluded it is likely that transactions or conditions relevant to
the matter would be encountered during the financial statement audit.
4. There are no transactions or conditions to be reported.
DERIVATIVE REPORT BY THE AUDITOR
To the Chief Executive Officer of X Financial Institution:
I have audited the financial statements of X Financial Institution as at December 31,
19X1 and for the year ended, and reported thereon under date of February 19, 19X2.
Pursuant to the requirements of Section XXX of the Y Act (the Act), I am required
to report to you any transactions or conditions encountered during the aforemen
tioned audit that (describe matters specified in legislation). For the purposes of
understanding the types of transactions or conditions that (describe matters speci
fied in legislation), I have used the following interpretations developed from the
following sources:
[Describe the interpretations used and the sources of such interpretations.]

During the course of the aforementioned audit, based on the interpretations referred
to above, I encountered no relevant transactions or conditions.
No procedures have been carried out in addition to those necessary to form an
opinion on the financial statements.
This report has been prepared in accordance with the applicable Auditing and
Related Services Guideline issued by The Canadian Institute of Chartered Account
ants, and is to be used soley to satisfy the requirements of Section XXX of the Act
and should not be referred to or used for any other purpose.
City
Date
cc: Superintendent of Financial Institutions
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(signed)__________________
Chartered Accountant
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